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Abstract
Ancient philosophers are preoccupied with the idea of craft (technê)

art, expertise, skill,

and not infrequently translated as knowledge or science. The idea is often seen by ancient
thinkers as the pinnacle of rational agency and offers them a vital paradigm for thinking
about the world and our place within it. One longstanding tradition is the view that virtue
shares important features with the sort of expertise involved in practicing a craft. In this
thesis, I investigate the relationship between craft and virtue in Plato, focusing especially
on the early dialogues. The
thinking about craft is central to his views on virtue, including how he develops particular
virtues like wisdom and justice as the basis for political rule. In the first half of this thesis
(C
diverse and wide set of examples that come to embody the idea for him) serves as a fruitful
model of knowledge for developing the nature and structure of virtue, as well as illuminates
key psychological features of the virtuous person. In the second half of this thesis (Chapters
3 and 4), I focus on another important way in which Plato relies on the idea of craft to think
about virtue. This is in the context of his account of political rule. Here, I focus not on the
idea of craft as a model of knowledge, but on how the sort of knowledge fit for political rule
(e.g. wisdom, justice) relates to ordinary crafts, the latter represent the existing branches of
expertise in various areas of human pursuit. I make the case that Plato understands the
nature of political rule as an architectonic form of knowledge

a master knowledge fit to

preside over ordinary crafts for the sake of promoting human welfare.

Keywords
Plato, technê, craft, virtue, skill, expertise, craft-analogy, politikê, architectonic, early
dialogues, Socrates, justice, political rule, wisdom.

ii

Summary for Lay Audience
Ancient Greek philosophers are preoccupied with the idea of technê, the Greek root from
which we derive words like technical, technology, and technocrat. Though the concept of
technê
closest to capturing its meaning. It is the application of reason and intelligence to some
specific area. One longstanding tradition in ancient Greek philosophy is the view that
virtue
for living well

shares important features with the sort of expertise involved in practicing a

craft. This idea is most prominent in the works of Plato (427 347 B.C.). My thesis
central to his views on the nature of virtue and political
rule. He relies on the idea of craft as a model of knowledge for developing the nature and
structure of virtue, as well as the psychological features of the virtuous person. He also holds
the view that political rule should be understood as a governing knowledge fit to manage
all other expertise or crafts in order to promote human welfare.
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Introduction
1.

sufficient
or should he procure a power and a technê for this,
too, so that unless he learns and practices it, he will commit injustice? (Socrates,
Gorgias, 509d7 e2).

2. But virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the crafts
(technai) as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing,
e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we
become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by
doing brave actions. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II.1 1103a31 b2).
3. And in general, technê perfects some of the things which nature cannot complete,
and imitates others. Therefore, if artistic things are purposive, clearly so are natural
things (Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a15 18).
4. They [the Stoics] also say that the wise man does everything well that is to say,
everything that he does: for as we say that the flute-player or the lyre-player does
lyreprudent man does everything well, so far as concerns what he does, and not of
course also what he does not do. In their opinion the doctrine that the wise man
does everything well is a consequence of his accomplishing everything in accordance
with right reason and in accordance with virtue, which is technê concerned with the
whole of life (Stobaues, 2.66, 14-67, 4 = SVF 3.560).

Ancient philosophers are preoccupied with the idea of technê (pl. technai)
expertise, skill, profession

craft, art,

and not infrequently translated as knowledge or science. The

idea of technê is often seen by ancient thinkers as the pinnacle of rational agency and offers
them a vital paradigm for thinking about the world and our place within it. The crucial role
that technê
importance and ubiquity in Greek intellectual culture, from tragic poets like Homer and
Aeschylus to the Hippocratic medical writings, and ultimately, culminating in the Sophistic
-

2
has often been called.1 Tracking this history of the development of technê, Leonid Zhumid
writes:
In the second half of the fifth century, most activities involving skills based
on knowledge and experience were subsumed under the notion of technê.
Initially a term used in handicraft, this notion was thoroughly
technê, opposed
both to natural philosophy and to mathemata, took a more and more
intellectual turn, until it finally served as an interpretative model of science
itself. To a considerable degree, this change can be accounted for by the fact
that the circle of disciplines taught by the Sophists included subjects related
to intellectual activities that, though practically oriented, had little to do
with traditional handicrafts. The very novelty of their pedagogical practice
made it necessary for the Sophists to explain and justify it by arguing that
the subjects they taught qualified as technê, since they involved both skill
knowledge that gradually comes into the foreground. Particular attention is
paid to its origin, acquisition, and application. In the course of the fifth and
the greater part of the fourth centuries, the notion epistêmê which
is
used as a synonym for technê. The newborn scientific disciplines, such as
2

Given this close association of technê with epistêmê
intellectual activities, scholars have given a broader definition to technê that extends
beyond modern views on craft, skill, art, and even knowledge. E.R. Dodds, for example,
notes that technê
3

Echoing this sentiment, W.K.C. Guthrie writes
4

1

This is most notably associated with Guthrie
A History of Greek Philosophy vol. III:
The Fifth-Century Enlightenment. For a survey of the pre-Platonic meaning of technê, see Roochnik
(1996), 17 88. For an account of the general understanding of technê in the intellectual culture, see
Nussbaum (1986), 94 99. For a historical study of technê as science, see Zhumid (2006), chapter 2.
See Johansen (2021) for a recent edited volume of essays on the concept of technê in ancient
philosophy.
2
Zhumid (2006), 45 47.
3
Dodds (1973), 11.
4
Guthrie (1969), 115 n3.

3
At the centre of this development is the longstanding attraction to technê found in ancient
conceptions of human virtue (aretê)

excellence of character. This idea is perhaps best

technê of the human and social kind (Apology, 20a6

technê,

originally referred to the art of a cook or a stonemason, in discussing intellectual and moral
problems. This seems to indicate that he relied not only on the common use of the word,
but also on the theory of technê

5

Thus by

hotly contested discussion on the nature of technê in the larger intellectual landscape of the
era.
This thesis is an investigation of the relationship between technê and virtue in Plato, paying
close attention to their treatment in the early dialogues (I shall comment on the scope of
this project in a moment). The idea that technê
often characteristically embodied in examples like medicine, carpentry, arithmetic, and
navigation

especially in the context of virtue is manifest in even a cursory reading of Plato.
especially the early dialogues), we find Socrates pursuing virtue

as either a technê analogous to medicine or carpentry or as sharing important features with
the sort of expertise involved in practicing them. This idea has often been referred to as the
craft-analogy. Some dialogues, such as the Gorgias, Protagoras, and later the Politicus, take
up the nature of technê directly as its central theme.
Despite the dominant presence of technê and its close association with virtue in Plato,
interpreters are generally cautious to conclude that virtue is a technê for Plato, at least not
without qualification. Interpreters are also skeptical of the central role of technê
moral and political philosophy, often questioning his commitment to the idea in his
dialogues. One narrative that emerges is that Plato (perhaps taking the historical Socrates
as a starting point) pursues virtue under the technê model of knowledge in the early
dialogues. However, there are hints in these works that Plato is aware of the limitations of

5

Zhumid (2006), 46. Emphasis is in the original.

4
technê and has become dissatisfied with it as a model of knowledge. From here, they either
technê
in light of these limitations or that he significantly moves away from it as a model of
knowledge and even abandons it altogether.6
According to this general narrative, one glaring problem raised by technê is its inability to
yield satisfying results about virtue. That is to say, thinking about virtue along the lines of a
technê analogous to medicine and housebuilding does not actually illuminate much about
virtue and how it ought to contribute to our well-being. Here, a few main features about the
nature of technê are often mentioned as being unsuitable for conceiving of virtue. Most
prominently, technê is the capacity for doing opposites. For instance, the medical technê
makes the doctor an expert for both healing and killing. This is seen as an unwelcome
feature for thinking about virtue since the latter does not appear to be the sort of expertise
involved in doing good and bad things. Furthermore, technê is generally viewed as valuable
only for its end, some specific product or result, whereas virtue is generally seen as valuable
for its own sake. Similarly, the idea that technê is so wedded to its product or result makes
inquiry into virtue ineffective since it is difficult to parse out what precisely is the product
of virtue. Furthermore, technê is always concerned with some specialized area whereas
virtue is concerned with the whole of life. Lastly, though this feature is never explicitly
mentioned in the literature, there is general resistance to associating virtue
knowledge that develops our character and allows us to live well

the kind of

with mundane and

professional skills. The underlying feeling is that virtue is concerned with how to live well
and how to be a good person, and this is weighty business. Thus it has little to do with the
sort of banal skills we encounter in ordinary life. On this reading, Plato is attentive to at

6

As we will see in Chapter 2, the claim that Plato significantly moves away from technê (or
abandons it) as a model of knowledge is overwhelmingly found in the literature on Republic I.
Scholars see Book I as the decisive moment that Plato rejects the craft-virtue analogy. I list the
complete references there. For some standard studies that propose this view, see Irwin (1977), 177
and Woodruff (1992), 102. For the view that Plato does not turn away from technê but important
developments take place in light of him recognizing its limitations, see Parry (1996) and Sprague
(1976). See Brickhouse & Smith (1994) for an interpretation of most of the dialogues I survey that is
attentive to the importance of technê, although their focus and aims are significantly different than
mine. For positive accounts of the relationship between virtue and technê in Plato, see Annas (1995)
and Barney (2021). Lastly, see Roochnik (1996) for the view that virtue is not a technê for Plato.
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least some these issues and he highlighted them in various places in order to express the
flaws of technê for thinking about virtue.
Though this narrative does not capture all the complexities and nuances of the literature,
the general sentiment is sufficiently dominant that I take it as the starting point of my
project. To begin with, this narrative raises some thorny interpretative issues about the
his
matter, the thesis does not advance any particular view nor does it assume some particular
order of composition in order to make its central arguments. On the whole, I believe that
technê is relatively consistent, though different elements of it will
come to the foreground depending on the problems he is confronting and the particular
philosophical commitments and goals of the dialogue. The scope of this thesis encompasses
the relevant texts in a large group of dialogues characterized by their broad thematic
affinities as noted by John Cooper in his introduction to Plato: Complete Works.7 These
dialogues are Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras,
Gorgias, Hippias Minor, and Ion. These works are conventionally referred to as Socratic
dialogues or early dialogues, I have adopted the latter in this thesis. However, by choosing
to focus on these dialogues, I do not intend to suggest that they represent the philosophy
of the historical or the character Socrates nor do I intend to take any position with respect
dialogues is on the basis that technê is discussed in a certain way in relation to virtue in
these works. Notably, the craft-analogy is featured most prominently in these works, where
we see Socrates pursuing moral knowledge by relying on ordinary examples from technê.
Moreover, the majority of these dialogues (the only exception being the Gorgias) also end
in aporia, without having arrived at a satisfactory account of the topic in question. For this
reason, I have also included Republic I a crucial text for understanding the relationship
between technê and virtue and Pl
-analogy, and not on its time
of composition relative to the rest of the Republic.8

7

Cooper (1997), xv.
Throughout this thesis, I make references to dialogues outside of this list in order to provide
corroborating evidence for my claims.
8

6

Before I discuss the overall aim and arguments of this project, I wish to make a few
technê
technê
untranslated when it is appropriate. The idea of expertise probably comes closest to
technê
as well. However,
not to be confused with our modern ideas of craft. As I will make it clear in this thesis,
identifies craft with production. In fact, Plato preserves much of the original meaning of
technê
application of reason or intelligence to some particular area. For this reason, we find a highly
expansive and diverse account of craft in Plato, sometimes ranging as disparate as
swimming and geometry.9 Furthermore, just as epistêmê and technê are used as synonyms
for each other in the intellectual culture of the fifth and fourth centuries, Plato is also
notoriously flexible with knowledgeepistêmê

sophia

technê

Lyons has provided an influential analysis of these terms in

his work, Structural Semantics: An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato.10 Lyons, along
with most scholars, agree that Plato tended to use these knowledge-denoting words
interchangeably. This largely seems to be the case in the dialogues I survey, though some
caution is needed depending on the particular context. I will make a note of the particular
relationship, especially between

technê

Finally, throughout this thesis, I frequently use the term ordinary crafts to refer to
established, conventional, or paradigmatic examples of craft in the Platonic corpus. They
include all craft examples that appear in Plato with the exception of virtue, political rule,
and controversial cases like poetry and oratory.

9

See Balansard (2001) for a complete index of activities, skills, and bodies of knowledge referred to
as craft in Plato.
10
Lyons (1963), 139 228.

7
The overarching aim of this thesis is to demonstrate t
central to his views on virtue, including how he develops particular virtues like wisdom and
justice as the basis for political rule. In the first half of this thesis (Chapters 1 and 2), I present
the ways in which Plato
that come to embody the idea for him) serves as a fruitful model of knowledge for
developing the nature and structure of virtue, as well as illuminates key psychological
features of the virtuous person. In Chapter 1, I survey a number of representative passages
across the early dialogues in order to showcase the flexibility with which Plato relied on
examples from ordinary crafts to serve different philosophical goals in the context virtue.
Here, I highlight three main goals. First, appeals to craft, particularly by Socrates, are used
to persuade the interlocutor and to advocate for claims in favour of moral expertise. Second,
craft examples provide the conceptual basis for Plato to posit a unified model of knowledge.
Lastly, the structure of ordinary crafts plays a heuristic role: it is an aid for inquiring into
the structure of virtue and for uncovering the guises of putative crafts like oratory.
Chapter 2 focuses on an interpretation of Republic I in order to examine the important ways
in which Plato envisions the just person, especially the just ruler, as an ideal craftsman. As
we will see, Republic I is a key battleground for the overarching aim of this thesis. Many
scholars see the text as providing the strongest evidence for supporting the view that Plato
arguments from craft in Republic I have not been well-understood. I develop what I call the
origins view in order to put forth what I view as the correct understanding of craft. This view
shows us that Plato intends us to understand the crafts as benefit-oriented and as something
discovered for meeting the various needs of human life. On this view, crafts are
intellectually
origins view of craft also answers the common objections raised against the craft-analogy
that I outlined earlier in the dominant narrative. Together, these two chapters show us that
believed to be.
In the second half of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), I focus on another important way in
which Plato relies on the idea of craft to think about virtue. This is in the context of his

8
account of political rule. Here, I focus not on the idea of craft as a model of knowledge, but
on how the sort of knowledge fit for political rule (e.g. wisdom, justice) relates to ordinary
crafts, the latter represent the existing branches of expertise in various areas of human
pursuits for Plato. Both chapters make the case that Plato understands the nature of political
rule as an architectonic form of knowledge

a master knowledge fit to preside over ordinary

crafts for the sake of promoting human welfare. In Chapter 3, I argue (drawing from the
Laches)
with the question of how virtue can remain authoritative in the face of expertise. This
question concerning the scope of virtue and ordinary expertise motivates Plato to see that
any knowledge fit for promoting human welfare must be fit to reign over ordinary expertise
in the appropriate way. I explore what this architectonic conception of political rule looks
like in the Charmides and Euthydemus. In Chapter 4, I argue that we also find an
architectonic form of knowledge as the basis for political rule in the Gorgias. In particular,
ique of oratory is motivated by the threat the practice poses
and orienting them towards the good (as an architectonic conception of rule would do),
oratory undermines the authority of ordinary experts and rules them in order to advance
committed to the rule of knowledge.

9

Chapter 1
1. Revisiting the Craft-Analogy: the Nature and Structure of
Virtue
This is the first of two chapters devoted to the idea of craft as a model of knowledge for
virtue. In this chapter, my focus is on the various roles that craft examples play in
elucidating the nature and structure of virtue. In the next chapter, I consider the ways craft
a clearer and deeper understanding of the relationship between craft and virtue, we must
grasp the role analogies to crafts play in discussions of virtue and virtue-related topics. What
purpose(s) do appeals to ordinary crafts like housebuilding and carpentry serve? What is
gained when Socrates and other characters bring in a host of craft-related examples? How
does Plato use examples drawn from ordinary crafts in these discussions?
In what follows, I survey a number of representative passages across the early dialogues in
order to draw attention to some common themes that emerge from the texts. The central
claim of this chapter is that the craft analogy serves three broad functions in relation to
virtue: (1) to persuade the interlocutor and recommend claims in favour of moral expertise;
(2) as the conceptual basis for positing a unified model of knowledge; (3) to aid the inquiry
into virtue-related topics based on the structure of established crafts. 11 The main
contribution of this chapter is to highlight the diversity in which analogies to crafts are used
in discussions of virtue. It is my hope that the following discussion can provide the resources
in helping us read analogies to crafts, especially as they appear in the early dialogues. These
passages, I believe, highlight the extensive degree to which Plato relied on crafts as a model
of knowledge for developing his views on virtue.
Before proceeding, I wish to make a clarificatory note on the language of analogy. The Greek
analogia
wider application until Aristotle.12 Thus what we mean by analogy is not the same as what
11

I do not mean to suggest that these three functions are exhaustive, but they do pick out the most
important roles analogies to crafts play in the early dialogues.
12
Robinson (1941), 241 242.

10
analogia
ordinary language and philosophical inquiry. While they may be useful in the ordinary
context, their use in philosophical arguments have long been controversial. For the
purposes of this chapter, I adopt a pragmatic and broad understanding of analogy

one that

a is to b as c is to d
analogies used for purposes of explanation and illustration.13 I am not so much interested in
whether Plato was justified in using analogies to crafts, but what these references and
comparisons are doing in discussions of virtue. Given that appeals to ordinary crafts are
ubiquitous, we can gain a great deal by paying attention to the ways in which they are
featured. Finally, by craft analogy, I mean any examples drawn from crafts in discussions of
virtue and any references to the similarities between aspects of craft and virtue.

1.1. Moral Expertise
One prevailing class of analogies to crafts follows a pattern of reasoning characteristically
rely on the idea of craft as expertise

specialized knowledge in a particular field

in order

to advocate for the necessity of moral expertise. The unifying idea motivating these passages
is this: in most of our undertakings, we seek expertise in some capacity, whether to teach
and council us or to do the work of which we lack understanding. If we organize all other
aspects of our lives according to expertise, why should we, in the most important pursuit of
becoming virtuous and happy, be any different?14 Examples that employ this kind of
analogical reasoning have the following features: (i) they are of a persuasive and pedagogical
character; (ii) they typically move from obvious relationships in the realm of ordinary crafts
to highly generalized conclusions in moral matters; (iii) they draw their conclusions without

13

Polarity and
Analogy (1966). For a general introduction to the role of analogies in science and logic, I am
Models and Analogies in Science (1963), especially her discussion of
classical examples.
14
Of course, there will be important differences to consider, some of which I discuss immediately in
section 1.2. But for understanding analogies of the type I highlight here, it is important to note that
Socrates relies on the common sense intuition that we seem to demand the rigour of expertise in
every aspect of our lives, but when it comes to matters of virtue and happiness, we are inattentive
and easily influenced.

11
opposition from the interlocutors, and (iv) they do not advance the central inquiry in any
real way, but serve to advocate the importance of adhering to moral expertise.
An example of this sort can be seen from the Apology (20a7 b5). In a discussion on the value
of sophists, Socrates asks Callias:
If your sons were colts or calves, we could find and engage a supervisor for
them who would make them excel in their proper excellence (prosêkousa
aretê), some horse breeder or farmer. Now since they are men, whom do you
have in mind to supervise them? Who is an expert (epistêmôn) in this kind
of excellence (aretê), the human and social kind? (20a7-b5)15
a is to b as c is to d
breeders are to young domesticated animals as experts in virtue are to young Athenian
males.16 The passage clearly carries some rhetorical flourish as it compares young Athenian
males to young male horses. However, the central idea is one we encounter frequently.
Socrates asserts the relations already recognized or agreed upon between breeders and
young livestock in order to persuade Callias of the same relations between teachers of virtue
and young men.17 For instance, breeders are recognized as experts in rearing domesticated
animals, they possess some knowledge of their subjects, and they improve them through
strategy is to draw on our reasoning in the realm of crafts to persuade hearers of the same
reasoning in the education of young men.
. The central idea of the
passage is that breeders are responsible for bringing about the respective excellences of
young domesticated animals. The implicit suggestion is that a breeder has the privileged
knowledge of what makes a horse an excellent horse, and therefore raises colts in light of

15

16

We may compare this to the city-soul analogy in the Republic. Justice in the city is to justice in the
soul.
17

. Hesse (1963), 69 70.

12
that knowledge. Accordingly, in the case of raising Athenian men, the teacher of virtue must
have the expert knowledge of what makes a human an excellent human. Whatever the
teacher of virtue purports to teach, whoever he turns out to be, he must do so in light of his
controversial as it assumes other relations that will need to be defended. For instance, that
breeders seek the interest of colts rather than themselves; that experts have privileged
knowledge in comparison to most people; and that the acquisition of human excellence is
sufficiently similar to the acquisition of animal excellence.
Indeed, we will encounter challenges of this sort to the craft analogy in the next section. For
now however, we can note that analogies of the type I highlight in this section intend to
persuade and instruct the interlocutor based on facts already agreed upon, rather than
function as arguments for the conclusions they draw. The following include other notable
examples that follow this formula. We will see that these cases tend to leap to universal
few craft examples that Socrates gives:
(a) Crito (47a2 48b). Socrates tells Crito that one ought to disregard the opinions of the
majority in matters of justice and injustice, and instead only pay attention to the
opinions of those with knowledge. In making this claim, Socrates draws a parallel to
our attitude with regard to the craft of physical training. In matters concerning
exercise and proper diets, we only care about the opinions of physical trainers. Their
praise and blame alone benefits us whereas valuing the opinions of those without

opinion of those with knowledge over the majority (47c8 d6).
(b) Laches (184e11 186e12). Socrates questions the best methodology for finding an
expert in virtue. He does so by drawing a parallel to the ways in which we judge
experts in physical training. In looking for physical trainers, we only trust those who
have sufficiently practiced their craft, studied with good teachers, and in cases
without teachers, we demand them to show us instances where they were successful
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in their craft. By this reasoning, Socrates concludes, we should look for the same
qualifications in those who purport to make young men virtuous.
(c) Lysis (207d6 210c5). Socrates advocates for the thesis that happiness does not
consist in the freedom to do whatever one wishes. Socrates gets the young Lysis to
see that the reason he, a free man, is only entrusted to make some decisions for
himself (in the craft of lyre-playing and writing), and not others (driving the chariot,
being in charge of his education) is because he lacks the relevant understanding. But
when he has acquired sufficient understanding, he will not only be in charge of his
own life but also entrusted with managing the matters of the household and the
affairs of the city. Therefore, Socrates concludes, in the c
where we have understanding. Where we lack such understanding, we will be
subject to others (210a9 c5). This use of the craft analogy is pedagogical in tone
given the young impressionable Lysis. Socrates relies on those crafts the boy has
experience with in order to instruct him on the relationship between freedom and
practical wisdom.
(d) Protagoras (313c6 314b4). Socrates cautions the young Hippocrates against the
harmful risks of consuming the teachings of sophists without being an expert
(epistêmôn) in the subject matter (313e2). In support of this claim, Socrates draws a
parallel to the merchants of the market who peddle provisions without considering
their benefits or harms to the body. Unless one is a doctor or a physical trainer, and
therefore knowledgeable in what is good and bad for the body, one will greatly risk
their bodily health in buying the provisions. Likewise, Socrates reasons, a sophist is
a kind of merchant who peddles teachings upon the soul (313c4-7). Unless we
become physicians of the soul, we risk accruing the most important harm in
listening to their teachings: harm to the health of our soul.
All these examples possess a certain pedagogical character. They persuade the interlocutor
and the readers by appealing to our general adherence to expertise in ordinary life as a
means to recommend the same behaviour in our moral conduct. This move usually goes
unchallenged by the interlocutor because the former claim is implicitly agreed upon, taken
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as obvious, or uncontroversial. In this respect, the craft analogy is used to recommend and
advocate for moral expertise based on assumptions already taken as true.

1.2. Craft and Knowledge
In this section I turn my attention to two noteworthy examples where the relationship
between craft and virtue is challenged. In contrast to the examples I cite in the last section,
interlocutors.
They do so by offering counter examples and a defence of the crucial differences between
ordinary crafts and virtue. A common way to read passages of this sort is to take Plato to be
pointing out the limitations of the craft analogy. That is
model of knowledge for virtue. We are thus invited to see the flaws in applying the analogy
between craft and virtue too liberally.
In what follows, I caution us against this trend of reading the texts. A more subtle lesson, I
contend, should be drawn.
objections, we will see that the account of virtue presented hinges on an account of craft in
non-trivial ways. In other words, whatever views one has about virtue, it must be contested
on the conceptual grounds of craft, or more aptly the concept of technê. This claim is best
explained by the fact that ordinary examples of crafts are recognized as instances of
established knowledge broadly understood. While they may be recognized as such, there is
no agreement about their nature and structure, methods of acquisition, relation to each
other, or practical implications for society. Thus analogies to crafts in this context function
as a broad debate on the nature of knowledge, and subsequently virtue. Hence, the
technê

epistêmê

interchangeably. If virtue is to be a kind of knowledge, as Plato seems to suggest, then it
must be articulated within a well-defined theory of knowledge. But since such theory is
lacking and many competing views are available, Plato uses disagreements between
Socrates and his interlocutors on the issue of craft as a way to work out and eventually posit
a unified model of knowledge. In this context, analogies to crafts serve as the conceptual
basis for working out a unified theory of knowledge within which virtue can be expressed.
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1.2.1. Charmides
The first example of our interest occurs in the Charmides
(sophrosunê) (165c4
to gignôskein heauton) (164d4).
Socrates draws an inference from knowing in the sense of gignôskein to knowing in the
sense of epistêmê

gignôskein) is what temperance is, then it clearly must be

some sort of knowledge (epistêmê tis) and must be of something (tinos), isn
(165c4 6).18 Critias answers that temperance is the knowledge of the personal self (epistêmê
heautou). In examining this definition, Socrates repeatedly presses the inquiry as if
temperance is a craft like medicine or housebuilding. In these examples, Socrates argues,
we can clearly point to the specific product or result (ergon) they provide for us, namely
health and house. If temperance is the knowledge of self, what ergon does it furnish? (165d8
e2).
This method of investigation is resisted by Critias on the grounds that there is no shared
nature (pephuken) between kinds of knowledge in general (165e4). Some crafts like weaving
and housebuilding produce identifiable products, but in crafts like calculation and
geometry, we do not find the same parallel (165e5 8). Interestingly, Critias does not say that
temperance is a theoretical activity like calculation and geometry, rather than the more
productively oriented crafts. He insists only that knowledge (epistêmê) is varied and there
are no essential features shared between any crafts. This claim is the real contentious point

You are right. But I can point out in case of each of these knowledges what
it is a knowledge of, this being distinct from the knowledge itself. For
again, the craft of weighing is a craft concerned with the heavier and lighter,
and the heavy and light are distinct from the craft of weighing (166a3 7).

18

;

16

we are at last brought up against the inherent limitations of a specific professional skill, and
19

t

Reflecting on the
20

which the technê analogy cannot be literally applied to the field of moral dec

too seriously. However, what is at really at issue seems to be the standardization of
objection but moves to
another criterion of knowledge. He employs crafts like calculation and weighing, those
more acceptable to Critias, to show that knowledge always has a specified and non-reflexive
subject matter. As I read the Charmides, the real purpose of the argument, and to some
degree the dialogue, is to work out the viability of a superordinate knowledge

one whose

task involves the governance of all knowledge, rather than some specified subject matter.
As Socrates presents things in the Charmides, he is committed to the belief that knowledge
is unified. Although he acknowledges some crucial differences, he is not prepared to accept
the view that crafts, in virtue of being a kind of knowledge, lack any essential features.
tion brings to the foreground their contrasting views of knowledge:
This is just what I mean, Socrates. You arrive at the point of investigating the
respect in which temperance differs from all the other knowledges, then you
start looking for some way in which it resembles all the others. It is not like
this; but rather all the others are knowledges of something else, not of
themselves, whereas this is the only knowledge which is both of other
knowledges and of itself (166b5 c3).
Critias implicitly concedes his earlier claim that all branches of knowledge are unique, and
settles on defending the uniqueness of temperance. That virtue is a special kind of
knowledge distinct from ordinary crafts is a central idea we will encounter in various
formulations, most immediately in the next example from the Protagoras. Plato is interested
in the uniqueness of virtue, but will present the idea on his own terms. In the second half

19
20

Gould (1955), 38.
Ibid., 39.
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of this dissertation, I argue that in certain key places (including the conclusion of the
Charmides), Plato presents virtue, understood as knowledge of what is good and bad for a
human being, as an architectonic form of knowledge situated at the top of the hierarchy of
crafts. This architectonic knowledge possesses special features such ruling, issuing norms,
providing correct use, etc. At the same time, insofar as it is a kind of knowledge, virtue
possesses features common to all crafts (e.g. having a unique ergon, being rational, reliable).
In the present context, Plato is interested in working out a standard account of craft, within
which his views of virtue can be articulated. That is to say, he is outlining a unified theory
of knowledge wherein virtue can eventually be put forth as the highest kind. This view helps
us understand Socrate

gignôskein to

epistêmê, and why he immediately follows this with the mentions of medicine and
housebuilding as examples (165c4 d6). What he is doing is subsuming varying instances of
knowledge broadly understood under one well-defined view of knowledge, in the sense of
epistêmê
having an ergon that is unique, beneficial, and a distinct and definite subject matter. When
Critias accuses Socrates of investigating temperance as if it resembles others, he is right.
Temperance, in virtue of being a kind of knowledge, should resemble other instances of
t should
have certain features present in medicine, housebuilding, and calculation.

with the idea of craft as a model for virtue. Rather, ordinary crafts constitute the existing
pool of knowledge one draws from in order to articulate a view of knowledge and the place
of virtue within it. Socrates and Critias reflect this point clearly when they appeal to
different craft examples as supporting evidence for their contrasting conceptions of
knowledge, and accordingly virtue. That Socrates meets Critias on his grounds by appealing
to more theoretical examples should speak in favour of the view that for Plato, crafts (while
different from each other in important ways) are a unified class of knowledge. If virtue turns
out to be a kind of knowledge, then it must be expressed against the backdrop of crafts,
understood as instances of a unified model of knowledge.
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Critias, as an intellectual opponent, is ultimately found wanting. He is unable to offer a fully
developed view of virtue as a unique class of knowledge, one that can be substantially
differentiated from ordinary crafts. Without a well-defined theory of knowledge, Critias has
to subject his definition of temperance to those criteria put forth by Socrates. In the next
example however, we will see Protagoras offer an elaborate view on the origin and
uniqueness of virtue, one that he differentiates from ordinary crafts.

1.2.2.

Protagoras

The Protagoras (318b1 328d2) depicts a dramatic confrontation between Socrates and the
elder sophist on the issue of moral education. The setting provides us with one of the most
memorable discussions on the nature of craft and virtue in the Platonic corpus. The
stion

whether virtue is teachable

is contested on the conceptual

grounds of craft, particularly how one interprets those ordinary models and their
implication for virtue.
In contrast to other sophists who teach traditional crafts (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry,
politikê technê). This art is about sound deliberation for
managing both household and public affairs
-2). In a role reversal distinctive to the dramatic
setting of the dialogue, Socrates believes that virtue cannot be taught (320b4 5).21 This is
evidenced by the way Athenians conduct their politics and the observation that prominent
fathers fail to pass on wisdom to their sons. In what is surely a veiled criticism of Athenian
politics, Socrates observes that when Athenians come together in the Assembly and the city
has to make decisions regarding building projects or the construction of ships, they seek
builders and shipwrights (319b5 c1). Anyone who is not a craftsman, no matter how
influential or well-to-do, has no say in the matter (319c1 7). This way of proceeding must
stem from the belief that these matters are technical (en technê), and therefore teachable
21

Protagoras appears to offer a functional view of virtue the sorts of skills that enable one to fulfill
their social role, which for young and privileged Athenian men was in the realm of politics (Barney,
80).
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and learnable (319c7-8). But in deliberations concerning city management, anyone has the
right to stand up in the Assembly and give counsel. They can come from any profession,
social class, and have no prior training with teachers (319d1 6). The reason for this stark
contrast, Socrates concludes, must be because Athenians think virtue cannot be taught
(310d6 7).
ng we looked at in section
1.1. In the Apology and other parallel examples, Socrates appeals to our confidence in
ordinary expertise in favour of adopting the same practice in moral deliberations. Here, he
identifies the lack of adherence to expertise in Athenian public life as evidence for the view
that virtue is not teachable. Yet, the commitment to the unity of crafts remains, in this case
pertaining to their teachability. Socrates sees a natural continuity between those skills
displayed in ordinary crafts and the would-be ones required for living virtuously. If we
confidently treat matters of virtue differently, his argument goes, then we must think that
virtue is not technical (en technê), and therefore cannot be taught.
Protagoras, picking up where Critias left off, accounts for the uniqueness of virtue. Despite
its dissemblance to ordinary crafts, he argues, it is still a technê, and therefore teachable and
learnable. Following the Myth on the origin of human societies (320c8ff), Protagoras
explains why moral and political life is of a different kind:
When the Athenians are debating architectural excellence, or the virtue
proper to any other professional specialty (aretê demiourgikê), they think
that only a few individuals have the right to advise them, and they do not
yourself, and with good reason, I might add. But when the debate involves
political virtue (politikê aretê), which must proceed entirely from justice and
temperance, they accept advice from anyone, and with good reason, for they
think that this particular virtue, is shared (metechein) by all, or there
323a4).
According to Protagoras, in ordinary crafts, one practitioner is sufficient to meet the needs
of many people. For instance, a few practicing doctors suffices for the medical needs of an
entire community (3226 7). It is therefore expected that only a select few are experts, while
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the majority are laymen. Political virtue, in contrast, is a requisite for both the birth and
maintenance of cities, and thus requires the collective participation of all citizens.
Therefore, everyone is entitled to be adviser on matters of virtue, just as everyone can advise
each other on speaking Greek (328a1).

language and all the crafts for survival, was on the brink of destruction because they lacked
the art of politics to work together for their common interests (322a3 b8). Zeus, fearing for
-3). Accordingly,
everyone must have some share of justice to begin with, otherwise cities could not exist as
they do now. In addition to possessing a share of justice, everyone has a vested interest in
continuing to act justly and virtuously, and ensuring others do the same. Without this
mutual cooperation, humans could not live amongst each other peacefully nor depend on
each other for survival. Therefore, Protagoras concludes:
For it is to our collective advantage that we each possess justice and virtue,
and so we all gladly tell and teach each other what is just and lawful. Well,
if we all had the same eagerness and generosity in teaching each other fluteplaying, do you think, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be
more likely to be good flute-players than the sons of poor flute-players? I
b7).
These passages pave the way for Protagoras to defend both a democratic and competitive
view of virtue. Given that everyone has a vested interest in teaching and learning virtue, and
has some share of it, everyone begins on equal footing. Those who are able to teach virtue
uniquely qualified to assist others in becoming noble and good, and
(328b1 5).
Perhaps more than any other example, this exchange between Socrates and Protagoras
illustrates that any serious attempt to define virtue must begin by addressing its relationship
to those established and traditional models of crafts. This starting point is an invitation to
posit a theory of technê, which in turn is an invitation to posit a theory of knowledge. In
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technê and
virtue characteristic of the sophistical profession. Helping others become virtuous is

teachability, as Socrates see it, depends entirely on whether it is a technê, in ways that are
shared by ordinary models. Protagoras does not deny that becoming virtuous requires a
technê

327a1).

On my interpretation, the examination of virtue and its relation to ordinary crafts functions
as a broad debate on the nature and structure of knowledge. In particular, I read the appeals
a class of knowledge, of which
virtue is a member, albeit it has the status of being the most special member. We know from
that gives us salvation in life

a kind of hedonic

calculus for measuring the magnitudes of pleasure and pain (356e5 357b3). As Charles Kahn
Protagoras comes closer than
any other dialogue to as

technê

22

This

is not to say that for Plato, virtue is acquired by just studying arithmetic or any ordinary
crafts. But that there is a natural continuity and unity between crafts insofar as they are a
kind of knowledge is thesis that I take Plato to be repeatedly advocating. This view is further
supported by the inference a
23

With this inference, Socrates reemphasizes the unified

model of knowledge he is working with.
As we will see in the second half of this dissertation, Plato has special motivations to posit
virtue as a unique craft, a view I flesh out along the lines of interpreting virtue as an
architectonic form knowledge

understood as the highest and most sovereign governing

craft. In the present context, we see that comparing virtue to ordinary crafts leads us to a
much broader and deeper debate on the nature of knowledge. In particular, established
crafts like medicine and architecture represent the existing branches of knowledge one
22
23

Kahn (1996), 216.
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needs to make sense of in order to articulate virtue as knowledge. Given that there is no
agreed standard or many competing views of technê, Plato uses disagreements between his
principle speakers on the question of craft (particularly their contrasting interpretations of
ordinary models) as a proxy battle for larger questions on unity of knowledge. The overall
lesson, I suggest, is to subsume various instances of craft under one standard model of
knowledge, against which virtue is to be articulated.
These examples, however, do not fully address those who warn against the limitations of
the craft analogy. In the next chapter, I focus on Republic I, where Plato appears to be the
most critical towards modeling virtue after ordinary crafts. I leave those discussions for the
next chapter as they pertain to issues related to the moral psychology of the craft
practitioner and in turn, the virtuous agent.

1.3. The Structure of Craft and Inquiry
In this final section, I highlight one additional role analogies to crafts play, one that has not
been substantially appreciated. This is the role ordinary examples of crafts play in the
inquiry into virtue and virtue-related topics. In this section, we see that crafts are a complex
enterprise with structural features that Plato exploits in order to aid his inquiry. In this
respect, I wish to highlight the heuristic value of crafts as a model of knowledge.
The overall lesson I draw from the texts is this: because the objects of inquiry are unknown
and difficult (e.g. virtue) or deliberately obscured (e.g. oratory), investigating after them in
terms of something more familiar and observable (ordinary and established examples of
crafts) is of assistance to our inquiry. The choice of crafts as a model to guide the inquiry
into virtue, can be attributed in part the historical development of technê in the fifth
century, aspects of which I have touched on in the introduction. However, internal to the
works of Plato, crafts are a useful and favoured model to guide the inquiry into virtue
because the crafts exhibit a certain logical structure that, when made use of, allow the
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inquiry to proceed in a way that is revealing.24 Shinro Kato, commenting on the role technê
in the Politicus, notices this use as well. He reflects on this issue from the perspective of the
late dialogues:
technê), which always plays a prominent role
fundamental basis on which the art of the sophist as well as that of the
statesman is to be determined. In the first case, it functions as the factor
pseudo-art and finally discloses its essence as the pseudo-art, i.e. imitative
art. In the second case, it is the solid base on which the genuine art of the
statesman is to be elaborated by several successive arguments. We can say
lie
philosophy from the first beginning in the earlier dialogues to the late
dialogues, such as these twin dialogues, the Sophist and Politicus.25

exhibit a certain logical structure, in particular, they have the following six structural
components:
(1) Craftsman. He is the rightful practitioner of his craft who has knowledge in his field
of expertise. Plato uses various language to describe him, some of the most common
technikos

dêmiourgos

epistêmôn

(2) Subject Matter. A craft typically has a unique and specified subject matter. This is
tinos

peri

instance, medicine is the study of the causes of health and disease.
(3) Goal

ergon

-oriented. They

24

Example (paradeigma) in the Politicus 277a3 278e11. There, the Visitor notes the difficulty of doing
inquiry without the use of models. One of their functions is to serve as a simple basis for
discovering similarities with more complex and remote objects of inquiry. See especially 278b1 c1
and 278e4 11.
25
Kato (1995), 165.
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not have products or results such as geometry, but it is still described in Plato has
possessing a characteristic function such as making the discoveries of diagrams
(Euthyd. 290b7-c6).
(4) Material or Tool. A craftsman relies on some means to accomplish the goal of his

(5) Manner. Crafts are accomplished in some characteristic manner, such as making,
using, distinguishing, measuring, caring/tending, ruling.
(6) Object. Crafts can have designated objects upon which they operate. This is where
their goals are produced. For instance medicine aims to bring about health in bodies
and horse training brings out the excellent condition of horses. This feature is most
common in therapeutic crafts which aim to produce their intended results in living
things.

of craft qua craft. Rather, they pick out its distinctive logical structure (especially
uncontroversial cases), as Plato understands it. This logical structure, I suggest, serves as a
guide for elucidating and defining virtue or virtue-related topics such as oratory. In what
follows, I discuss two cases that demonstrate how Socrates employs these structural
components to guide his inquiry into piety and oratory.

1.3.1. Euthyphro
I begin with a straightforward and isolated case from the Euthyphro (Eutphr. 12c10 14b6).
This example illustrates how appeals to crafts can help the inquirer, Socrates, clarify an
obscure feature of virtue, isolate the error of the definition under examination, and point
the inquiry towards the right direction. Socrates and Euthyphro are looking for the
definition of piety, arriving at the view that piety is a part of justice. Euthyphro claims justice
has two parts, one concerned with the care (therapeia) of gods and the other concerned
with the care of men. Piety is the part of justice concerned with the care of gods. This

25

twice.
The first use relies on examples from rearing crafts in order to rule out the sort of care that
of gods, Socrates begins by indicating his intentions in the inquiry: that he does not know
13a). Socrates proceeds to give
an example (hoion) from horse breeding intending to rule out one idea of care. He poses
the question expecting a negative answer: surely care for the gods is not the same manner
of care horse breeders have for horses. 26 We have seen, from the Apology example, that
Socrates often relies on crafts that tend to (therapei) living things as a model to illustrate
the relationship between teachers of virtue and young men. But here, the intended result of
the appeal to rearing crafts is a negative one.
A keener interlocutor would have observed that, if piety is the rearing sort of care, then it
would imply that the gods are subordinately related to men. Euthyphro does not pick up on
this point and instead agrees that caring for the gods is the same kind of caring for horses.
So Socrates must proceed by giving more illustrative examples to bring out the implication
of this error.
What follows are examples from dog breeding and cattle raising. The general point is
familiar enough. In rearing crafts, caring requires expertise which aims at the good. These
crafts care for their subjects by benefiting and improving them.27 Piety, if it is this sort of
care, would be the expertise of benefitting and improving upon the conditions of gods. Here,
the craft analogy works like a reductio ad absurdum. It is ridiculous and outright implausible
to think piety is the same as caring for horses. Supposing the definition is true leads us to
an unacceptable conclusion, namely pious men improve the gods, an evidently false claim

26

the Euthyphro, see Benson (2000), 58 65.
27
The idea that rearing or therapeutic crafts improve the recipients of their crafts goes
unchallenged until Thrasymachus in Republic I, who objects that shepherds are self-interested
rather than seek the welfare of sheeps. Therefore, the best rulers are those who seek the advantage
of themselves, rather than their subjects. see 343b. I discuss Republic I in detail in the next chapter.
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even Euthyphro recognizes. In this respect, the analogy clarifies to Euthyphro and to us,
that a better model of care is needed, particularly one that captures the way men are
subservient to the gods. This is what Euthyphro proceeds to do, suggesting piety is caring
for the gods the way that slaves care for their masters (13d6 7).
The second use of the craft analogy relies on a wider set of examples to pick out the
characteristic function (ergon)28 of piety. Socrates rephrases the definition of piety as a sort
of servicing craft (huperetikê) to the gods (13ad8), better reflecting the newly gained
understanding piety. Rather than relying on rearing crafts, Socrates gives an assortment of
examples (medicine, shipbuilding, housebuilding, generalship, farming) in order to pick out
the function of piety. Here, the analogy works like a teleological argument from crafts.
In each craft, we plainly observe an identifiable end, as medicine provides health and
shipbuilding is for the sake of building ships. Generalship may produce many fine results,
but victory at war is its chief purpose (14a-2). So what purpose does piety, understood as
service to the gods, achieve? This argument is quickly abandoned as Euthyphro is unable to
fruitful line of
If you had answered it, I should already have acquired from you sufficient instruction about
-2).29 Socrates thus suggests inquiring into the function of piety would have
given us sufficient information about the nature of piety, or at the very least pointed us
towards a more productive way of inquiring into piety.
Both uses of the craft analogy appear to come up short when Euthyphro fails to answer
these, admittedly difficult, questions. However, it should be noted that they lead us to more
positive avenues in the inquiry into piety. In particular they help us clarify the manner in
which piety is exercised towards the gods by ruling out what it is not. They also point to a
genuine difficulty with interpreting piety as a kind of knowledge possessed by those who

28

ergon

s the subsequent questions indicate, Socrates is looking for what each craft
does chiefly (to kephalaion
29
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are in a subordinate position. Piety cannot be the sort of knowledge about what is good for
the gods. Thus we must search for an account of piety in other ways of relating to the gods.
Furthermore, appeal to crafts leads us to see the importance of inquiring about the function
of piety. The reasoning goes, if most of our actions in the realm of crafts achieve some
definite goal, can it really be that our actions toward the gods serve no purpose? Although
this argument is abandoned, I suggest, we are still left with suggestions that the inquiry has
been on the right track.

1.3.2.

Gorgias

Having looked at an isolated example, I now turn my attention to a sustained use of the
structure of craft for the inquiry into oratory in the Gorgias. I consider the refutation of
Gorgias (449c9 461b2)

an introductory discussion that sets the stage for the central

arguments of the dialogue. In this example, we learn that hypothesizing the target of inquiry
as a craft allows Socrates to ask certain kinds of questions that are instructive. In particular,
the questions are instructive for disclosing putative crafts whose goals (in various ways)
he good life.30
The Gorgias takes oratory as its target of inquiry but we quickly learn by the end of the
dialogue that the disagreement amounts to different conceptions of the good life. We begin
early on with the supposition that oratory is a craft. Setting the stage for the rest of
4). This supposition
allows Socrates to proceed in a way that appeals to the structure of ordinary crafts as a
means to unveil the various disguises of oratory. In particular, it allows Socrates to disclose
oratory as what it really is

a pseudo craft concerned with matters of justice and injustice.

Although the craft status of oratory is not explicitly questioned in the refutation of Gorgias,
30

The putative crafts we frequently encounter in the Platonic corpus are sophistry, oratory, poetry,
and rhapsodic performance. The former three are a mainstay in Greek culture and education, and
which Plato examines in detail in the Ion, appears banal in comparison. However, it is interesting
to note that at end of the dialogue, Ion reveals the political bend of his profession, noting that
anyone who happens to a good rhapsode is also a good general (541ff).
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empeiria)
belonging to the class of flattery (kolakeia) in the subsequent discussion with Polus. The
stages of inquiry can be summarized as follows:
Stage I:
1.

Supposition that oratory is a craft (447c1 4).

2. What is the subject matter (peri ti) of oratory? (449d1 4).
e.g. Weaving: production of clothes; music: composition of tunes.
3. Oratory is concerned with speeches (peri logous) (449e1).
Stage II:
1.

What sort of speeches does oratory make? (449e1).
e.g. Medicine: diseases; physical training: conditions of the body.

2. Distinction between crafts that rely on hands and crafts that rely on speech (450b6
d1).
3. Making speeches is not the subject matter of oratory but the tool orators employ to
accomplish their aims (450d4 451a2).
4. Oratory is concerned with the greatest of human concerns (451d7 8).
Stage III:
1.

What is the greatest human concern? (451d9 452d4)
e.g. Health to doctors; strength to physicians; wealth to financial experts.

2. The greatest of human concerns is freedom and the source rule over others; The
ability to persuade by means of speech in law courts, council meeting, and the
assembly (452d e8).
3. Oratory is the producer of persuasion (peithous demiourgos) (453a2).
Stage IV:
1.

Persuasion about subject matter? (454b8 9).
e.g. Arithmetic instills persuasion about number by teaching.

2. Oratory produces the kind of persuasion that take place in law courts and large
gatherings. About matters of justice and injustice (454b5 7).
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To begin with, as is welland injustice that leads to his eventual downfall.31 His argument collapses when he is forced
to admit that, in addition to teaching oratory, he must also teach justice to his students. But
this admission is troublesome because Gorgias has now admitted to being responsible for
teaching a skill that is used to harm, despite his own admissions of teaching oratory to be
used justly (456e2 457a2). In order to arrive at this admission, Socrates needs to dismantle
what oratory really is from what it purports to be.
The main feature that Socrates is interested in

peri ti).

We can observe that at each stage of the inquiry, Socrates relies on various craft examples
to press Gorgias to be more specific in his answers. That oratory is taken to be a craft allows
Socrates to subject Gorgias to certain rules of engagement

ways of inquiring that are

grounded in the structure and transparency of ordinary crafts. What is doing most of the
work in pressing the inquiry forward is the criterion of uniqueness. Gorgias is deliberately
evasive and vague in his answers. But as Socrates points out, the claims made by Gorgias
are not unique to oratory. For instance, all craftsmen intend to persuade others of the
knowledge gained by their expertise. Implicit in this line of reasoning is the view that crafts
are uniquely individuated (Ion, 537c 538a).32 What is accomplished by means of one craft is
not shared by another. Therefore, Gorgias ought to define oratory according to its unique
subject matter.
However, the important point is not just that Socrates thinks oratory must adhere to this
criterion of uniqueness in crafts. Rather, his central aim is to disclose the masquerading
profession. Oratory, taken at face value, is about the mastery of making speeches, either for
display or in the political and judicial contexts. This skill is presumably useful in a refined
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for instance, claims that Gorgias enters the trap at 460a3 4. Cooper (1999) puts it much earlier at
454b5 7. For my purposes, nothing hangs on this issue. It is clear that once questions of justice and
32

I discuss this feature of crafts in Chapter 2, section 2.5 and Chapter 3, section 3.2.
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more ambiti
8).33 Gorgias goes on to claim that the sort of speeches oratory makes
are intended to persuade judges, councillors, and assemblymen in political gatherings,

8).
Oratory thus is not merely about developing those oratory skills vital for living in a
democratic city. It is concerned with the aggressive attainment and exercise of political
power. It does this by competing and winning over the professional expertise of craftsmen. 34
A little later in the argument, Gorgias elaborates that in decisions concerning the affairs of
(456a1
can be

8).35 This declaration emphatically reveals that oratory is

really concerned with ruling over and above all else.

(456a7 457c3). He explains carefully that although an orator can easily rob the doctors of
their reputation, he should not do so (457b1 5). He should use oratory like any agonistic
skill, in defence against enemies and wrongdoers rather than friends (456e4). Rachel Barney
helpfully points out that Gorgias in fact oscillates between two conceptions of oratory
the manipulative and the cooperative:
Gorgias finds himself pulled in two different directions. At some points, he
-neutrality: oratory differs from
the specialized crafts precisely in that the rhetorician can be more persuasive
about anything than anybody else (455d 56c, 459a c). And this subjectneutrality is consistently associated with what I have termed the
manipulative conception of oratory, on which it is essentially a tool of
enslavement. But at other times, Gorgias proposes that oratory too is a
specialized craft with a distinctive subject-matter, namely, the questions of
justice debated in the law courts and political gatherings (452e, 454b). And
33
34
35

I return to this idea that oratory poses a threat to ordinary crafts in Chapter 4.
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this specialized conception fits better with a cooperative conception of
oratory, on which it involves a genuine expertise in questions of justice an
expertise deployed on behalf of the community, as the doctor deploys his
expertise in medicine.36

things in the Gorgias, oratory is really about the attainment of power for personal gain. In
this respect, it is essentially concerned with manipulation as a tool for power and
enslavement. It has no special subject matter and can be exercised in any arena if it benefits
the orator. However, oratory masquerades in society as the kind of persuasion that takes
place in political gatherings. It is concerned with what is just and unjust for the benefit of a
political community. Socrates, as we know, will go on to classify oratory as a pseudo craft
(464c5 6). This dichotomy between what oratory purports to be and what it really is helps
us understand why, in the same breath, Gorgias is eager to boast the intoxicating power of
oratory and cautions pre-emptively against its unjust use. He willingly points to the success
3), but advises against
using oratory to undermine their reputation just a few lines later. (457b1 5). Gorgias thus
reveals the discrepancy between oratory as it is practiced in the world and the guise it must
uphold in public.
The various craft examples employed, as summarized above in four stages, serve to put
demarcated and easy to identify, Socrates relies on them to corral the number of disguises
available to Gorgias. That other crafts also possess features Gorgias attributes to oratory

oratory employs (like other crafts of similar sort) rather than the subject matter. He is able
to establish this only by giving concrete and uncontroversial parallels (e.g. arithmetic,
geometry).

36

Barney (2010), 103.
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Gorgias, unlike Polus or Callicles, cannot shamelessly admit to using oratory as a means to
power in whatever domain it is necessary (cf.461b5). Therefore, he cannot wholeheartedly
2). It is in this attempt to uphold the guise of
simplicity and transparency of ordinary craft
a craft
concerned with matters of justice and injustice.
Some commentators have noted that Gorgias characterizes oratory as taking place in the
lawcourts, assembly, and council meetings and in these contexts, questions of justice and
injustice cannot constitute the entirety or even the expected subject under discussion. 37 We
may then object that Gorgias is pressured to name a specialized subject matter when the
scope of his profession is much wider. However, it is important to note that, as much as
masquerading as a doctor or a wall-builder. Rather, the power of oratory gives one the
ability to rule them (452e4 8). This is evident when he argues that it is on the advice of
Themistocles and Pericles that walls are built rather than any individual wall-builder
(455e2 3). The advice of orators thus prevail because they present themselves as statesmen,
giving council with regard to what is best for the city. So while orators may discuss various
technical matters, they do so under the guise of justice and injustice. This is the true nature
of oratory that Socrates reveals.38

1.4. Conclusion

37

Cooper, 34.
For an interesting parallel to this pattern of inquiry, see the refutation of Polemarchus in Republic
I (331d 336a10). There, the structure of crafts serves not to unveil the guises of putative crafts, but
38

like the Gorgias, with the supposition that justice is a craft (332d1 2). Socrates then proceeds to asks
a series of
general purpose of the inquiry appears to be highlighting the faults in conceiving justice merely as a
8). I discuss this refutation in detail in the Chapter 2,
section 2.1.
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I began this chapter with the aim of investigating the ways in which crafts served as a model
for understanding the nature and structure of virtue. I have argued that appeals to crafts in
the context of virtue and virtue-related topics play three main roles: to recommend moral
expertise, as the basis for positing a unified model of knowledge, and to aid inquiry into
virtue and putative crafts. My survey of these passages, I believe, gives us the resources for
appreciating the diverse roles crafts play in the explanation of virtue. Analogies to crafts
scarcely amount to a run-of-mill compare and contrast between features of virtue and crafts.
Rather, given their flexibility, accessibility, and logical structure, examples drawn from
crafts are central for serving a variety of phi
knowledge.

account of virtue and

34

Chapter 2
2. Republic I: Justice, Ruling, and the Ideal Craftsman
In Chapter 1, I
specifically for elucidating its nature and structure. In this chapter, I continue to focus on
the idea of craft as a model of knowledge, turning my attention to the kinship Plato draws
between the craftsman and the virtuous person. I shift my focus from surveying key passages
across a number of dialogues to a sustained interpretation of Republic I.
Republic I is home to some of the most direct and controversial arguments for conceiving
virtue as a craft. The text takes up the topic of justice and the investigation mostly proceeds
from the hypothesis that justice is a craft. Throughout the discussions with Polemarchus
and Thrasymachus, a

he similarities between

the just person and the craftsman. It is commonly thought that a central lesson of Book I is
to indicate the flaws of postulating virtue as a craft
;39

.40 They
technê

remainder books of the Republic;41
42

My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that this common picture of Book I is incorrect. I
-founded
raft. When
correctly understood, craft illuminates important aspects of the nature of justice and
often supposed. In supporting this interpretation, I first (Section 2.1) outline putative textual
evidence for supporting the mainstream reading, focusing especially on
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objections against Polemarchus, that viewing justice as a craft renders it trivial (333d11 e2)
and makes it vulnerable to misuse (334a10 b5). I show that there are good reasons to doubt
that Plato intends to highlight the weakness of the craft analogy with these claims. I suggest
unreflective attitude towards justice as the one put forth by Polemarchus.
I then (Sections 2.2 2.6) move on to the next major place in the text that supports the
s on the nature of
craft (341c 342e), the craft of wage-earning (345e 347a), and the non-pleonetic argument
(349b 350c) are often criticized for relying on weak similarities between craft and justice.
In response to this, I begin (Section 2.2) by developing what I view as the correct
underst

origins view. The upshot of this

view is that Plato intends us to understand craft as benefit-oriented, discovered as a service
for meeting the various needs of human life. This view of craft is intellectually demanding.
For reasons related to their understanding and training, true craftsmen are understood as
the personifications of their crafts. With this view in place, I offer (Sections 2.3 2.6) a
are mostly well-founded and sensible. While they are insufficient for overhauling the
justice (tasks for the remainder of the Republic), Plato does intend us to understand the
arguments as illuminating the important ways in which the just ruler can be understood as
a kind of ideal craftsman.

2.1. Challenges for Understanding Justice as a Craft in
Republic I
The hypothesis that justice is a craft is first introduced by Socrates at the beginning of his
refutation of Polemarchus (332c5 8). From that point on, the discussion of justice and the
knowledge involved in bringing it about are closely tied to the idea of craft. That Socrates
would draw heavily on a host of craft-related examples to argue about virtue is not
surprising. But what is surprising is that no one seems to be very satisfied with these
arguments. They fail to persuade Thrasymachus and strike most modern readers as either
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implausible or bad arguments. Perhaps most surprisingly, Plato portrays Socrates as being
asting it before properly savouring its
(354b1
Book I is to draw our attention to the flaws of treating justice as a craft. By deliberately
highlighting these flaws, it is argued, Book II can begin anew, equipped with a markedly
different philosophical method and alternative models of knowledge. But what precisely is
supposed to be wrong with understanding justice as a kind of craft, as it is depicted in Book
I? In ways is the just person different from a practitioner of a craft? Which arguments did
Plato have in mind as pointing to the flaws of the craft analogy?
Interpreters who hold the mainstream view identify two places in the text that support their
reading. First, there is
as a craft renders it trivial (333d11 e2) and makes it vulnerable to misuse (334a10 b5), are
taken as direct grounds for rejecting the crafts as a model for justice. Second, there is
341c 342e), the wage-earning
argument (345e 347e) and non-pleonetic argument (349b1 350c), all of which are deemed
to be either implausible or deeply unsatisfactory. And on the mainstream view, we are
invited by Plato to read the arguments as such.
s 2.3 2.6. In this section, I
focus on some common criticisms of
refutation of Polemarchus. Against the mainstream reading, I argue that there are good
reasons to doubt that Plato intends to highlight the weakness of the craft analogy with the
pointing to the flaws with a certain ordinary and unreflective attitude towards justice, such
as the one put forth by Polemarchus.
Drawing on the poet Simonides, Polemarchus proposes that justice is to give each what is
due (331e3 4). He interprets this to mean that it is just to give benefits to friends and harms
to enemies (332a9 10). Against this, Socrates raises two salient objections that appear to
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undermine the idea of justice as a craft. First, Socrates wonders what sort of distinctive
benefit does the craft of justice confer? And for whom? (332d2 3). For instance, medicine
provides health to bodies, cooking provides seasonings to food, navigation seeks safety at
sea, and so on. Whatever justice might seem useful for (e.g. getting contracts, using money),
it is too general to be revealing (333a c). What can we say about the benefit of the craft of
justice that has not already been appropriated by the ordinary crafts? This line of inquiry
prevents the just person from using his expertise for bad ends? Socrates points out that the
person who is most capable in some skill or craft is also the person who is most capable of
misusing it. A doctor has the expertise for healing but in virtue of this expertise, he also
knows how to kill. If justice is a craft thus conceived, then, Socrates conclude
(334b3 5).
According to the mainstream interpretation, Plato indicates the flaws of treating justice as
a craft by having Socrates raise these two objections. To some interpreters, the major flaw
fundamentally different kinds of things. Crafts aim at unique goals in some specialized area
of human conduct (e.g. bodily health, housebuilding, sailing at sea). Justice, on the other
hand, is not concerned with some distinct goal or special field, but rather with general
questions of how one should live. The just person thus differs importantly from a craftsman
because he exercises his knowledge to direct the overall structure of his life as opposed to
relegating it to some limited area. If we pursue justice as if it is a craft with its own special
field and goal, we will end up with the awkward view that it is about safekeeping money.
And thus, it is argued, Plato shows us that pursuing justice as a craft renders it trivial. 43
One problem with such views is that interpreters tend to base their arguments on a narrow
conception of craft. Nickolas Pappas captures several of the main criticisms when he writes:
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One wants to object to Socrates that justice, unlike horse-trading, does not
exist as a means to some other end, but as a characteristic of all human
In the remainder of the Republic Socrates will speak much less
frequently about technê (The word occurs about .2 times per page in Book
2 10, once per page in Book 1). When he does propose a model for moral
knowledge (Book 5 7), that model is not technical skill but the theoretical
knowledge of the mathematician. The assumption behind technê, that every
activity works toward a goal, prevents the concept from illuminating justice,
of which we might say that it is its own goal, or that it has for a goal not some
distinct product, but an entire human life.44
This way of understanding the crafts presents a false dichotomy between crafts as
mathematics. In my view, the basis for this misunderstanding
characterization of the crafts as production (poêsis). And production, Aristotle argues, is
different from action (praxis) (NE. 1140a1 24). In a passage from Magna Moralia I.34,
Aristotle (or some Aristotelian) offers a similar
crafts of making have some other end beyond the making; for instance, beyond
housebuilding, since that is the craft of making a house, there is a house as its end beyond
MM,1197a4 5). By contrast, practical wisdom (phronêsis), Aristotle argues, has
no other end beyond the activity. So we might say that the end is the activity. Therefore, he
technê)
(1197a12 13).
In contrast to Aristotle, the idea of craft correlates to a much wider and diverse collection
of examples in Plato. They encompass a variety of skills, disciplines, and bodies of
knowledge. These include productive examples (e.g. housebuilding, carpentry), theoretical
examples (e.g. geometry, arithmetic), and other more practical oriented fields of expertise
(e.g. navigation, medicine). While we do find Socrates relying on productive examples to
explicate virtue, he is equally disposed to using more theoretical examples. Most notably,
in the Protagoras, Socrates calls the sort of knowledge that would give us salvation in life as
356e3 4), comparing it to a kind of arithmetic (357a3).
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it is measurement, it must definitely be a craft (technê) and knowledge (epistêmê) (357b4).45
Additionally, Plato does not draw or seem interested in the distinction between production
and action. And thus he does not set up craft in opposition to virtue on account of this
difference. While Plato recognizes that some crafts involve making a product distinct from
the craft itself (Chrm. 165e5 8), and that crafts are generally goal-oriented, these features
do not tell the whole story.
On the whole, what interests Plato about the idea of craft is broader and more complex. He
is especially interested in its intellectual features: for instance, precision, teachability,
reliability, and the ability to give causal explanations. These sorts of features constitute a
certain level of understanding that Plato finds attractive for thinking about virtue generally.
For Plato, the crafts are more modest and observable illustrations of the idea that human
beings can impose their rational agency onto some previously indeterminate and unorderly
area. By mastering a craft, we can bring order to that area for the sake of improving human
life in some way, whether this is to minister to our basic needs or to facilitate our social and
civic life.
As we shall see in sections 2.2 2.6, this is precisely the view that Socrates advocates to
Thrasymachus. The claims that crafts are discovered to meet some human need (341e), that
they are as complete or perfect as possible (341e 342b), and a nest of other claims about the
Putting aside
the merits of these arguments for the moment, even a cursory reading of them shows that
Socrates has in a mind a fuller notion of craft: one that intends to capture both the nature
of craft and its role in society, as well as certain kinds of attitude that come with practicing
a craft. And this fuller notion explains the fact that Socrates continues to pursue the idea of
justice as a craft in the remainder of Book I, despite purported evidence that he thinks the
idea is flawed in the refutation of Polemarchus.46

45
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This explanation of course does not answer those who see the entirety of Book I as a deliberate
exercise in failure. Thus, the burden of my reading is to show that the refutation of Thrasymachus
is more successful than it is purported.
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Accordingly, the accusation that craft and justice are different because the former is
productive, concerned with a distinct goal apart from the craft itself, cannot be regarded as
the nature of craft in the refutation of Polemarchus. Rather, I suggest that what Socrates is
doing is relying on commonplace facts about crafts as a means to reveal the flaw of
not because we
are pursuing it as if it were a craft. Rather, it is trivial because Polemarchus views it as trivial.
As it is well noted, the general problem with Polemarchean justice
harming enemies

benefitting friends and

is that he sees it merely as a property of actions rather than something

that structures life as whole. Polemarchus reflects the everyday attitude of ordinary people
towards justice. To act justly is akin to following an old adage or a maxim. It requires neither
objection is to highlight the triviality of viewing justice in this way. What can such a
superficial view of justice really tell us about what justice is useful for? When placed next to
ordinary crafts

with their clearly demarcated areas of expertise and designated role in

society this everyday attitude towards justice comes up short. Polemarchus struggles to
is trivial.
This reading helps us explain why Socrates is the first to bring up the idea that justice is a
use the basic structure of crafts to put pressure on Polemarchus. Inquiring after justice as a
craft allows Socrates to ask certain kinds of questions that are revealing (e.g. who are the
benefactors of justice? What is the aim of justice? What means does justice use to
accomplish its aims?).47 The idea of benefitting friends and harming enemies turns out to
have very little to say in response to these important questions. And this is precisely the

Now I come to the another major criticism of the idea of justice as a craft, which shifts
tures to its potential to be misused. For many
47

This is a strategy we have already encountered in Chapter 1. In the Gorgias, Socrates begins with
the hypothesis that rhetoric is a craft as a means to ask a series of questions that are informed by
the structure of ordinary crafts. These questions ultimately help Socrates reveal the various
disguises of rhetoric (447c 454b) and that rhetoric falls short of being a craft.
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that the person who is most
capable in a craft is also the one who is most capable of abusing it (334a10 b5)
most transparent effort to highlight the flaw of treating justice as a craft.48 C.D.C. Reeve
accurately captures this view when he writes:

(334c1 335a10), make use of the craft analogy (332d2 3). And Plato indicates
334b6) point us to its most
glaring flaw. A craft is a capacity for opposites. It enables its possessor to do
both good and bad things. The doctor knows how to cure, but ipso facto he
knows how to kill as well. A virtue on the other hand, can result only in good
things. A virtuous person cannot perform vicious acts. Precisely on this
ground Aristotle will later reject the idea that virtues are crafts
(Nicomachean Ethics 1129a11 17). Once again, we are being given a subtle clue
to what is really going on.49
Reeve cites this feature as one of the central reasons that Plato will go on to reject the craft
that crafts have the wrong kind of relationship to their ends for thinking about justice. One
way to express this worry is to say that although a craft has some intended end (usually
closely tied to its function), it cannot ensure that craftsmen are always motivated to bring
it about. Ideally doctors aim to heal patients and to do no harm. But in actuality, doctors
are motivated by all sorts of things (honour, wealth, revenge, etc.), with healing being only
one among them. There will inevitably be bad doctors. Nothing about acquiring medical
expertise guarantees that doctors use it for its intended purpose. In fact, medical expertise
makes them especially equipped to use it to harm.
If we treat justice as a craft thus conceived, not only does this view contradict repeated
claims in Plato that virtue is fine, beneficial, and good, but it also makes justice a kind of
value-neutral skill for accomplishing whatever end the just person desires. This is what Julia
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Socrates makes a similar point in the Hippias Minor. By relying mostly on an analogy between
medicine and justice, Socrates concludes that the just person is one who soul is in the condition
where it can voluntarily accomplish both fine and shameful actions (375b 376c). Questions of how
to precisely interpret this conclusion for Plato is controversial. For an influential interpretation and
general remarks on the problem of misuse with crafts and its implication for virtue, see Irwin
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Annas has in mind when she observes that the idea of craft essentially involves means-end
reasoning. It is a kind of value-neutral skill for achieving a variety of ends that are
antecedently determined. Thus, according to her, the flaw of treating justice as a craft
marchus is that the crafts lack a built-in
notion of the good towards which they must aim.50
Rooted in the criticisms of Reeve and Annas is the general feeling that there is something
deeply unattractive about treating justice (and virtue generally) as a kind of craft or skill.
On this picture, justice looks like the sort thing that has little effect over who we are, the
condition of our soul, and our character. It appears to be a detached body of knowledge that
tells us how to pursue ends, rather than set those ends for us. Conceiving justice as a craft
may give us the technical proficiency for deliberation but leaves out important questions
about our values and how we shall live. Justice, the thought goes, ought to shape who we
are and the kind of life we lead. And once again, we find ourselves with the worry that craft
and justice are radically dissimilar.
I do not think that this picture is correct. One of my aims in this chapter is to show why.
idea of craft,
but to present us with a more demanding and complex conception of craft. This is what I
have called the origins view of craft, which is put forth by Socrates in the refutation of
Thrasymachus. In contrast to Thrasymachus, the origins view of craft understands the
nature of craft as essentially a service, and requires a complete and deep mastery of the

implausible and as I shall argue in the next sections, his arguments are more promising than
they are often supposed
arguments, we will be in a better position to see how the idea of craft can abate the worry
about misuse.
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For now however, I wish to draw our attention to a tension in the text highlighted by
who is most capable of doing good and bad things in his craft (333e6 334a8). If the
mainstream reading of this claim is right
applying this feature to the just person

if Plato is intending us to see the fatal flaw of
then it is puzzling why Socrates would go on to

advocate for a view that directly belies this lesson. As he goes on to tell Thrasymachus later,
a craftsman, in the precise sense, is someone who seeks to benefit the recipients of his craft
and never himself (342d3 8). In the same vein, the ruler, in virtue of being a craftsman in
the precise sense, always promotes the interests of his subjects and never himself (342d10
e11). This matter comes out even more sharply when we find Socrates relying on the same
medical example to make both claims.51 On the face it, these two claims are not obviously
inconsistent. For it is certainly possible for a doctor to possess the ability to heal and harm
as part of his expertise, but for various psychologically complex reasons, he always acts with
a view to benefit his patients. Indeed, this is what I take to be the view that Plato presents
to us in Book I. But if the mainstream reading is correct, then we would apparently find
in the analogy to
justice, only to show us later that the commitment to ruling being a craft should lead us to
think that true rulers never act unjustly. This reading then would have Socrates argue
explicitly for a view which he has intended to refute earlier.
The crucial difference between the two claims is clearly in the language of craftsmen in the
precise
conditions that would constitute an ideal craftsman, whereas with Polemarchus he is
relying on a certain ordinary sense of the word. My remarks with regard to
previous objection apply here in much the same way. The idea of using justice to do both
benefits to friends and harms to enemies. Polemarchus is appalled by the suggestion that
the just person is the most clever (deinos) thief (334a10), but his version of the just person
would have to be one if he is to perform good actions to some and bad ones to others. Hence,

51

6).
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the propensity for seeing justice in terms of d
deinos

7) throughout this argument should also invite us to

be more cautious of his characterization of the craftsman. It is likely that he is not
considering the craftsman with respect to his knowledge and expertise as a precise account
would involve (e.g. epistmêmôn, technikos), but rather with respect to someone who
exhibits a certain

-like ability for serving a variety of ends. In this

respect, the mainstream reading is right about the faults with justice in this argument, but
it is wrong to attribute it to the idea of craft simpliciter. As I noted previously, we are given
little information about how Socrates or Polemarchus might view the nature of craft besides
some commonplace facts which are taken for granted. For these considerations, it seems
, not as evidence for highlighting the weakness of treating
justice as a craft, but rather as an exercise that intends to draw out the flaws of a certain
ordinary and unreflective attitude towards justice, as exemplified by Polemarchus. This
strategy relies on ordinary perceptions of craftsmen, in contrast to what Socrates will go on
to do later at the insistence of Thrasymachus, who prefers to speak about craftsmen and
precise

2.2. The Origins View of Craft
We are now ready to move on to the second major place in the text that is commonly taken
to support the mainstream reading. Thrasymachus roars into the midst of discussion, loudly
3). Over the
Socrates offers three arguments that rely on
the idea of craft: the nature of craft argument (341c 342e), the wage-earning argument
(345e 347e), and non-pleonetic argument (349b1 350c). All of which are generally taken to
be deeply flawed and highly implausible.
Before proceeding to the details of these arguments and addressing their most common
criticisms, I shall begin by developing what I take to be the larger view of crafts motivating
of craft has not been well-understood in the mainstream interpretation, it is important to
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first establish what I view as the correct understanding. Once we have this view in place, we
and well-founded. In what follows, I develop what I have called the origins view of craft,
paying close attention to issues that arise in the interpretation of Republic I.
At the heart of this origins view
discovered to meet human needs:
If you asked me whether our bodies are sufficient in themselves or whether
they need something
of this, because our bodies are deficient rather than self-sufficient, the craft
of medicine has now been discovered. The craft of medicine was developed
to provide what is advantageous for a body. D
saying this or not? (341e2 7).52

consideration reveals that it is fundamental to the picture of crafts that Plato presents to us
in Book I. According to the passage, a deficiency arises in some area, such as our bodily
function. This deficiency, Socrates points out, is the product of a lack or an incomplete
nature in the thing in question. Bodies are not self-sufficient and have nutritive and
remedial needs. Because of this deficiency (dia tauta, 341e4), and out of necessity, medicine
understanding of the nature of crafts as essentially a service. In providing and seeking what
is advantageous to that which each craft is naturally set over (341d8 9), crafts contribute
something beneficial to human beings. A little later in the refutation, Socrates elaborates
that each craft is individuated on the basis of providing or performing something unique
(346a1 9, 346d5 6). In doing so, each craft benefits us in a peculiar way, not common with
the others (346a6-7).53
These claims indicate to us that Plato does not perceive the nature of crafts to be valueneutral nor completely lacking in any built-in notion of the good, as the mainstream
52

53

,
I address objections to this origins argument directly in section 2.3.

;
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interpretation would have us believe. Clearly, the crafts do lack a notion of the good in the
full sense as we do not come to have knowledge of it through any ordinary craft. But this
does not mean that the ordinary crafts are value-neutral.54 On the contrary, we have good
reasons to believe that Plato envisages them to be minimally benefit-oriented because their
nature is to meet the various areas of human need. And in some sense, this view is even
agreeable to Thrasymachus.
Whether he is thinking about the craft of ruling or shepherding, Thrasymachus certainly
believes that crafts are beneficial in some way. But what is so fundamentally disagreeable to
him

is that crafts are means of

benefitting anyone else besides their practitioners. Thrasymachus might agree with
Socrates about why crafts originated (342a1), but there is no good reason to think that
practitioners ought to act for the sake of this original purpose or that it is realistic to expect
them to do so. In fact, given that human nature is ultimately defined by self-interest,
Thrasymachus thinks that craftsmen and rulers will always act with the aim of seeking their
own interests. And in the eyes of Thrasymachus, this culminates with the large scale act of
appropriating all the material resources and enslaving others (344a7 b1, 344b5 6). For
Socrates, this is to misuse the crafts but for Thrasymachus, this is a realistic and even a
desirable state of affairs. I shall
for now I focus on the question of how we get from the original purpose of crafts described
craftsman, seeks or orders what is advantageous to the object of his craft and never himself
(342d3 8). In other words, what reasons might Socrates have for thinking that craftsmen,
especially rulers, will seek to honour the original aims of their crafts?
Several clues internal and external to Book I help us answer this question. Let us begin with
the internal textual evidence. As Plato presents things in Book I,
throughout the refutation of Thrasymachus is to establish the craftsman as someone who is
functionally defined in reference to his craft. The doctor, he notes, in the precise sense, is
defined as someone who treats the sick rather than a money maker (341c5 9), since the
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In the next two chapters, I explore the normative limitations of the nature of ordinary crafts.
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former is the function of medicine.

tain is defined according to his

craft (kata tên technê, 341d4) and his rule over his sailors (341c10 d4). The relationship
between the craftsman and his craft is presented as being so close that we often find Socrates
preferring to speak impersonally abou
). And only when he has established some claim about the nature
of craft does Socrates then move on to apply the same conclusion to the craftsman. This
preference is not accidental,
For Socrates, the craftsman is in some sense secondary to the craft he practices. What I
mean is this. The identity of the craftsman is determined exclusively by the nature of what
he knows. In the same m
.
commitment to and mastery of a body of knowledge become the defining features of the
sort of person he is. The clearest expression of this claim is found in the Gorgias. There,
Socrates claims:

who has learned music a musician? And a man who has learned medicine is
this so too, by the same reasoning, with the other crafts?
makes him? (

Grg. 460b1 5).

To ask who is the craftsman amounts to asking what is the nature of his craft. And here lies
part of the reason why Socrates would claim that craftsmen seek what is advantageous to
personifications of their
expertise. What is important for him is to establish the nature of crafts understood in a
particular way: providing an assortment of services and aids that benefit human beings. The
identity of the craftsman is only then understood in reference to this nature. At the
invitation of Thrasymachus who introduces the language of precisely speaking, Socrates is
not looking to describe the various ways in which craftsmen might fall short in the world,
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but what it means to be craftsmen in th

precise
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And this means personifying

bodies of knowledge which by their nature is to be of service to human life.
To sum up, ordinary crafts are not value-neutral in the ways that they might initially appear.
Rather, they are benefit-oriented and have their origins and nature in serving various areas
of human need. Moreover, Socrates understands the role of the craftsmen as exclusively
determined by the nature of their expertise. In this respect, ideal craftsmen are viewed as
the personifications of their crafts. However, this description is not only an abstract ideal
or merely a theoretical claim. There are good reasons for thinking that craftsmen would be
motivated to use their crafts in the ways that they were intended. Here I consider two
b

account of crafts in order to illuminate the

motivations, especially the worry about misuse.
First, what suffices for possessing a craft for Plato is not merely the ability to bring about a
product or result. It also involves the ability to perform various intellectually complex tasks
on the basis of possessing understanding of a particular field. In a well-known passage from
the Gorgias, Socrates contrasts craft with knack (or experience: empeiria) and routine
(tribê). (463a6 466a3), on the grounds that those who possess a knack are unable to provide
causal explanations and lack accounts of the nature of the objects of their crafts (4652a2
5). They merely proceed by guessing (464c6) on the basis of memorizing what customarily
happens (501a7 1). In contrast, a craft proceeds
nature of the object it serves and the cause of the thing it does, and is able to give an account
501a 6).56 The suggestion is that possessing a craft is not a mechanical and
rote activity, accumulated through the sheer collection of facts. Rather, it involves the

55

This is evidenced by several occasions where Socrates confirms that Thrasymachus is talking
about craftsmen in the precise sense: 341b5 6; 342b6 7; 342d7 8.
56
I return to this passage in Chapter 4.
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explanations on the basis of those principles that define his craft.57 This knowledge extends
beyond mere know-how; it involves a deeper and complete grasp that we might nowadays
characterize as understanding.58
We also find support for this idea outside of the Gorgias. In the Ion, Socrates argues that
those who are able speak on the basis of craft and knowledge (epistêmê) are able to do so
about the whole (to holon) of the craft (532c5 9). He reasons that there is a common manner
of inquiry59 that defines each craft (532d2 3) and possessing it means mastering the whole
of the subject, rather than a part of it (532e1 4
possesses a craft rely on their knowledge of the principles of their craft (e.g. the specific
manner of inquiry) to guide their actions and judgements of the various parts that
constitute the whole field. For instance, Socrates claims that those who are able to judge
and speak well about painters can do so not just about Polygnotus but about every painter
as long as he is one (532e7 533b4). The reasoning here is presumably that the craftsman can
answer questions about what makes a painting a good one, what sort of techniques can
bring about a good painting, how to judge if a particular painting is an instance of these
techniques, etc. These kinds of abilities suggest a complex intellectual process, one that
results in the ability to explain and relate particular parts in terms of some larger cohesive
whole.60
57

In making this point, I am in large agreement with Annas (1995) and (2011) who has argued over
the years for a non-rote and rich conception of craft/skill in Plato and Aristotle. Her focus generally
has been on the aspects of skill that are fit for thinking about the intellectual structure of virtue,
especially the acquisition and exercise of virtue. My aim here is to explain how this richer (and
what I consider the correct) notion of craft helps us address the worry about misuse a common
objection against the craft analogy and to develop a conception of craft with an eye towards
illuminating the psychological motivations of the virtuous person in order to address the issues of
Republic I. For the same reason, m
be exhaustive here.
58
epistêmê) as
understanding. See Schwab (2020), which includes a detailed survey of the literature and its
technê, especially 238 242.See
epistemology is about knowledge. For my
purposes, I use the idea of understanding in order to emphasize that craft is intellectually
demanding and a stable disposition, not to be mistaken as mere know-how or knowledge as a
collection of propositions.
59

60

Other intellectual abilities attributed to the craftsmen include the ability to give council
concerning decisions in their respective crafts (La.184e11 185a7, Grg. 514a5 515e10, Prt. 314a3 b4)
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All these remarks give us good evidence for thinking that what suffices for possessing a craft
for Plato is highly demanding

amounting to complete mastery. As such, it is inaccurate to

characterize it as essentially involving only means-end reasoning or as a state that arises
through the routine memorization of a set of instructions. Rather, for Plato, possessing a
craft involves a more complete and deep understanding of the whole of its subject matter.
The craftsman does not merely calculate the means of successfully bringing about a certain
end, but reflects and evaluates his actions in terms of the principles governing the whole of
his craft. Thus what distinguishes the craftsman from the layman is not how well one knows
how to perform a set of isolated actions, but the disposition to act in a unified way on the
basis of a deep and complete understanding.
Here I submit that the motivation to honour the original aims of crafts grows out of this
understanding. A doctor may know how to kill as part of what he knows about medicine,
but he would not kill in order to promote his own self-interests (e.g. money, revenge)
because he understands that this action cannot be explained or justified in terms of the
principles that constitute medicine, for instance, that it should seek and provide what is
advantageous for the human body (Resp. 341e2 7). A doctor who does kill for his own selfinterest is only a doctor in the putative sense, and not, as we will see later, in the precise
sense. This is because he lacks the unified disposition to act on reasons that cohere well
with the whole of medicine. In fact, I suggest that this action is not actually an instance of
to kill. Arguably, this medical fact can be obtained by any layman with sufficient research
performs actions that violate the principles of medicine does not
possess the craft of medicine, but merely the collection of a set of medical facts. In contrast,
a true doctor is one whose actions proceed from a unified and complete understanding of
the craft of medicine.
I do not think that this idea is counter-intuitive to our own contemporary thought about
various sorts of professional skills and expertise. Often when we witness doctors or

and the ability to make certain kinds of evaluative judgements with respect to other practitioners in
their particular fields (Ion 531d12 532b7).
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firefighters who perform actions that appear to involve extraordinary moral virtue (e.g.
jumping in a burning building to save a child, risking the potential for contracting infectious
disease), they cite the reason for their actions as simply doing their job. What this idea
expresses is that, precisely speaking, a good craftsman is not a good person who happens to
be a firefighter or a doctor, but someone who is good at those crafts conceived in the right
way (e.g. save lives and protect property, alleviate pain and promote health). 61 The
he nature of his craft motivates him to perform those actions
which his craft demands of him.
A second and related
fts are teachable and
therefore learnable is well-recognized. While it is possible that one can become competent
in a craft without a teacher (La. 185e4 6), on the whole, he has acquired his craft by being
taught (La. 185b1 4; Prt. 319b5-c1). We have some idea of the kind of training a craftsman
would undergo. In another passage from the Gorgias (514a5 e9), Socrates draws a parallel
between those experts who are called upon in the Assembly to make building and medical
decisions and those who are called to manage the affairs of the city. Socrates notes that a
craftsman must begin by learning how to execute a craft successfully under the guidance of
a teacher (514b7 c2). Then, over time, he must learn to do so independently (514c2 3). This
learning process involves trial and error. Socrates observes that before a trusted doctor is
called upon to state-level services, he would need to have sufficiently exercised his craft in
private practice

with many indifferent62 and successful outcomes (514e3 6). The

suggest
opportunity to improve at his craft by learning from both his successes and failures.
Gorgias is to highlight the
similarities between those who would take on political rule and those who are expert
enough to perform at the city-wide level, rather than any craftsman who is in private
practice. These passages highlight for us again that the kind of expertise Plato is interested
in the context of virtue and political rule is highly demanding. More importantly, the
61
62

Barney (2006) makes this point as well (50).
en to bring about.
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passages reveal to us that acquiring a craft is developmental. How to precisely flesh out the
stages of this development rewards further examination. However, for the purpose of the
present discussion, the details of this development can be set aside. What is important is
s from a stable
disposition developed through a gradual process of learning and training. This development
requires an extended period of time, characterized by increasing intellectual effort, some of
which includes developing the abilities to independently execute a craft successfully and to
detect the causes of failures so that they lead to improvement and future success.
In this way, I suggest that we have another reason for thinking that craftsmen would be
motivated to honour the original aims of their crafts. The significant intellectual effort, time,
training required for achieving the level of expertise Plato had in mind come to form the
might say that mastering a craft is transformative. The process of acquiring a craft involves
of inquiring problems in his field, of demonstrating his knowledge, and of giving
explanations. Simultaneously, he must actively contribute to his own learning in a way that
enables him to advance from a beginner to an expert in a way that is peculiar to his craft.
Moreover, this period of education is conducted by other experts who are members of the
same community of which the learner will eventually become a member himself. In this
respect, the learner is shaped by the practices and interests of those that make up his
discipline. As we shall see, this aspect of community will play a crucial role when we look at
all of this indicates an educational process that yields a stable disposition in the craftsman.
soning and environment has been
shaped by his prolonged training in various aspects of his craft

its principles, norms,

methodology, and aim. The craftsman is motivated to do as his craft demands of him
because he has been trained to do so, in a manner that is intelligent rather than mechanical,
immersive rather than detached. It is in this way that a craftsman can be understood to
personify his craft. As Socrates puts it in the Gorgias
subject is the sort of man his expertise (epistêmê) makes

(Grg. 460b4 5).
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The above considerations form the central pillars that makeup what I have called the origins
view of craft. Let us take stock. I argued that the origins view of craft is founded on the idea
that crafts were first discovered to meet human needs, an argument that Socrates makes
explicit in his refutation of Thrasymachus. This view helps us see that the crafts are not
value-neutral but are services that aims to provide benefits to human life. Socrates believes
that craftsmen would be motivated to abide by the original aims of their crafts in part
because he envisages them to be the personifications of their expertise. That is, their
identity is determined by the nature of what they know. This claim is not only made
explicitly in the Gorgias; it is also evidenced in Republic I by the emphasis and language in
which suppose any claims about the craftsmen
follows directly once the nature of craft has been established.
Moreover, I suggested that viewing craftsmen as the personifications of their expertise is
not merely an abstract idea. We have good reasons to believe that craftsmen would be
motivated to use their crafts to serve others in the ways that they were intended, and not,
(as mainstream interpreters object), prone to abuse their crafts for selfish interests. Here I
possessing a craft is highly demanding as it involves a complete and deep understanding of
the whole of its subject matter. This understanding is measured by the disposition to
one performs a set of isolated actions. Second, crafts are acquired through an extensive
period of training and learning. I argued that given the significant time, practice, and effort
required for mastering a craft, the process is transformative and ends up shaping the learner
in ways that are characteristic of an expert in his craft. This is the basic worldview that
specifics of these arguments, showing how, given the origins view of craft, they are stronger
than they are often supposed to be.

2.3. Rulers and Craftsmen in the Precise Sense
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One of the most striking things about how the refutation of Thrasymachus gets underway
is that it is Thrasymachus who introduces the idea of craft in the course of articulating his
own account of justice. Much has been written on the exact position Thrasymachus means
to advance about justice and to what degree his position can be rendered coherent. 63 These
difficulties however do not preclude us from seeing that one central disagreement between
Thrasymachus and Socrates is the question of what it means to be a ruler in the precise
sense. Is it someone who seeks and orders what is advantageous for himself or for his
subjects? To varying degrees, both ground their answers to this question by appealing to
principles of craft. And so the question of what constitutes a real ruler is largely pursued
along the lines of what it means to practice the craft of ruling.

339a1 2). Those who are in positions of rule make laws to serve their own
interests and in turn declare to their subjects that following these laws is just (338e1 6).
Thus, to do what is just is really to do what is advantageous for the stronger. With this
account, Thrasymachus introduces the crucial idea that justice is the product of a kind of
political arrangement between rulers and those who are ruled. Henceforth, the focus of the
discussion turns towards what constitutes an ideal ruler. Does ruling involve a commitment
to complete injustice and possessing the power to attain those ends of injustice? Or does it
involve a commitment to justice and acting as the craft of ruling prescribes, to seek and
order what is advantageous for its subjects?
In response to Thrasymachus, Socrates gets him first to agree that rulers are not infallible
but are liable to make mistakes about their own their interests (339c1 6). In turn, whenever
the established rulers undertake to make laws, they will sometimes prescribe laws that are
in their interests and sometimes prescribe laws that work against them (339c7 9). By
63

whether he espouses a coherent position on justice. For an introduction to this issue, see Annas
(1981), especially 36 37 and Chappell (1993). For arguments that Thrasymachus does not hold a
coherent position, see Maguire (1997) and Everson (1998). For arguments that he does, see Kerford
(1947), Reeve (2008), and Wedgewood (2017). For my purposes, I set aside these issues and focus on
the differences between Socrates and Thrasymachus on the nature of craft and its relationship to
ruling.
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demanding their subjects follow those laws in the name of justice (339c10 11), the
established rulers sometimes unwittingly order their subjects to do things that work against
. If this is true, Socrates concludes, then in some cases justice is doing
what is disadvantageous to the rulers (339d1 3).
scaping this contradiction is to distinguish rulers in the precise
sense (ton akribei logoi) from rulers in the ordinary sense (ton hos epos eipein) (341b5 6).
To our surprise, he does so by appealing to ordinary craftsmen. He claims that we express
oursel
of these, insofar as he is what we call him, never errs, so that, according to the precise
account (and you are stickler for precise
that error he is no craftsman

340d8 e3).

e3 4).

makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and
(340e8 a3, cf. Grg. 460b4 5).
irst, he could have
believes to be advantageous
(340b6 8). This is a philosophically interesting view. Rulers need not be bound by the
factual outcomes of their laws. What matters is that they are in such a powerful position
that they can command others to serve their interests, whatever they happen to believe
those are at the time. But Thrasymachus rejects this solution. From his explanation, we can
see that he is not interested in the mere power to enact laws, but rather is committed to the
. And what brings
(like the kind other craftsmen exercise in their respective crafts) to skillfully rule by
committing complete injustice. As Thrasymachus makes clear later, he has in mind a tyrant
who appropriates property, kidnaps and enslaves citizens (344a c). What seems attractive
to Thrasymachus about crafts is that they represent a kind of power for successfully
attaining ends. The tyrant is successful at ruling the same way that the doctor is successfully
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344a8).64

wealth, power, and

Second, we may assume that Socrates and Thrasymachus share the same conception of
craft, but disagree only with respect to its proper aim. However, there are further subtle but
important differences. As I outlined earlier in my account of the origins view of craft,
Socrates views the craftsman as secondary to his craft, that is, his identity as a craftsman is
determined exclusively in reference to the nature of the craft he practices. In contrast,
In his cynical
worldview, crafts are seen as a competitive asset in a zero-sum game, where my getting
more is done at the expense of you getting less. In order to survive and thrive under such
being a doctor is just another way to gain power and money or any of the other
or disease is
ultimately subordinate to what Thrasymachus sees as the universal desire governing all
human beings: pleonexia65, the desire to outdo others in pursuing

-

interest.66 Crafts, especially the kind practiced by the tyrant, are seen as an asset in pursuing
our pleonetic desires, rather than a service for meeting the various areas of human need.
They serve the practitioner as opposed to prescribing standards which the practitioner will
aim to personify. These two radically different perspectives on the nature of craft provide
precise

64

It has sometimes been suggested that Thrasymachus only appeals to the idea of craft under
pressure from Socrates. However, that Thrasymachus would appeal to technê in order to explicate
his view of ruling would not be unlikely given that we know he was a famous sophist and orator.
The Sophists notoriously enriched the idea of technê
intellectually and ethically oriented disciplines. See Zhumid (2006), especially 46 47. See Nawar
65

s understanding of craft.
I discuss the precise meaning of pleonexia in section 2.6.

66

justice do it unwillingly and because they lack the power to do injustice, if in our thoughts we grant
to a just and an unjust person the freedom to
handed travelling the same road as the unjust. The reason for this is the desire to outdo others and
la

c6).
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Finally, the passage above marks an important methodological shift for the discussion to
follow. It deser
precise sense and in the ordinary sense is primarily concerned with the grounds for their
(340d8 e1)67.
in ordinary language we refer to craftsmen in reference to their professional standings. But
this is merely a loose way of speaking. The precise grounds for someone being called a
doctor or a grammarian is determined on the basis of him possessing the relevant expertise,
in particular for Thrasymachus, the infallible exercise of that expertise. In the same way, a
ruler is not someone who happens to occupy the position of ruling but someone who
possesses the ability to rule.68 By introducing the ruler in the precise sense, Thrasymachus
is attempting to clarify the grounds for distinguishing true rulers from putative rulers. And
with it, he outlines the kinds of traits that are rational for us to aspire, given the kind of
world in which we live.

2.4.
342e)

First Argument: The Nature of Craft (341c

By framing the true ruler as a tyrant who is skilled at accomplishing injustice, Thrasymachus
has in effect refocused the problem of misuse. Recall that on the mainstream interpretation,
a fatal flaw with crafts is that they can be used to promote ends for which they are
-neutrality and reveals that they possess
the wrong kind of relationship to their ends for thinking about justice and ruling.
Thrasymachus has taken this problem one step further by subverting the value of crafts
altogether. He shows that crafts are designed to serve the interests of their practitioners.
344b7 c1).
Socr
serve the interests of that which they are naturally set over (341d8 9). And if Thrasymachus

67
68

The Eleatic Stranger makes a similar point the Politicus: that a private citizen is worthy to be
called a doctor and king only if he possesses the relevant expertise (Plt. 259a1 b5).
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is committed to ruling as a craft, then he must accept that a true ruler seeks and provides
what is advantageous to his subjects, rather than himself.

(1) Each craft seeks and provides what is advantageous to that which it is by nature set
over.
(2) Ruling is the craft that seeks and provides what is advantageous to its subjects, that
which ruling is naturally set over.
(3)
himself, not to his subjects.
(4)
t of ruling.
Thrasymachus objects:
You think that shepherds and cowherds seek the good of their sheep and
cattle, and fatten them and take care of them, looking to something other
in
cities true rulers, that is think about their subjects differently than one
does about sheep, and that night and day they think of something besides
their own advantage (343b1 c1).
Commentators react to this argument in much of the same way as Thrasymachus, viewing

optimistic.69 Thrasymachus (and mainstream interpreters) may be right to claim that there
are rulers and shepherds who behave in this abusive way, but the challenge is to show that
they are, as Thrasymachus claims, true rulers and shepherds. That is, it remains to be shown
that this abusive behaviour is the way that crafts ought to be practiced. My reading is that
while Socrates presents a demanding conception of craft and ruling, it is neither naïve nor
overly optimistic. Rather it offers an effective answer to the Thrasymachean worldview.
The most controversial
offering two supporting points. The first supporting point comes from

in

the origins view of craft: the claim that crafts are discovered and developed to meet some
specific areas of human need. This claim secures from Thrasymachus the agreement that
69

benefit of their objects and not of their practitioners, and this seems absurdly optimistic (49).
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crafts, as bodies of knowledge, are naturally oriented (pephuken) towards some specific area
(341e8 9). Thrasymachus may be eager to point out that shepherds are more likely to seek
their own good than the good of the sheep. But even he must admit that shepherding, as a
body of knowledge, would not exist unless there were shepherding needs which made the
discovery and development of such a craft necessary.70 It would be empirically false for
Thrasymachus to claim that the craft of shepherding is naturally oriented towards procuring
wealth for the practitioner. Hence, Socrates is well-reasoned to object that Thrasymachus
-maker rather than a sh

(345d1).

Thrasymachus is vulnerable to this objection because he has insisted on discussing the
craftsmen in the precise sense and has previously agreed that craftsmen, precisely speaking,
are not money-makers, but defined in reference to the function of their respective crafts
(341c5 d10).
After establishing that each craft is naturally oriented towards that which it is set over,
Socrates offers a second point in support of premise (1), the idea that crafts are complete or
perfect (teleios) areas of expertise. The purpose of this argument is to eliminate the
possibility that crafts are, in some way, naturally aimed toward providing what is
advantageous for themselves. Socrates presents this argument as an exclusive disjunction:
either crafts provide something advantageous for themselves or they provide something
advantageous for their proper objects. Since crafts have no deficiencies and are complete or
perfect, there is no need for them to seek what is advantageous for themselves but only that
which they are naturally set over. This argument strikes most readers as dubious. It seems
blatantly false to suggest that crafts have no further needs for improvement. This is
of medicine, which is always in need
of further discoveries to meet its goal. Thus,
(342b2 3) in medicine or any other craft seems plainly false.
To this, we can answer that by characterizing crafts as complete or perfect, Socrates means
that they are self-sufficient. Socrates first contrasts medicine with the human body by
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Book II describes the purposes of cowherds, shepherds, and other herdsman as providing cows to
farmers for ploughing, oxen for builders to haul their materials, and fleece for weavers and cobblers
(370d9 e3).
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341e5 6).71 The body has

needs which it is unable to provide for itself in order for it to perform its characteristic
some further virtue, as the eyes are in need of sight, and the ears of hearing, so that another
craft is needed to seek an

342a2 5). The reasoning

here is that in order for the eyes to perform their characteristic activity of seeing, they
require an additional thing, namely sight

the capacity for seeing. This indicates to us that

Socrates is only committed to the claim that medicine does not need something else
another body of knowledge

to supply what it lacks in order for it to perform the work for

which it is naturally suited. This is true even if we grant that medicine, as we know it now,
may not be capable of treating every kind of disease. But as a body of knowledge, medicine
is complete or perfect in the sense that it is self-sufficient. It contains within itself the
exhaustive means necessary for bringing about health. There may be new discoveries to
make, but it would be on account of medicine and its principles for making such discoveries,
rather than another craft. Again,

aim is to establish the nature of medicine as a

self-sufficient body of knowledge, rather than the state as it is currently possessed by some
particular group of practitioners at some point in time. So, if the crafts are complete or
perfect in the sense of being self-sufficient, then it is not appropriate for them to seek what
is advantageous for themselves. And hence, we are left with the second option of our
exclusive disjunction, that crafts do not seek what is advantageous for themselves, but only
that of which they are the crafts.

designed, by nature, to seek and provide what is advantageous for that which they are
naturally set over. And if Thrasymachus is committed to ruling as a craft, then we can see
that the argument works effectively to undermine his account. The foundation of any
political institution exists for serving some necessary need for our social and civic life (e.g.
the need to live together harmoniously, protection from wild life and natural disasters, a
social agreement for sharing benefits and burdens, etc.). The discovery and development of
the craft of ruling occurs for meeting such specific need. In addition, ruling is a self71
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sufficient body of knowledge. Its exercise does not depend on some additional governing
first argument sets out to show the right way for rulers to rule on the basis of a particular
understanding of the nature of craft. His argument is not, as is often supposed, intended to
establish the altruism of rulers and craftsmen. Now as I pointed out in my account of the
origins view of craft, we have independent reasons for thinking that craftsmen would be
motivated to practice their crafts in the ways that they were intended, given the right
training and that they meet the sufficient level of expertise.
nt flaw in
right way to
practice the crafts is to use them as a means for personal gain. Sure his view might have a
certain realist appeal by capturing the ways some rulers and experts behave. But his
argument fails to work as a normative claim about why we should think that this behaviour
is a good one or one that qualifies them as true rulers and shepherds, as Thrasymachus puts
it. We have more reasons to side with Socrates by thinking that Thrasymachean rulers and
As I noted earlier, what appeals to Thrasymachus about the idea of craft is that it enables
practitioners to successfully and infallibly bring about a certain result. This is the way that
most mainstream scholar interprets the idea of craft in Book I. Yet, it is clear that we are
given a more fleshed out view of why Socrates thinks that ordinary crafts illuminate ruling
more than they detract from it. And if rulers are practicing the craft of ruling, they would
be just. On the other hand, Thrasymachus lacks a fully developed view of the nature of craft.
He could very well respond that although crafts were originally discovered for meeting
specific needs, they have since evolved to take on new or multiple aims. One of these aims
is to satisfy the interests of their practitioners, given facts about human nature and our
society. But Thrasymachus does not pursue this line of reasoning and this ultimately limits
his account of ruling as he is forced by Socrates to accept a host of other claims about the
nature of craft. The ideal tyrant may be a ruler in the putative sense, but he is not engaged
in the craft of ruling but the only procuring material wealth and power for himself. So
Socrates is justified
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seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subjects;
the ones of whom he is him

342e7 10).

Still we might think that Thrasymachus has a point, that the argument fails to distinguish
between a craft aiming at its own advantage and it aiming at the advantage of its
craftsman.72 We might grant that crafts are self-sufficient, but their practitioners are clearly
not. And a craft that aims at the advantage of its practitioner does not clearly indicate that
it is deficient in some way. So Thrasymachus is still able to claim that ruling provides what
is advantageous for its practitioners, even though there is no need for ruling to seek what is
this worry.

2.5.

-Earning

(345e 347e)

If the point of crafts (including ruling) is to benefit their practitioners, then why are
craftsmen provided wages for their services? This is the crucial question posed to
-earning. The argument begins by
introducing another importan

the idea that

each craft is uniquely individuated. Socrates begins by stating that every craft differs from
another on the basis of possessing a unique power (dunamis) for supplying us a product or
result that

346a6 7). For

instance, medicine provides us with health, and sailing provides us with safety at sea
(346a7 8). It is on account of each of their respective powers for providing such results that
we recognize medicine and navigation as the distinct crafts that they are. Given that
doctors, navigators, and all craftsmen for that matter receive wages for their practices
(346c5), and that wages are not the distinct result of any of their respective crafts, wages
must result from their collective practice of some additional craft, namely wage-earning
(346c9 11). If we take away their wages, Socrates notes, craftsmen would still provide some
kind of benefit in virtue of being doctors and housebuilders (346d1 e2). The point of the
argument is to show that practitioners are materially benefitted from a separate craft, rather
than their own respective crafts. In doing so, Socrates is again challenging the
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Thrasymachean conception of craft by maintaining that crafts (when considered apart from
wage-earning) benefit that which they are naturally set over, rather than their practitioners.
Many interpreters are quick to point out that the argument tends to pose more problems
than it solves them. 73 For one, it appears to undermine the view that Socrates has just
painstakingly tried to establish previously on the nature of craft, that no craft benefits its
practitioners. But now we are told that the craft of wage-earning in this regard. This makes
the argument appear ad hoc. What are we to make of the craft of wage-earning? Moreover,
does the argument provide a satisfying answer to Thrasymachus?
In response to these questions, it must first be conceded that it is possible that Socrates may
never have arrived at a fully developed view on the craft of wage-earning in the Republic,
371e), and the
education of the Guardians in Book IV. However, the argument as it stands is not as artificial
origins view of craft (341e2
is discovered out of necessity in order to fulfill some specific area of deficiency. In doing so,
each craft offers a unique benefit to us, not shared with others (346a6 8
argument here on wage-earning fits consistently with this picture that he has been
presenting. The existence of a body of knowledge that provides wages clearly serves a
necessary function in any society. It provides incentives for people to take up specialized
professions which are themselves vital. Craftsmen are also not self-sufficient. They cannot
provide for themselves all their material needs while simultaneously pursuing and
practicing their own crafts (Cf. Book II 369e 370c). And so they must also practice the craft
of wage-

346d4) their own crafts by benefitting them. So

while wage-earning is put forth as an anomalous craft, it is done so on the basis of claims

The argument would fare better if craftsmen were not characterized as the practitioners of
wage-earning, but rather as the object upon which the craft is exercised. Wage-earning
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provides what is advantageous to craftsmen by giving them wages in much the same way
that medicine provides health for bodies. This would avoid the problem of characterizing
wage-earn
seek to promote the advantage of that which they are naturally set over. In any case, as it
stands, the point of the argument is clear. The fact that wage-earning exits as a collective
Wage-earning provides wages to craftsmen and this is how they are in fact materially
benefitted.
The wage-earning argument provides an effective answer to Thrasymachus if we read it as
Socrates intends his argument to be read, as evidenced by his speech to Thrasymachus at
345b8 d1. He insists that they adhere to the discussion of true craftsmen as they had agreed
before. And this means defining them in reference to the function of their respective crafts
and not, as Thrasymachus has done, examining them as they behave in the world.
By putting forth the craft of wage-earning, Socrates is implicitly conceding that the
focused on the nature of craft over practitioners
Socrates and Thrasymac

an important point of difference between
-serving shepherd

crafts are designed to serve others? And if no benefits are in place, then what would
motivate anyone to take up crafts in the first place? Wage-earning provides an answer to
this issue by showing that craftsmen are in fact benefitted through the exercise of a separate
craft.
tion of the
shepherd and ruler. Socrates asserts that while it is possible for crafts to produce results
which they are not naturally oriented towards, such as becoming healthy while sailing, we
would not call sailing the craft of medicine on account that it happens to make us healthy
(346b1 6). Though the claim is not made explicit here, Socrates elaborates a little later that
ergon) of each thing is what it alone can do or what it does

65
353b2 4). This claim explains why health, though it can be
brought about through sailing, is not its natural end since medicine can effect health better
than sailing (presumably because medicine is discovered with an eye towards health).
Similarly, we can infer that though ruling can provide rulers with material benefits which
Thrasymachus has been describing (e.g. power to control property, wealth, and citizens), it
is a categorical mistake to ascribe these benefits to ruling. Thrasymachus has mistaken the
incidental features of ruling for that which ruling is naturally oriented towards
-earning argument
conces

s own interests must be considered.

2.6.
Pleonexia (349b1 350c)

-

point of the discussion, it has
on justice is that it is less profitable than injustice. The just person, he points out, always
gets less than the unjust person as evidenced by how they each fare in contracts and in their
own public and private affairs (343d2 e7). In fact, Thrasymachus boldly claims, justice is
-

348c12) and it is injustice that should be

identified with virtue and wisdom (348e1 4). This radical rejection of conventional beliefs
(348e8
344a1 2)74. And this power to
(pleonektein; pleon echein)
intelligence and represents the qualities that make one good and praiseworthy.
-argument once again proceeds by drawing a comparison between the just
person and the expert craftsman. The argument runs (roughly) as follows:

74

66
(1) A just person only wishes (and believes that he deserves) to outdo his opposite, an
unjust person (349b1 c3), while the unjust person wishes (and believes that he
deserves) to outdo everyone, both those who are like and unlike him (349c4 d2).
(2) The expert craftsman does not seek to outdo or believes that he deserves to outdo
other experts in his craft, only non-experts (349e1 350a5), while the non-expert
seeks to outdo and believes that he deserves to outdo everyone (350a11 b2).
(3) Therefore, the just person resembles the expert craftsman while the unjust person
resembles the non-expert.
(4) The expert craftsman is intelligent (phronimos, 349e4) and knowledgeable
(epistemôn, 350a7) in his craft, which makes him wise (sophos, 350b3) and good
(agathos, 349e6)75, while the non-expert is un-knowledgeable (350a11 b1), which
makes him ignorant (amathês) and bad (350b10).
(5) The just and unjust person is the kind of person they each resemble (349d11 12;
350c7 8). Hence, the just person is wise and good while the unjust person is ignorant
and bad (350b7 11).
(6) Therefore, justice is virtue and wisdom, while injustice is vice and ignorance (350d4
5).
This argument is perhaps the most poorly received of the series. It is criticized for being
obscure, obviously fallacious, and generally unsatisfying as it relies on a weak analogy
between the just person and the craftsman. One major objection levelled against the
son
outdoes others by being able to get more of a share of good things, while everyone else gets
less. This is what Thrasymachus means
cities under his power (348d5 6).
crafts, Socrates takes it to mean performing the craft well or badly, in an objectively
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As we have already seen in Chapter 1, Plato is notoriously flexible with knowledge-denoting
terms, especially
technê epistêmê
sophia
technê
epistêmê
9.
that a just person is. See White (1979) for an influential defence of the claim that Plato is not open
to this kind of objection about goodness because his commitment to a single Form of the Good
48). For the
the Republic. However, with respect to this argument, I believe that Socrates ascribes the term good
here to the craftsmen in virtue of their possession of knowledge. And with respect to the just
person, this is also the source of his goodness. The just person is good in virtue of his possession of
the relevant knowledge.

67
successfully shown that injustice is not a virtue on the basis that the craftsman does not
outdo those who are like him.76

position is best understood when we see that his argument is a direct response to
laim that the unjust person has good judgment (euboulia) and displays
intelligence and goodness by acting unjustly (348d1 4). His argument works by drawing a
comparison between the attitudes and behaviour of the craftsman

who is identified here

by Socrates as possessing the qualities of an intelligent and knowledgeable person in virtue
of his craft

to the attitudes and behaviour of the just person. The upshot of the argument

is that, due to the nature and structure of knowledge, those who are truly intelligent,
knowledgeable, wise, and good are not motivated by pleonexia to outdo everyone. Contrary
to what Thrasymachus claims, it is the just person who displays the attitude and behaviour
of those who are intelligent, rather than the unjust person. Moreover, I suggest that the idea
epistemic authority. The notions of power and authority help us clarify the kinship between
outdoing in the context crafts and outdoing in the context of justice and injustice. 77
To make my case, it is useful to begin with an important remark from Socrates in the middle
of the argument:
In any branch of knowledge or ignorance, do you think that a knowledgeable
person would intentionally try to outdo other knowledgeable people or say
something better or different than they do, rather than doing or saying the
very same thing as those like him? (350a6 9).78
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view that ruling is a craft. Thus far, we have not given any indication that Thrasymachus has
abandoned his view that his ideal ruler practices a craft by accomplishing injustice on a large scale.
Thrasymachus may hold a different view of the nature of craft and what constitutes a true
craftsman, but Socrates is justified to draw from craft experts to support his argument.
78
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There are several important things to note about this passage. To begin with, Socrates takes
himself to be making a general claim about knowledge and a knowledgeable person on
account of the examples drawn from crafts. Socrates began the argument by noting that a
craftsman (musician, doctor) is intelligent (phronimon) and good (agathon) in the subject
matter of his respective craft (349e4, e8). This is what distinguishes him from the one who
is ignorant in a craft, the non-expert. And in being a craftsman, he does not engage in
pleonexia towards his fellow craftsmen, but only towards those who are non-experts. We
may object that Socrates is not warranted to make this generalization on account of a few
examples. But
whatever subject matter he happens to be an expert) are prescribed by his knowledge.
Whether this is in the way that the musician tunes his lyre or the way that the doctor treats
the sick, the craftsman always does what is dictated by the particular branch of knowledge
of which he is an expert. I have already drawn our attention to the close relationship
between the craftsman and his craft in the origins view. I have argued that
ideal craftsmen are the personifications of their crafts. I have also pointed out that the
process of a mastering a craft is transformative. Here, we can see these ideas at work.
Socrates is drawing our attention to the way that knowledge affects us, not just in what we
know but in our attitude and our behaviour. One of the effects of being a knowledgeable
person, according to Socrates, is that one does not aim to outdo his fellow expert, but only
those who are ignorant.
Of course the important question is: why? There is a kind of curious vagueness in the way
that Socrates discusses the notion of outdoing in the crafts. We are never explicitly told just
how precisely the craftsman outdoes the non-craftsmen, with the exception of the brief
comment in above passage, that he might intentionally try to say something better or
some combination of acquisitiveness and competitiveness. It is the desire to have more at
the expense of others having less.79 But what precisely does the craftsman want more of over
the non-craftsman? And why does he not desire to have more of it when it comes to his
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fellow craftsman? And why does outdoing a non-craftsman involve saying something better
or different?
We might initially be tempted to answer that the craftsman obviously desires to outdo
others by competing for more money or some other form of material good. But this does
not explain why he might only choose to compete for such things with those who are nonexperts, and not his fellow craftsmen. If the goods in question are in fact material, then one
might think that the craftsman would be especially keen to have more of them over his
fellow craftsmen, whom he might view as direct competitors.
Instead, I answer that outdoing in this argument refers to something like the desire to
possess the power attached to being an epistemic authority. Several times throughout the
refutation of Thrasymachus, Socrates characterizes the crafts as ruling over that which they
are naturally set over. These claims suggest that he views all crafts as engaging in a kind of
rule.80 Commentators have typically dismissed these claims or found them puzzling. 81 But
Socrates has good grounds for thinking so. Crafts rule in virtue of possessing the power to
give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience in their respective areas of expertise.
Medicine is a ruler of bodies (342d7 8), for Socrates, because he sees it as the authoritative
branch of knowledge for deciding what is best for the human body. A doctor who acts in
accordance with the dictates of medicine is then in a position of authority with respect to
the health of the body.82 This authority is an epistemic one, as opposed to, say, one based
on force.

80

e1; cf.
341d2
one wants to rule for its own sake, but they ask for pay, thinking their ruling will benefit not
themselves but thei
346a1). Socrates then follows up this claim by pointing to
he is referring to (346a6 8).
81
For example, Parry (1996) calls the claim
17).
82
We will see Plato qualify this claim from another perspective in the next two chapters.
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The idea of epistemic authority helps us explain why Socrates maintains that craftsmen do
not wish or believe that they deserve to outdo their fellow craftsmen. Socrates attributes
this non-pleonetic feature to both the motivation and the attitude of the craftsmen. I shall
view, true craftsmen are in some sense fungible. There is no distinguishing feature that
cising his authority from another. This is because
their power to issue commands is prescribed by their crafts (347a1 3, 350a1 2). Their
authority is grounded in the objectivity of their craft and therefore their actions and
instructions are always unanimous. On this view, craft is not a private but a communal
endeavour. To practice a craft is to participate in the collective efforts of a community of
people who have studied and trained in the same branch of knowledge. In this way, craft is
unifying rather than competitive.83

musician attempted to outdo another musician by competing for the authority on how to
tune a lyre, it would turn out to be a fruitless task since he would be competing to issue the
same set of commands (e.g. what constitutes harmony) as his fellow musician. This is
fruitless because it is not possible for him to have more power on account of other musicians
having less by saying or doing the same thing as them. Outdoing his fellow musicians
requires him to distinguish himself in some way as being better and more capable. For the
same reason, Socrates maintains that a craftsman does not believe that he deserves to outdo
his fellow craftsman either. In th
prescribes. If a musician did believe that he deserves to outdo another musician, he would
either have to believe that his fellow musician is mistaken about some fact in music and
therefore not acting from the craft of music or that he himself is motivated to have more
power by deviating from the dictates of music. In both of these cases, the outdoing occurs
as the result of one person not acting from his craft and therefore not acting as a true
craftsman. As Socrates makes it clear in this argument, outdoing does not occur between
two craftsmen.
83

Pace Barney (2006), 53. It is true that crafts are typically characterized as competitive in the
ancient world. However, I do not believe that we have evidence for thinking that Plato viewed them
that way. More often, Plato tended to attribute the competitive feature of crafts to practitioners in
other disciplines, such as orators, sophists, and rhapsodes.
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We can now see why a craftsman wishes to and believes that he deserves to outdo a noncraftsman, and why this outdoing involves saying something better or different (350a8 9).
A non-craftsman is by definition someone who is ignorant in some craft. As such, he lacks
the epistemic authority to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience in that area
of expertise. If he attempted to exercise his authority (as Socrates seems to assume in this
argument), then he would rule on the basis of ignorance. A craftsman wishes to and believes
that he deserves to outdo a non-craftsman on the basis that he is the one who possesses the
real expertise. And he precisely wants the power to do so on account of the non-craftsman
having less. This outdoing involves saying something better or different because the dictates
that originate from knowledge and expertise are clearly different and better than the
dictates that originate from ignorance.
On the other hand, we can also see why a non-craftsman wishes to and believes that he
deserves to outdo everyone. The nonare not grounded in knowledge-related reasons. Most likely, his attempts are grounded in
the desire to satisfy his own interests. As such, he is not unified with others in the same way
that a craftsman is unified with his fellow practitioners in virtue of their shared expertise.
So, to the non-craftsman, everyone poses a threat to his efforts to satisfy his own interests.
-sum good between those
who possess the relevant expertise, but only in cases that involve the ignorant.
This reading not only makes good sense of the text but also provides us with the resources
to bridge the gap between outdoing in the context of crafts and outdoing in the context
justice and injustice. We have already seen that there is an important sense in which
Socrates understands all crafts as engaging in a kind of rule. I have argued that this ruling
is to be understood as possessing the epistemic authority over some area of expertise. This
point naturally lends itself to the discussion of political rule. Political rulers, we might say,
possess the ultimate authority
obedience

the power to give orders, make decisions, and enforce

over the city and its citizens. The Thrasymachean tyrant is motivated to possess

this authority because it puts him in a position to have access to material goods and, tacitly,
the freedom of self-governance. The tyrant is not subject to the constraints of conventional
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morality and the laws of others. He is in a position to dictate and achieve what he judges to
be in his best interest. And this ability to be completely unjust is to Thrasymachus,
344c5 6). So while the tyrant is interested
in accumulating all the material resources at the expense of others having less, the more
accurate claim is that he desires to be in a position that enables him have access to these
material goods. And it is this power or authority attached to political rule that is the object
it)
on account of everyone having less.
The just ruler is also interested in the power of political authority but for more complex
reasons. Socrates famously claims in Book I that good people do not seek to rule for money
or honour, but for fear of being ruled by someone worse than themselves (347c2 5). They
approach ruling as something necessary since it cannot be turned over to those better than
or even as good as themselves (347c6 d2). In an ideal city of good people, the citizens would
compete in order not to rule, because it would be clear to them that true rulers by nature
seek the advantage of their subjects rather than themselves (347d2 6). And knowing this,
the citizens would rather be benefited than to take on the burden of benefiting others
(347d6
as part of his argument on pleonexia, we can see that this description is consistent with
what he goes on to claim about outdoing in the context of justice.
The just person does not wish to nor believe that he deserves to outdo those who are like
him, that is, those who possess the relevant qualifications of being an epistemic authority.
True rulers are in this sense fungible. It matters less who rules as long as the ruler
understands the nature of political rule and acts and orders as ruling prescribes. However,
the just person is motivated to outdo those who are unlike him

those who are unjust and

seeking ruling for their own gain. He wishes and believes that he deserves to possess the
power of political authority at the expense of the unjust person having less. On this
interpretation, then, the desire to possess the power of authority is what connects outdoing
in the crafts and outdoing in the context of justice and injustice. For Socrates, the basis of
this outdoing is an epistemic one

the desire to see the person in charge rule according to

the relevant expertise, whereas for Thrasymachus, this outdoing is motivated by self-
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interest. I now turn to consider why Socrate

-pleonexia offers a

compelling response to Thrasymachus.

exclusively from brute force but rather from intelligence. This is evidenced by
Thrasymac

euboulia, 348d1 2)

by acting unjustly, and that those who are able to be completely unjust are intelligent
(phronimoi) and good (agathoi) (348d3
who sees through conventional morality and understands that injustice profits. This insight
and his ability to realize complete justice
his power

subjecting entire cities and communities under

are worthy to be called wisdom and virtue (348e1 4).

Thrasymachus attributes to the tyrant are not actually indicative of intelligence, wisdom, or
good judgement. Those who are truly intelligent and knowledgeable (however humble their
respective subject matter might be) are not engaged in power disputes, always attempting
to best each other. Instead, the effects of the nature and structure of knowledge is as such
that one is motivated to act as knowledge prescribes. Those who are truly knowledgeable
understand that the rule of knowledge is what ultimately profits and they care to see that
this is the case. To rule on the basis knowledge would produce a unifying relationship with
other rulers in virtue of their shared expertise, rather than a pleonetic one. It is only from
the stance of ignorance that one wishes and believes that he deserves to outdo everyone. At
s cunning and skilled at
deception.84 But his attitude and behaviour are plainly at odds with those who are
knowledgeable. Thrasymachus sees himself as offering moral insight by pointing to how an
intelligent person would behave. But in fact, there is a gla
so-called intelligence and those who are intelligent in virtue of their possession of a craft in
disparity. The tyrant thinks and behaves in a way that is contrary to intelligent and
knowledgeable people.
84

). The connotation is that the tyrant rules by force and under-handed tactics.
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This conclusion may seem small relative to the grand conclusion that Socrates ultimately
draws, that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice is vice and ignorance (350d4 5). And
th
the belief that injustice is a virtue and understand justice as genuinely harmful. However,
understood, the argument is internally coherent and the appeal to crafts illuminates key
themes that remain
important in the remainder of the Republic.

2.7. Closing Remarks
-pleonetic argument fails to recognize that the unjust
man has fundamentally different priorities and aims than the just man. 85 Thrasymachus
clearly would not recognize the terms of comparison between his tyrant and other
in opposition to conventional indicators of knowledge and intelligence. Thrasymachus sees
the attainment of power and wealth as the ultimate measure of happiness and this
commitment shapes all his other views, including the nature of craft and ruling, and
ultimately how an intelligent person should live. In disarming this general worldview, the
refutation of Thrasymachus and the arguments of Book I are insufficient. Hence, we are
invited by Socrates at the end of Book I to see that the arguments have been unsatisfying in
some way. These arguments fail to persuade Thrasymachus and leave Socrates wanting
entrenched in a certain view of human nature and society

a view that begins at a radically

different starting point than Socrates. And this is in some way a consequence of the kind of
society and political current in which Thrasymachus lived, one that is responsible for
breeding such a brutal and self-interested outlook.86
85
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Though it extends beyond the scope of this thesis to give a thorough defence of the important
role craft continues to play in the remainder of the Republic (and elsewhere), it is useful to note
86
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ments from craft
against both Polemarchus and Thrasymachus are not as deeply flawed as they are commonly
craft what I called the origins view. This view of craft is strongly supported by the textual
evidence of Republic
sufficient
in the sense that they demonstrate to Polemarchus the flaws of conceiving justice in an
ordinary and unreflective manner. They are also sufficient
commitment to ruling as a craft should lead him to think that the ideal ruler is committed
to justice, rather than injusti
important ways in which Plato understood the just ruler as an expert of ruling, some of
these ways include his attitude and behaviour towards other rulers, his relationship to
ruling, and the nature of ruling and its proper role within a city. This interpretation thus
helps us make better sense of the text and yields a new appreciation of the strength and
shown
that Republic I is not a viable piece of evidence for ascribing to Plato the view that he was
critical towards the idea of craft as model of knowledge for virtue and ruling.

Republic.
disease in Book IV (444d3
famous ship of state passage (487e 489a) where the
relationship between the philosophers and the city are presented mainly through analogy to the
602c) is put forth via the
distinction of
discussion is that the three kinds of craftsmen are presented as possessing knowledge (epistêmê),
correct belief, and ignorance respectively (601d8 602a10). Briefly, my own view is that the idea of
craft continues to serve as a viable model of knowledge in the remainder of Republic, useful for
articulating the structure of the expertise of the just ruler. However, in absence of the right context,
psychological investigations of the nature of the person, and an account of what precisely is the
discussions of
crafts in comparison to Book I: Socrates has to go beyond the structure of expertise and provide the
right context for which the expertise of the ruler can be understood. See Schwab (2016) and Harte
(2017) for interesting interpretations that rely substantively on the idea of craft/expertise to make
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Chapter 3
3. Architectonic Knowledge in the Charmides and Euthydemus
In Chapters 1 and 2, I examined the ways in which ordinary crafts serve as a model of
one important aspect of the
relationship between craft and virtue. In the second half of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), I
turn my attention to another important aspect of the relationship. In several key texts, we
find Plato presenting virtue (especially wisdom and justice) not as analogous to the crafts,
but rather as the sort of political knowledge or expertise (politikê) fit to preside over them
in an architectonic role. The overarching goal of Chapters 3 and 4 is to demonstrate the
the crafts. In contrast to the first two chapt
chapter and next is to articulate how virtue relates to the crafts understood as fields of
expertise. In serving this goal, Plato
this focus is still present) but more on their limitations. In the conclusion of this thesis, I
will discuss how I see these two distinct focuses fitting together.
The idea that the nature of political rule should be understood as an architectonic form of
knowledge, directed at the good and tasked with the management of ordinary crafts, is a
According to the Politicus, a ruler is akin
architecôn
workers by providing understanding rather than manual labour (Plt. 259e8, 305c10 d5).87
Similarly in the Republic, a central task of the philosopher-king is to arrange the practice
and products of all other crafts in light of his knowledge of the Good (Resp. 505a b3).88
In this chapter
Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus. Drawing from the Laches, I show that the idea of an
architectonic form of knowledge as the basis for political rule grow
87
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88
For a detailed analysis of architectonic knowledge in the Republic and its relationship to
politikê, see Barney (2007).
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with the question of how virtue can remain authoritative in guiding our actions in the face
of specialization. This question concerning the appropriate scope of virtue and the nature
of ordinary expertise sets in motion the idea for Plato that any knowledge fit for promoting
human welfare must be fit to reign over the crafts in the appropriate way. Plato explores
what this knowledge might look like and how precisely it shall preside over the crafts in the
Charmides and Euthydemus.
In both works, there is a growing emphasis towards integrating the search for individual
virtues with a larger investigation on the nature of political rule. In the Charmides, the
search for temperance (sôphrosunê) leads to a larger discussion on what sort of knowledge
would provide the greatest benefit for cities. Here, I argue that Plato develops two
competing views of happiness
as goodness

what I call happiness as living knowledgeably and happiness

in order to establish that the kind of knowledge fit for political rule must

provide a normative target for all other knowledge undertakings. We learn that a happy
society is not one merely constituted by a collection of genuine expertise (though this
remains an important goal), but one in which different areas of expertise are oriented
towards some larger goal of value provided by the knowledge of good and bad.
In the Euthydemus, Plato continues to demonstrate his interest in the political facets of
virtue. The search for the content of wisdom and the producer of happiness is eventually
revealed to be the

11). Whereas the

Charmides focuses on the right target that an architectonic conception of political rule
should provide, the Euthydemus examines what the architectonic political ruler ought to
know. In this context, Plato presents us with one of the most important ideas in
architectonic thinking, the distinction between the user and the maker. I shall argue that
what prompts the identification of the kingly craft with wisdom and knowledge of correct
use is its standing as the most sovereign knowledge in the land. It becomes clear that, for
Plato, the sort of knowledge fit to bring about happiness must be the sort that is
teleologically superordinate to all bodies of knowledge. Thus conceived, the central task of
the political ruler is to utilize his knowledge of correct use to guide the practice of
craftsmen
city.

in order to bring about a happy
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3.1. The Scope of Virtue in the Laches
The Laches dramatizes an investigation into the nature of courage between Socrates and
two prominent generals, Nicias and Laches. In one crucial discussion (194d 195d), we learn
that ordinary crafts pose a unique challenge to the scope of virtue. Nicias, with the help of
Socrates, proposes that courage is some sort of wisdom (sophia) and knowledge (epistêmê)
(194d1 e8).89 In particular, he claims that it is the knowledge of what is to be feared and
hoped for in war and in all other circumstances (194e11 195a1). This definition prompts the
following objection from Laches:

Or do you think the courageous are the people who know? Perhaps you call
even though I do suppose they are the ones who know what is to be feared
in farming. And all the other craftsmen know what is to be feared and hoped
for in their particular crafts. But these people are in no way courageous all
the same (195b3 c2).
The underlying problem targeted by
between virtue, understood as knowledge of good and bad, 90 and the knowledge possessed
by ordinary craftsmen (e.g. medicine, farming, navigation, etc). At first glance, we might
not see why this is an important concern and why we should conceive of virtue in relation
to ordinary expertise. However, the above passage brings to light an important problem. On
the one hand, virtue is something that structures our life as a whole. It is not merely about
knowing what is good and bad in the abstract. Rather virtue enables us to put such
knowledge into effective use in our daily life, whatever circumstance in which we happen
to find ourselves. In this particular case, courage is knowing the appropriate grounds of
89

Here again, we

-denoting terms. Socrates and his
epistêmê

sophia
introduce examples from crafts without controversy.
90
Knowledge of hope and fear is eventually revealed to be the knowledge of good and bad, in
particular knowledge of bad things that produce fear and good things that produce hope. This
claim is brought out explicitly when Socrates takes over the examination, and especially clear at
198b
non-

c4).
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hope and fear not just in war but in all other circumstances. 91 On the other hand, the crafts
already appropriate their respective areas of expertise and their craftsmen are presumed to
know what constitutes good and bad in each of their crafts. So where does virtue fit in all of
this? How does the knowledge of good and bad relate to other bodies of knowledge? And
how can it remain authoritative in guiding our actions where other forms of expertise rule?
As Laches presses in the above passage, the craftsmen know the basis of hope and fear in
their respective crafts, but this does not seem to us like courage at all. Either virtue is just
good and bad.
Nicias meets this objection (and thereby preserving the claim that courage is knowledge of
good and bad) by arguing that in fact, ordinary crafts do not possess full sovereignty in their
respective crafts:
more
than being able to describe health and disease, whereas I think their knowledge
there are many cases in which it would be better not to get up from an illness?
Tell me this: do you maintain that in all cases to live is preferable? In many
cases, is it not better to die? (195c7 d2).92
Though a doctor qua doctor possesses the medical expertise for giving an account of health
and disease, there remains a gap in his knowledge for making end-of-life care decisions.
explanation is to return to the issue we encountered in the last chapter on the value of crafts.
David Roochnik, for instance, argues that this passage confirms that crafts are value-neutral:
in order to produce one or the other. He does not, however, know whether he should apply
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We find a parallel passage, cast in a more light, in the Gorgias on the limits of helmsmanship
(Grg. 511d3 512b4). There, Socrates explains that the reason why the helmsman is modest about his
craft (even though he has saved lives at sea) is because he understands that what ultimately makes
those lives worth living is the condition of their souls something that he does not know. I return
to this passage in the next chapter.
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however, he is wrong to infer that the reason why the craftsman is limited is because the
nature of crafts are value-neutral. The matter is more complicated than Roochnik reveals.
As I argued in the origins view of crafts in the last chapter, there is strong evidence for
thinking that Plato envisions crafts to be services, which intend to provide benefits to
human life in some way. And thus, it is inaccurate to say that they are value-neutral. Rather,
c

-

-oriented but clearly

lack a full conception of the good.

that captures this complexity. According
94

[t]he

shoemaker must grasp the end of his craft So he needs to understand what is good for feet;
ultimately, this requires understanding the good of the body, which means understanding
the good of the soul, which means understanding the human good as such

95

As we will

see in the next chapter on architectonic knowledge in the Gorgias, Plato presents us with
just this argument. There, Socrates argues that all crafts must be ultimately subordinated
to political rule because the latter is properly concerned with the good condition of the soul
(Grg. 465d5 7).96 In this respect, we might say that the doctor lacks the capacity to make
end-of-life care decisions because the goal of his craft is teleologically subordinate. That is,
the health of the body is ultimately done for the sake of the health of the soul. And since
the doctor lacks knowledge of the latter, he only possesses the partial understanding he
needs in order to exercise his craft in a beneficial way.
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Roochnik (1996), 100 101. Emphasis is in the original. Annas (1981), in a discussion on the value of

doctor to question whether the sick ought to be healed. Of course, in his private capacity he may be
faced with the question whether to let a patient die; but that is a matter of medical ethics, not of
94

Barney (2007), 298 299.
Ibid, 298.
96
Aristotle presents a similar hierarchy of the ordering of the crafts in the opening lines of the
Nicomachean Ethics. There, he argues that all crafts aim at some end and where crafts fall under a
single capacity (dunamis), they are organized under a master craft (architektonikê), given that
subordinate crafts are pursued for the sake of the end (telos) of the master craft (NE. 1094a6 18).
For instance, bridle making is subordinate to horsemanship and actions pertaining to warfare are
subordinate to generalship.
95
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The second way that ordinary crafts are insufficient, Barney suggests, relates to the
incompleteness in their contexts.97

shoes are in themselves good,

but the normativity of their goodness, in any particular situation, can be overridden by the
demands of the context

that is, by rival goods and by the greater good of the whole

98

The

craftsman can best consider the circumstances that inform how he brings about the goal of
his craft. However, he lacks the panoramic perspective for knowing the larger contexts that
would make his product or result ultimately beneficial. The Gorgias, for instance, presents
the Athenians as possessing excessive appetites for pleasure with unjust and corrupt souls.
There, Socrates emphasizes the goal of appetite correction and bringing their souls back to
health, rather than the goal of maintaining the good condition of their souls (505a6 b9,
517b5 c1). In this political context then, we can imagine that the crafts will be practiced with
a different emphasis, with less focus on luxury and more on austerity in order to serve the
good of the whole. And this larger context, it is evident, eludes the ordinary craftsman.
Let us now ret
There are several important points to note. To begin with, as the context of the passage
makes clear, Plato does not conceal the fact that ordinary crafts can potentially make virtue,
understood as knowledge of good and bad, redundant. If ordinary experts are presumed to
know what is good and bad in their respective crafts, then where does virtue fit in? And if
there is some special area of expertise for virtue, how can it remain authoritative in the face
of other experts? The way that Plato addresses this worry, on this interpretation, is to show
that ordinary crafts are in fact normatively limited. The way that this limitation is fleshed
out paints a more complicated picture of the relationship between crafts and virtue. Nicias
shows that medicine possesses the expertise for describing health and disease, but it is
unable to judge whether recovery is more to be preferred than illness for patients. On my
view, this is because ordinary crafts are normatively dependent on virtue, both in terms of
their goals and contexts. By pointing to the limits of ordinary crafts, Nicias makes room for
courage (and virtue generally) to remain as the knowledge of what is good and bad in all
circumstances. In other words, we now see that in every area of life, there remains a need
97
98

Barney (2007), 299.
Ibid, 299.
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for the guidance of virtue. At the same time, we see that the kinds of concerns we explored
in this section pave the way for Plato to work out the right conception of virtue. What sort
of knowledge is appropriate for providing the right context and goal for the crafts? Under
what kind of rule will the crafts become normatively sufficient, and thus fulfill their status
as services that contribute to human life in some way? What sort of the guidance will this
ruling knowledge provide to the crafts? And how precisely shall this ruling knowledge
of crafts (as both benefit-oriented and normatively insufficient) and his concern with the
sovereignty and scope of virtue drive him towards architectonic thinking. In the next
sections, we will see Plato explore the nature of an architectonic form of knowledge, its
relationship to ordinary crafts, and happiness.

3.2. Architectonic Knowledge in the Charmides
The Charmides is an inquiry into temperance (sôphrosunê) and culminates in an obscure
argument between Socrates and Critias that defines temperance as knowledge of self and
its abstract formulation knowledge of knowledge (164c7ff). This definition is ultimately
given up on the grounds that reflexive knowledge is epistemically impossible. Even if it is
possible, it is of no use to our happiness and faring well. What will ultimately make us
happy, Socrates concludes, is the knowledge of good and bad. And thus the search for
temperance ends unsuccessfully. Before the dialogue ends in aporia, however, Socrates puts
forth a series of arguments (171d 175a) designed to show the promise of knowledge of
knowledge, to identify its failings, and to introduce the knowledge of good and bad.
In what follows, I propose the Charmides develops two competing views of happiness in
order to highlight the right kind of knowledge required to oversee the performance of crafts.
It is in this context that we find Plato investigating different candidates for architectonic
knowledge. These two competing views, which I shall call happiness as living knowledgeably
and happiness as goodness, are the products of two kinds of rule: ruling by knowledge of
knowledge and ruling by the knowledge of good and bad, respectively. The former account
of happiness is the result of an error-free society where each acts according his knowledge,
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while the latter is the state where the knowledge of good and bad reigns. On my reading,
the failure of happiness as living knowledgeably only points to the inadequacy of knowledge
of knowledge as a candidate for rule. It does not demonstrate the strong position,
sometimes suggested by commentators, that knowledge of good and bad is sufficient for
happiness.99 The happiness as goodness view, as I shall bring out, only establishes the
necessity of the knowledge of good and bad for happiness, so that all knowledge
undertakings, represented by ordinary crafts, can benefit us. I present this reading below.
Although the central argument treats knowledge of knowledge as the abstract formulation
of the knowledge of self, the discussion unfolds in a way that emphasizes two distinct
characteristics of temperance, self-knowledge (epistêmê heautou) and good governance (eu
oikeisthai).100 The dialogue introduces the idea of good governance early, at 161e, making it
explicit at 162a that any satisfactory account of temperance must result in a well governed
5). The
idea of good governance is brough
as the ability to distinguish what one knows and does not know (170a6 8). Socrates imagines
the sort of benefit temperance thus understood would provide for individuals, households,
and cities. The following passage introduces what I have called the happiness as living
knowledgeably view:
What benefit would we get from temperance if it is of this nature [sc. the
ability to know what one knows and does not know]? Because if, as we
assumed in the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what
99

Irwin (1995) is the most notable representation of this position. He outlines two possible
interpretations of the failure of knowledge of knowledge: (1) either Socrates is expressing a
moderate claim that if the products of other knowledges are to benefit us, they must be used by
the knowledge of good and bad or (2) an extreme claim that only knowledge of good and bad
that the superordinate science of good and evil is sufficient for happiness (174b11
(41). Irwin
takes it for granted that the speech at 174bff endorses the sufficiency of the knowledge of good
amendment in
light of the failure of knowledge of knowledge, rather than an argument for its sufficiency for
branches of knowledge are directed.
100
The transition from knowledge of self to knowledge of knowledge is notoriously vexing (165c7,
166c2). Critias proposes that temperance is knowledge of the personal self (heautou) but slips into
the reflexive knowledge of itself (heautês) later. On this vexing relationship see Tuckey (1955), 30
37, 107 11, Annas (1985), and McCabe (2011).
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he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were
able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would
be the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had
temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those who were
under our rule. Neither would we ourselves be attempting to do things we
did not understand, rather we would find those who did understand and
turn the matter over to them nor would we trust those over whom we ruled
to do anything except what they would do correctly, and this would be that
of which they possessed knowledge. And thus, by means of temperance,
every household would be well-run, and every city well-governed, and so in
every case where temperance reigned. And with error rooted out and
rightness in control, men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirable
and well in all their doings and, faring well, they would be happy (171d1
172a3).
In evaluating temperance as a knowledge fit for rule, Socrates makes it clear that any
candidate for ruling must be able to bring about the greatest benefit, happiness. The nature
of this rule is presented as overseeing the way that other kinds of knowledges are practiced.
Later, Socrates will reveal that the other kinds of knowledge he has in mind are crafts. For
now, we are only told that temperance governs by overseeing all knowledge transactions in
order to bring about an error-free society: one in which everyone acts according to
knowledge and in which, when they lack knowledge, the matter is entrusted and handed
over to those with knowledge. Acting in accordance with knowledge and therefore acting
correctly (orthôs prattein) is what constitutes happiness.
While this view of happiness is presented as initially promising, some strange things have
come to light (172c 173a). Socrates prompts further investigation by introducing a utopian
dream (173a7 d5). In this passage, happiness as living knowledgeably is clarified as acting in
accordance with the knowledge of true craftsmanship (dia to alêthinois dêmiourgois, 173c2).
In particular, happiness consists in reaping the benefits and rewards of true craftsmanship.
If temperance governs by the principle of picking out true craftsmen and making use of
them, Socrates argues, then we would have all of our goods and services skilfully (technikos,
than we do now, and safety when we
as well, because we would be employing true craftsmen? (173b4 c2).
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The thinking here is that the rule of knowledge of knowledge can benefit us by banning
deceptive practices by those who lack knowledge. It functions as a kind of quality control
by organizing cities around those who are competent experts in their respective crafts. In
turn, the achievements of crafts will be the outcomes of true craftsmanship. While it was
previously agreed that this kind of living constituted happiness, we are now told this is
merely acting in accordance with knowledge (kata tas epistêmas) (173a9 b1). Whether this
kind of living can make us happy, Socrates worries, has not been firmly established (173d1
5).
Socrates
goods furnished by ordinary crafts. True craftsmanship may give us health and safety at sea,
but these goods, as Socrates claims below, do not add up to happiness. The reason why
these goods fail to add up to happiness will need to be examined closely in a moment. At
this point, Socrates merely expresses his scepticism. He reasons with Critias that it is not by
means of calculation or even knowledge of health that we become happy, but by the kind
of knowledge by which we come to know the good and bad (174b5 10). With this new
information, Socrates introduces the happiness as goodness view:

from me that it was not living knowledgeably that was making us fare well and
be happy, not even if we possessed all the knowledges put together, but that we
have to have this one knowledge of good and bad. Because, Critias, if you
consent to take away this knowledge from the other knowledges, will medicine
any the less produce health or cobbling produce shoes, or the craft of weaving

Cri: They will do it just the same.
Soc: But my dear Critias, our chance of getting any of these things well and
beneficially done will have vanished if this is lacking.
Cri: You are right.
Soc: Then this knowledge, at any rate, is not temperance, but that one of which
the function is to benefit us (ergon estin to ôphelein hêmas). And it is not the
knowledge of knowledge and the absence of knowledge, but of good and bad.
So that, if this latter one is beneficial, temperance would be something else for
us. (174b11 d7).
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The first thing to note about this view of happiness is that Socrates introduces it in the
context of crafts. He questions the value of crafts, as a whole, without the knowledge of
good and bad. Can medicine still give us health? Critias seems to think so, but Socrates
warns that if we are lacking knowledge of good and bad, then we are leaving behind the
possibility of attaining the outcomes of crafts in a way that is beneficial for us. 101 This manner
of proceeding suggests that one central task of the knowledge of good and bad is to ensure
that crafts provide their products and results beneficially. In addition, by situating the
knowledge of good and bad within the context of crafts, Socrates continues where the
discussion of knowledge of knowledge left off. The knowledge of good and bad is presented
as successfully accomplishing what knowledge of knowledge failed to do

oversee the

practice of ordinary crafts in a way that brings about happiness.
This point is especially prominent when we compare the two competing views of rule. At
first glance, knowledge of knowledge is an attractive candidate for bringing about
happiness. It governs by ruling out the absence of knowledge in order to ensure that all
crafts are performed by those with knowledge. This appears to be a desirable state of affairs,
as it is better to have true craftsmen (as opposed to false or incompetent ones) provide us
with their products. Under this rule, we are protected from the deceptions of charlatans and
the malpractice of those who lack expertise altogether. However, this kind of governance
ultimately fails to bring about happiness because

and this is the force of the argument

a

flourishing society is not merely living according to correctness. Rather, it requires an
overarching goal of value towards genuine expertise are directed.
Allow me to explain what I mean. Central to the passage presented above is the principle
that each craft is individuated by its proper ergon: understood both in the strong sense of
function, some characteristic activity proper to the craft, and in the minimal sense, the
proper product or result of craft.102 Socrates claims that if the knowledge of good and bad
101

It is possible that craftsmen can accidentally produce results that are beneficial. However,
without the knowledge of good and bad, we are leaving behind the possibility of attaining those
benefits reliably.
102
ergon
should be understood as a characteristic activity in some cases but a product in others depending
on the sort of thing it is. I am sympathetic to this view as often in the early dialogues, Plato
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aims at what is beneficial, then temperance must be something else (174d6 7). It must be
because temperance and the knowledge of good and bad cannot aim at
the same ergon. This way of individuating the crafts is endorsed by Plato in a number of
places. The Ion

ergon

has been assigned by the god and so what we know by means of navigation we will not know
7). In Book 1 of the Republic
benefits us in a peculiar way (idian), not common (ou koinên

8).

This principle is also a recurring obstacle to the viability of knowledge of knowledge in the
Charmides. At least one of the issues plaguing knowledge of knowledge is its reflexive
nature, as it does not aim at something unique except all knowledge in general. In turn, it
cannot be distinguished from other types of knowledge (170b11 c4).
On this picture, if medicine aims at health, then it cannot also aim at what is beneficial (to
ôphelein). We have encountered this divergence between technical kinds of expertise and
their value previously in section 3.1. Here in the Charmides, Socrates presents this
divergence by focusing on the way that crafts are individuated. He accepts that we might
still have things like health and victory in war under the guidance of knowledge of
knowledge, but without the knowledge of good and bad, these things cannot be provided
with the higher goal of benefitting human welfare in view. This is precisely because crafts
only aim at their respective goals, but the task of benefitting requires a distinct branch of
knowledge whose function is to benefit us (174d3 4). Seen from this vantage point, we can
now understand why knowledge of knowledge fails to bring about happiness. Under its rule,
we can (at best) attain a collection of genuine products and services. However, knowledge
points out, all the knowledges put together will not make us happy (174c1 2).
This is the tone, I submit, in which Socrates introduces the happiness as goodness view. He
asks, if you take away this knowledge of good and bad from the rest of the knowledges103,

apergazethai) us with its ergon
products and results rather than their characteristic activity (e.g. Chrm. 165c10 d2; Euthphr.13d10
14a3).
103

4.
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what would happen? His suggestion is that all knowledge undertakings

crafts

would

exist in vain, providing their goals without contributing to our welfare. If this reading is
correct, then the knowledge of good and bad cannot be sufficient for happiness. Rather, the
dialogue only establishes its necessity as a ruling knowledge for bringing about happiness.
Under the rule of the knowledge of good and bad, the argument indicates, everything can
then be done towards the ultimate goal of benefitting human welfare. This is what I take to
Charmides. He presents the happiness as
living knowledgeably view as a best-case scenario. In presenting the sort of utopian world
ruled by knowledge of knowledge, Socrates demonstrates that this kind of knowledge, even
if perfectly obtained, and governing all other crafts, would still not be sufficient for
happiness. What does bring about happiness, he shows us, is the rule of the knowledge of
good and bad. The search for the producer of happiness is, effectively, a search for the
highest ruling knowledge, whose presence makes all other knowledge undertakings
beneficial. In the next sections, we see Plato maintain this line of inquiry in the Euthydemus
account of happiness. Importantly, the dialogue introduces a central theme in architectonic
thinking, the distinction between the craft of making and using.

3.3. Architectonic Knowledge in the Euthydemus
The Euthydemus presents two famous protreptics

speeches intended to exhort young men

to study philosophy. Both of these passages, like the Charmides, are concerned with seeking
the producer of happiness. In the first protreptic (278e 282d), Socrates gets Clinias to agree
that all men wish to fare well (eu prattein)104, and that we do so through the possession of
good things (278e3 279a4). He proposes a list which includes traditional virtues (courage,
justice, temperance, and wisdom), and a category of what we might call conventional goods
(beauty, wealth, health, things to satisfy bodily needs, noble birth, power, and honour)
(279a7 c2).105 Through a series of arguments, we arrive at the conclusion that happiness
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Like the Charmides, doing well (eu prattein) and being happy (eudaimonein) are used
synonymously and rather freely. See Euthyd. 280b6 and Chrm. 172a3.
105
For the purposes of this chapter, I set aside the puzzling argument that good fortune (eutuchia)
is superfluous if we possess wisdom (279c 280b).
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must involve the correct use of good things if they should benefit us and make us happy.
Wisdom, Socrates concludes in the first protreptic, is knowledge of correct use (282a1 6).
What exactly this correct use entails, and what sort of things actually constitute happiness
for Socrates, are matters of controversy.106 Adding to this difficulty is the surprising move
Socrates makes in the second protreptic (288d 292e). After a brief interlude, Socrates
resumes his discussion of wisdom and happiness. In seeking the content of wisdom, he
begins to look for candidates in crafts like generalship, statesmanship, and the kingly craft.
This move comes as unexpected and presents us with an interpretative difficulty. Julia
Annas accurately captures this difficulty when she writes:
At this point there is a wrinkle: a wrinkle in the argument and not just in my
interpretation. Everything in the first part of the argument leads us to expect
that the happiness is question is individual happiness, that each person is asking
what would benefit him individually. And so we expect the object of discussion
to be individual virtue. But what we find in the second part of the passage is
that the skill under discussion is politikê
of acting correctly in the
d1). Further, this is identified with the skill exercised by a king
(basilikê technê) (291c4 5). No argument is offered for this, and the arguments
proceeds as before, with analogies with skills like medicine and farming.107
Socrates takes care to remind us in the second protreptic that he is picking up where the
first protreptic left off (288d5, e4). In doing so, he is clear that the second protreptic is
advancing parts of the same argument. Given this, how should we understand this apparent
shift in focus from considering what each person needs in order to make himself happy to
asking what a ruler needs in order to make an entire state happy? And how can we make
iness?
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There is a longstanding scholarly dispute surrounding the first protreptic, where some scholars
have looked to as establishing the strong claim that wisdom is sufficient for happiness and that it is
the only good. Prominent examples include Irwin (1995), chapter 4, Annas (1993), (1999), chapter 2,
Dimas (2002), and Russell (2005). For dissenting views see Vlastos (1991), Parry (1996), Brickhouse
& Smith (2010), Jones (2013). My reading gives us independent reasons for rejecting the strong
claim. I argue that the two protreptics are unified by an architectonic view of wisdom. A
consequence of this view is that the two protreptics only establish wisdom as the highest ruling
knowledge, and thus make room for other things to be beneficial under its direction. I focus on
developing this view of wisdom below.
107
Annas (1993), 61. Emphasis is in the original.
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In what follows, I argue that we can make good sense of the Euthydemus
wisdom and happiness and the connection between the two protreptics if we see that the
nature of wisdom is presented as an architectonic form of knowledge. In searching for
candidates for wisdom, Socrates is looking for the most authoritative sort of knowledge
available and one that will serve as a good candidate to rule the crafts for the sake of
benefitting us. And thus, the search naturally turns to statesmanship and the kingly craft
given their positions in the hierarchy of crafts. Furthermore, as I will bring about in section
3.4, an architectonic conception of wisdom can account for both the nature of individual
and political wisdom. On this view, there is no major difference between individual and
political wisdom, except perhaps in areas of application. What matters is that the nature of
wisdom is uniquely authoritative with respect to other crafts and that it stands in the correct
relationship (being teleologically superordinate) to them so that happiness is rendered
possible through its exercise.
In supporting this architectonic conception of wisdom, let me begin with an important
remark from Socrates on the notion of benefit and its relation to happiness in the first
protreptic. In considering things we might find conventionally good like health and wealth,
Socrates asks:
And would the possession of good things make us happy if they benefitted
us or did not benefit us? if they benefitted us And would they be
beneficial to us if we simply had them and did not use them? For instance,
drink any, would we derive any advantage from these things? (280b7-c3).
We previously saw the importance of the idea of benefit to the Charmides
happiness. Re
we forgo the possibility of getting things done well and beneficially for us (174c9 d1). In the
above passage, Socrates makes this connection between benefit and happiness explicit.
Things contribute to our happiness by benefitting us. And they only benefit us, according
to the Euthydemus, through use, specifically the sort of correct use provided by wisdom.
The value of things like health and strength is ultimately dependent on wisdom alone.
underscoring knowledge of correct use with the idea of ruling.
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Socrates claims that, just as knowledge of carpentry alone produces right use with regard to
hegoumenê) and directs (katorthousa) our conduct in relation to
connotation of ruling is that of commanding or leading. Knowledge of correct use alone
provides guidance and direction to actions with respect to the use of other things and their
contribution to our happiness. Wisdom, clearly, is the most impactful factor in determining
sdom as the most authoritative
kind of knowledge. From the perspective of the first protreptic, Socrates frames wisdom as
ruling over those conventional goods initially enumerated back at 279a. However, when we
turn to the second protreptic, the discussion begins to present wisdom as ruling over other
kinds of crafts. This move, I suggest, is pointing us towards an architectonic view of wisdom.
When the discussion resumes in the second protreptic, Socrates begins to search for
candidates that would provide us with correct use. Crafts like medicine, money-making,
lyre-making, and speech-writing are ruled out on the basis that they separate the activities
of making and using (289a4 290a6). Any candidate for wisdom, it turns out, must be able
to do both. This criterion is surprising, since the first protreptic only demands that wisdom
be knowledge of correct use. Nonetheless, Socrates makes it clear at the beginning of the
is
a kind of knowledge which combines making and knowing how to the use the thing which
6). This claim is important because Socrates clearly specifies that they are
looking for a kind of knowledge which makes and uses what it itself makes. This criterion
is firmly observed in ruling out the other candidates. However, when we turn to the kingly
craft, Socrates no longer adheres to the making and using what itself makes criterion.
We arrive at the kingly craft in an incredible turn of events. The mostly passive Clinias, in
an ingenuous move, declares that generalship, their most promising candidate, is only
capable of capturing cities and camps.108 However, generals do not know how to use the
things they capture and always hand over their products to the statesman (290d1 3), the
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The initial distinction between making and using now includes capturing (290b7 c6).
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same way that fishermen hand over their preys to cooks or quail hunters to quail keepers.
What generates this characterization of generalship is an understanding of knowledge that
is characteristically architectonic. The analogy to mundane crafts reflects the sort of
hierarchical thinking Clinias has in mind. Generalship, like fishing and quail hunting,
provides its labour for the sake of a higher craft whose task is to put its result to use in
promoting some higher goa
way Socrates rules out the money-making and lyre-making sorts earlier (289a4 290a6).
to use their own products. Whereas

not only separates

the activity of making/capturing and using, but that it is practiced for the sake of
statesmanship. In other words, we have now discovered that the goal of generalship, along
with the goals of other crafts, all lead up to one overarching architectonic goal, aimed at by
statesmanship. If happiness is indeed brought about by statesmanship (which Socrates has
now identified with the kingly craft), then happiness emerges as this architectonic goal
the chief good for the sake of which all other crafts are practiced. Socrates puts this point
in sharp focus when he concludes that they have arrived at wisdom:
It was due to this craft [sc. kingly craft] that generalship and the others handed
over the management of the products of which they themselves were craftsmen,
as if this craft alone knew how to use them. It seemed clear to us that this was
the craft we were looking for, and that it was the cause of right action (he aitia
orthôs prattein) in the state, and to use the language of Aeschylus, that this craft
alone sits at the helm of the state, governing all things, ruling all things, and
making all things useful (291c7 d3).109
Had Socrates been examining the kingly craft in the same manner as the others, he would
have asked: what does the kingly craft make? And does it know how to use it? However,
only
user of the products of all other crafts, as opposed to the only one that knows how to use
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what it itself makes.110 And it is this account of the kingly craft that is now identified with
wisdom. As Socrates describes things in the above passage, what he finds attractive about
the kingly craft as a candidate for wisdom is its standing as the most sovereign knowledge
in the land. It is uniquely authoritative and its end is superordinate to the crafts. It is for the
sake of the kingly craft that all other crafts pursue their own ends.
These elements of wisd
within the context of considering individual happiness, Socrates maintains that wisdom is
uniquely commanding with respect to other goods. So, when we turn to the second
protreptic, Soc
ranks the highest. Socrates finds the kingly craft, in essence, by asking: for the sake of which
craft do all crafts make their products? The kingly craft, therefore, materializes as a fitting
candidate given that it is the highest ruling knowledge available. In addition, the shift
between the two protreptics from considering conventional goods to considering crafts is
intuitive enough, since many of the goods enumerated are the products of crafts (e.g. health
to medicine, wealth to moneymaking, strength to gymnastics, bodily necessities to farming,
weaving, etc.). In positing wisdom as uniquely able to provide guidance in the first
protreptic, Socrates does not deny the existence of other kinds of knowledge. So, whatever
craft turns out to provide us with wisdom, it must do so on account of being more
authoritative than those crafts that supply us with conventional goods. In this way, wisdom
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A little later in the argument, Socrates will demand that the kingly craft must also make
something ( 291d5 293e7), but this still does not change the fact that the kingly craft is now
presented as the user all the products of other crafts.
The search for wisdom reaches aporia when Socrates demands that the kingly craft, now
user of the products of all crafts, must also produce something beneficial (292a7 9). However, the
kingly craft can only benefit others by perpetuating itself in them, since it cannot produce things
that are neither good nor bad such as making citizens rich, free, and preventing faction (292b4 6).
This claim leads to an infinite regress: if the kingly craft can only perpetuate itself in others, then in
what respect will they be made good and useful? In the respect that they are useful for making
others good. But in what respect will they be made good and useful? And so on ad infinitum. As I
read the Euthydemus, the aporia does not in and of itself undermine the identification of wisdom
with correct use or the viability of the kingly craft as a candidate for wisdom. What is at issue is
that there must be a specifiable good independent of knowledge or virtue. For this reason, some
have looked to the Republic
regress. See Kahn (1996), 208 209.
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emerges as an architectonic craft whose position on the hierarchy of crafts gives it the
privileged knowledge of correct use of all other goods.

3.4. Wisdom and the Kingly Craft in the Euthydemus
If what makes the kingly craft an ideal candidate for wisdom is its embodiment of
architectonic knowledge, and if this fact explains the connection between the two
f
wisdom. The sort of knowledge that brings about happiness for Plato is concerned with
thoughts and actions on an architectonic level. That is to say, wisdom engages in universal
and foundational reasoning about what to do and how to live well in all circumstances and
it does so by aiming at the goal of what is beneficial for human beings. This architectonic
goal serves as the target towards which all other human pursuits aim

represented by the

oundcharacterize other crafts

how to procure victory at war or how to bring about health

wisdom takes into consideration only what benefits human beings. By identifying wisdom
with the kingly craft

the user of all the products of all other crafts

Plato establishes

wisdom as the single overarching science of everything. It subordinates all other knowledge
undertakings in order to use them to promote the successful realization of the ultimate goal,
human welfare.
At this point, it is useful to examine the Euthydemus
and a using craft. What precisely does the knowledge of correct use entail? And how does
wisdom, now identified with the kingly craft, benefit us by correctly using the products of
all other making crafts (291c7 d3)? On these sorts of questions, the Euthydemus remains
mostly silent. However, the idea that the crafts ought to be hierarchically arranged
-

es

in Plato.111 And in these passages, Plato gives us more of an idea of the kind of understanding
provided by the using craftsman. I highlight some common themes below.
111

For passages that distinguish between a making craft and a using craft, see Cra. 388a 390d, Rep.
601d 602a; Grg. 517c7 518a5; Phdr. 274e7 9.
Physics 2.2 where he uses
the architectonic language to distinguish between a making and a using craft (Ph. 194a34 b9). I
examine the Gorgias
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In places where we find the distinction between a making craft and a using craft, the using
(eidos, Cra. 390b1), the use for which the product is made or to which it is naturally suited
(Rep. 601d4 6), or the excellence of the product and the means of bringing it about (Grg.
517c7 518a5). This kind of knowledge allows the using craftsman to judge correctly how the
product performs (Rep. 601d8 e2, Cra. 390b6 8) and whether it benefits or harms those
who use it (Phdr. 274e9, Grg. 517c7 518a5). On the basis of his privileged knowledge, these
passages claim, the user ought to direct the activity of the maker by issuing certain norms.
The user, for instance, will give instructions to the maker about what makes a product good
and bad (Rep. 601e4 5) and prescribe the best materials to choose so they fit the type of
work the product performs (Cra. 389b8 c1). For instance, Socrates in the Republic tells us
that a flute-player relays information (exaggellei) to the maker about what makes a good or
bad flute (601e4 5). The maker thus serves (hupêretêsei, 601e1) and must listen
(anankaxomenos akouein, 602a1) to the flute-player in making his product. This is the
use, he must rely on the user to provide some sort of guidance in successfully making his
product.
This general line of reasoning, we can reasonably believe, is what is also going on in the
above kingly craft passage (291c7 d3) from the Euthydemus. On this reading, generalship,
for instance, is the subordinate expertise of achieving victory at war. In capturing cities and
craft. However, as I have highlighted throughout this chapter, victory at war is not isolated
goal for Plato. In some cases, it might be more beneficial to withdraw from battle.
Generalship is dependent

both in terms of its goal and context

on higher normative

deliberations, in this case about what benefits the city and its citizens. Since generals lack
the knowledge of correct use, they must depend on the kingly craft to provide guidance on
the conditions that make their crafts beneficial. This is the manner in which knowledge of
correct use enables the kingly craft to rule subordinate crafts: it engages in norm-issuing
behaviour in light of human welfare.
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The Euthydemus also does not spell out, like other architectonic passages in Plato, the exact
norms that knowledge of correct use issues, for instance prescribing the best materials or
communicating what makes the outcomes of subordinate crafts the best. A plausible
interpretation, however, can be gleaned from the leading examples of medicine that we first
encountered in the Laches. There, the doctors needed guidance in deciding whether to bring
about health or safety at sea. Similarly, what generalship needs is to decide whether to
pursue victory and at what risk or cost. An interesting parallel passage in the Politicus lends
some additional insight (304e 305d). There, the Eleatic Visitor suggests that kingship,
which is also identified with statesmanship, provides the right and wrong time (enkairias
kai akaiprias, 305d4) to the activity of generalship (amongst other subordinate crafts). It
does so by deciding whether we should go to war or withdraw in a friendly manner (304e9
11). In a similar fashion, the kingly craft will exercise its knowledge of correct use by dictating
to generals and other subordinate craftsmen the exact set of circumstances in which they
should act, and what constitutes the right course of action under such circumstances. It
issues these norms always with a view to what is ultimately beneficial for human welfare.
The kingly craft thus directs the activities of the subordinate craftsmen by providing the
right context and target for their actions. It is in this sense that the kingly craft is said to be
the cause of right action in the state (291c10).
Unpacking the architectonic features of the passage also allows us to appreciate the
epistemic division of labour between the kingly craft and ordinary crafts. Generalship still
provides the strategic expertise in bringing about victory. In fact, late into the second
protreptic, Socrates continues to describe medicine as the craft of health and farming as the
craft of providing nourishment from earth (291e4 292a2). As such, we have no reason to
think that Socrates rejects the specialization of ordinary crafts. What he does deny,
however, is their capacity to bring about their products or results in a beneficial manner
without the direction of wisdom. On this picture, subordinate craftsmen are
of the kingly craft. They carry out the normative vision set out by wisdom. Their expertise,
under the rule of wisdom, can be properly oriented towards the right goal and performed
under the right circumstances. When generalship accomplishes victory at the behest of the
kingly craft, then victory can be rightfully said to benefit us.
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If this characterization of wisdom and the kingly craft is correct, then we have reasons to
believe that there is no essential difference between individual and political wisdom on the
Euthydemus picture (I discuss in a moment what an architectonic conception of wisdom
looks like in the individual person). And thus, Socrates is warranted to shift his focus from
inquiring after the cause of individual happiness in the first protreptic to the cause of
happiness in the city in the second protreptic. Wisdom in the individual and in the political
ruler may differ with respect to their areas of application, given that the latter will exercise
his wisdom in a larger domain. However, both protreptics understand wisdom as the most
authoritative knowledge, the nature of which rules all other crafts for the sake of promoting
human welfare. It is important to clarify that given this interpretation of wisdom, I do not
mean to suggest that any wise person, in virtue of possessing wisdom, will need to be a
manager of crafts in order to be happy. Nor does this view entail that the individually wise
person is a de facto political ruler. However, in conceiving wisdom as the most authoritative
of happiness in the Euthydemus.
Living well inevitably involves making decisions about a variety of subject matters and
goods under many different circumstances. In doing so, we will need to make decisions
about things that happen to be the proper goals of other experts. In the Platonic context,
these experts can range from doctors, financial advisers, physical trainers, and, more
insidiously, sophists, orators, and poets. Practically speaking, the wise person will not know
every sort of craft nor be entirely self-sufficient. He might need to depend on other
craftsmen for their technical proficiency or to perform the specific tasks in areas where he
lacks expertise. For instance, he might consult a doctor when he is ill, or rely on a helmsman
while seafaring. However, in positing wisdom as an architectonic form of
point is that the wise person will always remain sovereign concerning matters of human
welfare. Whatever circumstance he finds himself in, whichever expert he encounters, his
wisdom will remain decisive in promoting happiness. Thus, wisdom acts as the organizing
and guiding principle of the entirety of his life.
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In recalling an old drinking song in the Gorgias, Socrates tells us to suppose we get a doctor,
a physical trainer, and a financial expert in a room. Each would without hesitation call the
product of his craft the greatest good (452a d). The arguments of the Euthydemus show us
that wisdom aims at the real greatest good. It is in this way that it
the state, governing all things, ruling

3).
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Chapter 4
4. Architectonic Knowledge in the Gorgias
In Chapter 3, I explored the idea of an architectonic conception of political rule in the
Charmides and Euthydemus. Drawing from the Laches, I contended that one of Plato s main
motivations for positing an architectonic form of knowledge as the basis for political rule is
his concern with the issue of how virtue can remain authoritative in guiding our actions
where other forms of expertise rule. This concern leads Plato to the idea that any knowledge
fit for promoting human welfare must be fit to preside over the crafts in the right way. In
this chapter, I argue that the Gorgias also presents us with an architectonic view of political
rule. This time, however, the threat facing the sovereignty of political expertise is much
more sinister than the specialization of ordinary crafts. In the Gorgias, we find Plato
confronting the powerful influence exercised by the orators and the dangers they pose to
his vision of politics and a well-governed society.
I begin this chapter by exploring the contrasting views on the nature and character of
oratory between the orators themselves and Socrates. This contrast serves as the important
backdrop for the dialogue s development of politics as architectonic. I argue that all three
orators

Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles

share to some extent the idea that oratory is a tool

for gaining freedom and power (Section 4.1). In particular, they understand their discipline
as a means for being free from the rule of others, the constraints of laws and morality, social
roles and duties, and as a way of returning to what is just by nature. This radical
commitment to freedom and the power for self-governance stands in contrast to Socrates
commitment to a society governed by the rule of knowledge. I argue that at the heart of
Socrat

critique of oratory is the idea that the discipline directly threatens an architectonic

conception of political rule (Section 4.2). Instead of preserving the expertise of ordinary
crafts and using them to promote the good, oratory does exactly the opposite. It competes
and undermines the advice of ordinary craftsmen in the affairs of the city and subordinates
them in order to advance the

own private good.
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Following this account of the two views of oratory, I move on to the textual evidence in
support of the idea of politics as architectonic (Section 4.3). The main passage on which I
support my reading comes from the refutation of Callicles, where Socrates presents the
hierarchical arrangement of the crafts (517c 518a). I detail what this picture of political craft
might look like, especially if it fully realized. Finally, I close this chapter by outlining how
an architectonic conception of political rule coheres with the other features attributed to
political rule in the dialogue (especially its corrective branch, the craft of justice), such as
providing order to the soul and treating it of injustice and corruption (Section 4.4).

4.1. Oratory as a Source of Freedom and Power
In Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, we encounter three distinct orators who vary in their
willingness to explicitly state the true motivations for taking up oratory. However, over the
course of the dialogue, it becomes increasingly clear that those who pursue oratory view it
as a means for attaining political power and the freedom (eleutheria) to pursue one s selfinterests. The first indication of this idea comes from Gorgias. When asked by Socrates what
is the greatest good and how does oratory bring it about (452d2 4), Gorgias answers:
The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates. It is the source of
freedom for mankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the
source of rule over others in one s own city I m referring to the ability to
persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting,
and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that
might take place. In point of fact, with this ability you ll have the doctor for
your slave, and the physical trainer, too. As for this financial expert of yours,
he ll turn out to be making more money for somebody else instead of
himself; for you, in fact, if you ve got the ability to speak and to persuade the
crowds (452d5 e8).
By far the most modest out of the three orators, Gorgias argues that oratory instills in its
practitioners and students the ability to speak persuasively in political gatherings in order
to exert influence in the affairs of the city. This ability is lauded on the basis it is the source
(aition) of both freedom and one s rule over others. Here, Gorgias expresses two ideas that
are central to the

worldview, freedom and power. At first it is not clear how these

two ideas are connected, but we have in fact encountered a similar position from another
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orator in Chapter 2. In my analysis of Thrasymachus, I argued that he viewed the world in
competitive terms where goods (e.g. wealth, property) are zero-sum. I suggested that one
of these goods is the power attached to political authority. This power enables one to be in
a position to have access to material wealth and to be freed from the constraints of
conventional morality and laws. For these reasons, Thrasymachus praised the tyrant s
ability to be completely unjust as stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice (344c5
6).112
Though Gorgias is not so bold to express these ideas openly, by locating oratory as the
source of both freedom and one s rule over others, he shares with Thrasymachus to some
extent the idea that authority is a zero-sum good. The underlying worldview is that we are
faced with two options: either we are ruled by others or we are in a position of rule ourselves.
The former can be understood more generally as being subject to the constraints placed
upon us by the laws and norms of one s society or more specifically, being subject to the
authority of other experts. From the

perspective, obedience to these constraints

denies or significantly limits our capacity to determine and pursue what is in our selfinterests. As Polus and Callicles make it clear later, the orators view their society as
fundamentally predatory, where everyone is vying to possess some power over others in
order to serve their own interests, and they do so at the expense of others having less. As
such, other people cannot be entrusted to provide what serves us. The only available
alternative is to be in a position where one can rule over others in one s own city (452d7
8). Oratory thus enables its practitioners the ability to gain substantial political influence
and to exercise control over others through the power of persuasion. What constitutes
freedom then is to be in such a powerful position where we can pursue what is in our selfinterests without the constraints of others. This may involve taking from others through

112

See especially section 2.6 in Chapter 2.
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manipulation or on a larger scale, deviating from the conventional rules of behaviour such
as committing injustice with impunity.113
Socrates next interlocutor Polus makes these ideas explicit by connecting oratory with
injustice. Earlier, Gorgias was forced to admit out of shame that orators, in addition to
teaching their students how to speak persuasively, also taught them what is just and unjust
(460a2 b1). This admission had the unfortunate consequence that orators must now be held
responsible for those students who use their skills unjustly. In contrast, Polus is more
forthcoming that oratory is a means for fulfilling one s political ambition. He claims that
orators have the greatest power in their cities (466b4 5). Echoing Thrasymachus open
admiration for tyrants and potentates, Polus claims that what is admirable about the power
of orators is that like tyrants, they can put to death anyone they want, and confiscate the
property and banish from their cities anyone they see

(466b11 c2). This comparison

highlights the true goal of oratory and the corresponding way of life of which it is
committed. It functions as a powerful tool for committing injustice and it affords one the
freedom to do whatever one sees fit.
Besides making explicit the bolder implications of Gorgias defence, Polus adds another
layer to the idea of freedom secured by the practice of oratory. In a discussion on whether
people who act unjustly are truly happy, he cites Archelaus, the King of Macedonia as a chief
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See Cooper (1999), n35 for a more positive interpretation of the relationship between oratory and

for mankind itself, rather than just the orator himself. On this picture, oratory is the means by
which a city of free people commit themselves to self-rule, rather than being submitted to the
enforced rule of tyrants and oligarchs. In this way, oratory is an essential tool for protecting the
democratic process. I am somewhat skeptical of this interpretation as Gorgias immediately follows
up the praise of oratory as a source freedom with its power for enslaving and exploiting other
nly source of freedom for mankind because the
ability to use speeches to persuade others is something that is unique to human beings. It should
also be noted that all three orators consistently emphasize oratory as something the practitioner
practices against other people, whether it is other experts, enemies, or the majority of people. This
is especially clear when Callicles urges Socrates to take up oratory as a means of defending oneself
against those who are eager to take him to prison or rob him of his property and rights within the
city (486a6 c3). Here Callicles emphasizes not the way that oratory secures freedom for the whole
of society, but for the individual person against others.
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example of someone who is deemed the most blessed by his society while having come by
his power through unjust means. He notes:
Why of course he s [Archelaus] unjust! The sovereignty which he now holds
doesn t belong to him at all, given the fact that his mother was a slave of
Alcetas, Perdiccas brother. By rights he was a slave of Alcetas, and if wanted
to do what s just, he d still be a slave to Alcetas, and on your reasoning would
be happy. As it is, how marvelously miserable he s turned out to be, now
that he s committed the most heinous crimes (471a4 b1).
The most interesting claim here is the suggestion that injustice is a means for social
mobility. If we abide by conventional morality and the traditional codes of conduct, then
we would forever be confined to our fortune and social circumstances. Archelaus
willingness and the ability to achieve injustice has now taken him from pauper to King. If
we take seriously the idea that oratory is an essential tool for accomplishing injustice, then
we can draw the similar conclusion that the orators also see their discipline as a means of
transforming one s station in life. On this picture, oratory is seen as an instrument for
subverting traditionally defined social roles and duties, and in turn it alters that to which
we are appropriately entitled.
These ideas culminate in a dramatic confrontation between Socrates and Callicles. The
introduction of Callicles delivers us with one of the most memorable personalities in the
Platonic corpus. Callicles provides the orators with a much needed theoretical defence for
the views advocated thus far. With Callicles, we learn not only the goals and power of
oratory, but on what basis we ought to pursue the kind of life endorsed by the orators. As
Socrates remarks a little later, the central issue between them is: what it is I m to devote
myself to, and in what way I might come by

(488a5 6). Is it the life of oratory-politics?

Or is it the life of philosophy? (500c3 d4).
The foundation of Callicles defence turns on a familiar distinction between phusis (nature)
and nomos (convention), the latter include both legally enacted laws and the wider set of
customs and social conventions. Callicles chastises Socrates for failing to make explicit the
difference between what is just by nature and what is just by nomos:
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I believe that the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many.
They do this, and they assign praise and blame with themselves and their
own advantage in mind. They re afraid of the more powerful among men,
the ones who are capable of having a greater share (pleon echein), and so
they say that getting more than one s share is shameful and unjust and
that doing what s unjust is trying to get more than one s share. They do this
so that those people won t get a greater share than they. I think they like
getting an equal share, since they are inferior. These are the reasons why
trying to get a greater share than most is said to be unjust and shameful by
law and why they call it doing what s unjust. But I believe that nature itself
reveals that it s a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to
have a greater than the worse man and less capable man (483b4 d2).
To begin with, the language of pleon echein (outdoing, overreaching, the desire to have
more) recalls that of Thrasymachus.114 Like Thrasymachus, Callicles sees conventional
justice as a form of restraint.115 He argues that legally enacted laws and the basis on which
we assign praise and blame are simply means of controlling the stronger few by the weaker
majority. The terms stronger and weaker are measured with respect to one s ability to
get more than one s share, intelligence in the affairs of the city, and the courage to do
whatever one sees fit (491b1 4). On this view, the weaker Many relies on laws, shame, and
education to curb the pleonexia of the stronger few, and to mold them into adopting the set
of behaviours and actions prescribed by conventional morality (483e4 484a2). They do so
in fear of being dominated by the stronger few. In contrast, nature shows that what is just
is for the stronger to have a greater share. Callicles points out, everywhere we look, among
other animals and in whole cities and races of men (483d3 4), the stronger prevails over
the weak (483d5 6). In this way, Callicles shows that oratory and its way of life is just
according to nature. In particular, oratory allows the stronger few to attain political power
so they can rise above the constraints placed upon them by nomos and rule the many
according to the law of nature (483e3).
Another important element of Callicles worldview fills out this picture. At first, it is not
precisely clear of what the stronger should have a greater share. However, a little further in
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See Barney (2004) on the important similarities and differences between Thrasymachus and
Callicles.
115
-depth discussion of justice, particularly its relationship to order
(kosmos) at 504aff, justice is understood between all parties as abiding by the laws, and in
ee especially 479a5 e6.
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the argument, Callicles is revealed to be committed to a strong version of hedonism

the

view that the pleasant and the good are the same (495a2 6). Socrates asks whether those
who are deemed the stronger by Callicles ought to rule themselves, in addition to ruling the
Many (491d4 6). By rule, Socrates clarifies, he means being temperate and self-controlled,
ruling one s appetites and pleasures (491d8 9). To this, Callicles responds that it would be
miserable for those who are free to enjoy good things to restrain themselves with the law
of the

(492b5 8). And in the fact, the goal of life and what ultimately constitutes

happiness is not to restrain our appetites. Rather, it is to let them become as large as possible
and to procure the means of fulfilling them (492d5 e1). The goal for the stronger and the
more intelligent few then will be to have a greater share of pleasure for pleasure sake:
having as much flow in as possible (494b1 2).
These considerations outline the major characteristics of oratory according to Gorgias,
Polus, and Callicles. In particular, I underscored the idea that all three orators share to some
extent the view that oratory is a means for gaining political power and thus allowing one to
break free from the constraints of society. I close this section by considering a possible
response to the orators on the value of freedom from the Lysis.
Socrates: [I]n those areas where we really understand (phronimoi)
something
will trust us, and there we will act just as we choose,
and nobody will want to get in our way. There we will be free ourselves, and
in control of others. There things will belong to us, because we will derive
some benefit from them. But in areas where we haven t got any intelligence
(nous), no one will trust us to act as we judge best, but everybody will do
their best to stop
there we are going to be subject to the orders of
others; there things are not going to be ours because we are not going to
derive any benefit from them (210a9 c4, emphasis mine).116
Here we find Socrates warning Lysis against the exact sort of lessons that the orators would
have unduly imparted on impressionable youths much like Lysis himself. Just before this
passage, Socrates makes a point of showing that at first, we might believe that happiness is
incompatible with a life of servitude to the orders of others and being forbidden from doing
whatever one likes (207d 209a). However, as Socrates takes care to demonstrate in the
116

We have briefly encountered this passage in Chapter 1, section 4.2. There, I highlighted the
general structure of passages of this type, here I focus on its content.
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above passage, such a limited interpretation of freedom and happiness is misguided. Just as
we would submit to the orders of a doctor when we are ill rather than letting ourselves do
whatever we like (209e6 210a8), being subject to the epistemic authority of others in areas
where we lack understanding is beneficial and contributes to our well-being. Freedom from
the rule of others is not in and of itself desirable if we cannot derive any benefit from the
things we are pursuing and the matters about which we are deliberating. And we can only
derive such benefits, Socrates argues, through either possession of the relevant
understanding required for judging what is beneficial and harmful ourselves or to entrust
others who has expertise in such matters.
This lesson to the young Lysis illustrates the central tension Plato depicts between Socrates
and the orators in the Gorgias. What is the key to general happiness? Is it the commitment
to the rule of knowledge or the unbridled freedom to pursue whatever one sees fit? As we
will see below, Socrates criticizes oratory precisely on the grounds that it pursues the things
it does (wealth, power, especially pleasure) without having first investigated their nature
and cause (501a1 2). Though oratory may be the source of freedom for mankind itself and
the source of rule over others (452d6 7), it lacks the kind of understanding necessary for
determining whether what it accomplishes is really beneficial or harmful. And thus it is
suggested, the rule of knowledge should always take precedence over unbridled freedom.

4.2. Oratory as a Threat to Political Rule and Expertise
At the centre of Socrates critique of oratory is the revelation that, despite what the orators
claim, oratory is not a craft, but belongs to a form of flattery called empeiria

an experience

based practice or knack (463b4).117 According to Socrates, there are two kinds of crafts, those
that aim at the body (medicine and gymnastics) and those that aim at the soul (justice and
legislation), the latter two constituting the two parts of the political craft (politikê) (464b2

117

empeiria

capture the pejorative sense in which Socrates is using the term. In addition, I do not think that
Plato is setting up technê as purely theoretical and therefore opposed to empeiria. Rather, I believe
that referring to a practice as an empeiria implies that it is based on mere experience.
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8). Medicine is said to be a counterpart to justice while gymnastics is a counterpart to
legislation

(464b7 8).

The

division

here

between

medicine/justice

and

gymnastics/legislation seems to be distinguishing between those crafts that perform a
corrective function in restoring the conditions of the soul and body and those crafts that
maintain and regulate their conditions. The flattering knacks, on the other hand, appear
craft-like (464b3) by masking itself with each of the parts of the genuine crafts (464c6 d1).
Oratory imitates justice, while pastry-baking imitates medicine, sophistry to legislation, and
cosmetics to gymnastics:
Crafts

Knacks

Soul:
Political
Craft
(politikê)

Body:
Unnamed

Soul:
Flattery
(kolakeia)

Body:
Flattery

Justice

Medicine

Oratory

Pastry
Baking

Legislation

Gymnastics

Sophistry

Cosmetics

On this picture, genuine crafts are those practices that provide care for the body and soul
with a view towards what is best (pros to beltiston, 464c4), in particular the best state of the
body and soul (464a2). They are based on knowledge and therefore able to provide the
nature and causes of the objects they care for and the means by which they care for them
(465a2 5, 501a3). In contrast, knacks imitate genuine crafts by aiming at what appears to be
the best (464a3 b1), namely pleasure. They are based on guessing rather than knowledge.
Knacks have not investigated the nature and cause of pleasure (501a3 6) and whether it is
good for the objects they serve. And thus they proceed without discrimination and produce
pleasure based on the memory of what customarily ha

(501a6 b1).

characterization of oratory as a knack reveals some of the dangers posed by the
practice. For starters, oratory has discovered a device for effectively persuading the
Athenian populous (459b6 c2): pleasure. Given the

natural cleverness at dealing

with people and their strengths in estimating the psychological forces that make people feel
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pleased (463a6 b1), the orators succeed in persuading the citizens in the affairs of the city
without possessing any relevant expertise. That oratory poses a threat to political rule,
especially the corrective part performed by the craft of justice, is manifest in Socrates
division above. As Socrates puts it, oratory is an image (eidôlon) of the craft of justice
(463d1 2). But how precisely does oratory imitate justice? And what is it about oratory s
production of pleasure that makes it such a threat to the task of true political craft?
I want to suggest that what makes oratory especially dangerous in Plato s eyes is that it
directly challenges the architectonic structure at the heart of his conception of political rule.
I shall present evidence for why we should construe true political craft in the Gorgias as an
architectonic form of knowledge in the next section. In this section, I focus on the specific
ways in which oratory undermines the expertise of ordinary craftsmen.118 The upshot of my
argument is this. Oratory makes speeches about what appears to be good to the Athenian
public but in fact those speeches are designed to gratify their the

desire for pleasure.

The content of these speeches concerns the affairs of the city and how it is to be wellmanaged (491b1 2). In particular, I argue, they primarily concern decisions that belong to
the proper domains of ordinary craftsmen. Rather than preserving their expertise and
utilizing them towards producing the good condition of the citizens (as an architectonic
conception of political rule would do), oratory corrodes the authority of ordinary crafts and
subordinates them under its rule for the sake of promoting injustice.119 In doing so, oratory
orients the Athenian citizens away from what is in fact good for them towards what appears
good, namely, pleasure and the gratification of their bodily appetites. In this way, I suggest
that oratory disrupts Plato s vision of an orderly society that sees the rule of knowledge as
its fundamental fabric.

118

I briefly presented this idea back in Chapter 1, section 4.2. Here I focus on developing it in more
detail.
119
In characterizing oratory as threatening the expertise of ordinary crafts and thereby challenging
the function reserved for an architectonic conception of political rule, I do not mean to suggest that
only function. Indeed, the Gorgias also depicts oratory as being practiced in the
courts to defend oneself and in general matters of dealing with people, such as in private business
(484d2 5). However, I wish to show that it is this threat oratory poses to ordinary expertise in the
political setting that makes the practice especially harmful for Plato. And as I shall demonstrate
below, this picture is confirmed in the refutation of Gorgias.
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The idea that oratory threatens the authority of ordinary expertise is most clearly expressed
in the refutation of Gorgias, in a discussion (455b 456a) concerning the kind of advice that
orators offer in city meetings.120 Socrates begins by giving us some examples of the kind of
decisions that take place in the these meetings. They involve the appointment of expert
craftsmen (e.g. doctors and shipbuilders), specific concerns about wall-building, equipping
the harbors and dockyards, and decisions in the military such as the selection of generals,
the organization of troops against enemies or an occupied territory (455b2 c3). Here,
Socrates highlights for us that the affairs of the city (491b1) are primarily concerned with
practical and concrete decisions about what to do in the knowledge and skills of other
craftsmen. Socrates argues that in these matters, it is usually the relevant craftsman who
gives speeches and advises the city.121 However, Gorgias quickly points out that it in fact the
orators whose opinions succeed:
Well, Socrates, I ll try to reveal to you clearly everything oratory can
accomplish. You yourself led the way nicely, for you do know, don t you, that
these dockyards and walls of the Athenians and the equipping of the harbor
came about through the advice of Themistocles and in some cases through
that of Pericles, but not through that of the
whenever those
craftsmen you were just now speaking of are appointed, Socrates, you see
that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on these
matters prevail (455d6 456a3).
He concludes that oratory encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything
that can be

(456a7 8).122 Gorgias offers us a closer look at the kind of

influence past successful orator-politicians have held over the city. It is through their power

120

This is also where we are presented with the best extensive discussion of the content of the
orato
orator-politician are those who are intelligent about the affairs of the city, and about the way it is to
be well managed (491b1 2). A little earlier, he suggests that those who pursue oratory and the life of
5).
The relevant craftsmen advise the city on the basis of their expertise, but as I will bring out in
this interpretation, their advice is not absolutely authoritative, as the true political ruler will
ultimately decide how their advice can best serve the city. In contrast to the orators, the true
political ruler is not contentious towards ordinary expertise, but rather preserves them and brings
them towards serving their ultimate goal of benefitting the citizens.
121

122
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of persuasion that these specialized matters of the city were decided. It is always the
views that wins over any individual expert:
Many a time I ve gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some
sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform
surgery or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade
him, I succeeded, by means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain
too that if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and
had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over
which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn t make any
showing at all, but the one who had the ability to speak would be appointed,
if he so wished. And if he were to compete with any other craftsmen
whatever, the orator more than anyone else would persuade them that they
should appoint him, for there isn t anything that the orator couldn t speak
more persuasively about to a gathering than could any other craftsmen
whatever. That s how great the accomplishment of this craft is, and the sort
of accomplishment it is! (456b1 c7, emphasis mine)
Gorgias is careful to downplay the hostility oratory poses to medicine here by adding that
the orator could appoint himself as the doctor only if he wished (456c2). He immediately
qualifies this praise with the warning that the orator should use his skill justly and only
against enemies and wrongdoers (4562 457a2). Putting aside the question of whether
Gorgias defence of the just use of oratory is successful or sincere, for our purposes, these
passages reveal that the orators do compete with ordinary experts often and are always
successful whenever they choose to do so.123
So how precisely does oratory win over ordinary craftsmen? And why is this considered a
bad thing? As Socrates pressures Gorgias to reveal, the orators are only able to be
successfully persuasive in large gatherings among those who don t have knowledge
(459a3 4). The orators best specialized experts by making themselves appear more
knowledgeable than an actually knowledgeable person (459b6 c2). In particular, they do so
by making speeches that gratify the appetitive desires of the Athenians. Jessica Moss has
helpfully argued that the kind of pleasure oratory elicits in the masses is the pleasure of
having one s judgements of what is good and bad affirmed.124 The orators approve and
disapprove of the same things as the masses and in doing so, they praise the masses
123
124

Moss (2007), especially section III.
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judgements of value.125 And this kind of praise, Moss suggests, may satisfy what is attributed
to the spirted part of the soul in the Republic as the desire for honour and esteem. It may
also encourage the masses pursuit of the things they already value and thus the orators
praise indirectly gratifies the masses desire for ordinary pleasures like wealth and excess.
Lastly, the masses are easily gratified by this method because they fail to distinguish
between what is pleasant and what is best for themselves.126
We can extend Moss view to the way in which orators succeed in defeating the craftsmen
when it comes to giving advice on specialized matters in political gatherings. The orators
give speeches that approve and disapprove of the same things as the Athenian people. For
instance, one may advise the selection of a specific general by praising the qualities admired
by the masses such as brashness, intemperance, and aggressiveness. Or one can encourage
specific building projects by appealing to the fears of the masses, and thus soothing their
anxieties about certain perceived threats. The orators can also succeed in making patients
take or refuse medication on the basis of rewarding the patients own (mis)conceptions of
health. In these sorts of ways, the orators please their audience on the basis of affirming
their judgements of value. And in doing so, they succeed in persuading the masses because
the latter mistakenly believe that whatever please them are services and benefits (522b5
6).
Ordinary craftsmen, on the other hand, advise on the basis of their expertise. This advice
will often be unpopular, running counter to the values and opinions of the Many given the
gap in knowledge between ordinary people and experts. We can imagine that it is often
painful for the masses to have their mistaken beliefs corrected as it may dishonour their
judgements of what is good and bad. Furthermore, if the craftsmen advice succeed, the
masses will have to live with the decisions and outcomes that directly oppose their own
values. This adds another possible source of pain in that by submitting to the advice of
craftsmen, the masses will be (indirectly) discouraged from pursuing the things they value.

125

those who are alike him in the city (510b7 e8). The young aspiring tyrant becomes a friend of the
tyrant by accustoming himself to like and dislike the same things as the tyrant (510d4 9).
126
Moss, (2007), 243 244.
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Given the choice between the expert craftsmen who cause pain and the orators who produce
pleasure, and given that most people fail to distinguish between what is good and what
appears good (pleasure), the

advice will always prevail whenever they are in large

gatherings. This is especially the case in the Assembly where these affairs of the city are
deliberated and decided in front of the masses.
The corrosion of the authority of ordinary expertise is harmful because as Socrates explains
later, this kind of speeches
sake of promoting the

ones that gratify the citizens

slight the common good for the

own private good (50d10 503a1). Here, we can see the

tangible ways in which orators slight the common good. The orators actively interfere in
the practical decisions of the city without a view to what is best, as a true political ruler
would do by keeping in view the excellent condition of the citizens. Instead, the orators
keep in view their own private good, the attainment of political power and the gratification
of their appetites. This state of affairs engenders the disorganization and disorder of the
city. The affairs of the city are managed and decided according to whatever happens to
please the citizens own mistaken beliefs and values at the time, rather than according to
the dictates of craftsmanship.127 This will often lead to disastrous outcomes such as defeat
at war, ill-planned building projects, poverty, and gluttonous citizens.128 This is amplified
by the fact that the orators (driven by pleonexia) also intend to commit injustice against the
masses by exploiting their desire for pleasure in order to have a greater share themselves at
the cost of the masses having less. In this way, the orators obstruct the citizens from
receiving the kind of knowledge and advice that is beneficial for their welfare in order to
further their (the

own interests.

Moreover, the means by which the orators achieve their own private good contribute and
increase the disorder in the citizens souls. Rather than redirecting the citizens appetites
towards the truth and correcting their mistaken beliefs (517b5 c1), the

continue to

indulge them. In particular, they do so under the guise that they are after the citizens best
127

As we will see in section 4.4, craftsmanship is presented in the Gorgias as the cause of order and
absence of craftmanship is disorder.
128
This point is also made in the Phaedrus where Socrates argues that when a skilled orator, who
does not know the good from bad, employs his powers onto the city who knows no better either, it
will lead to disastrous consequences (260c6 d2).
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interests. This combination of actively harming the citizens through gratifying speeches and
the illusion that these speeches are beneficial makes the masses less open to be persuaded
by knowledge and reason.129 As Socrates puts it, whenever an orator is more persuasive than
a doctor, a non-knower will be more persuasive than a knower (459b3 5). Oratory thus
undermines the place of genuine expertise in society and most importantly, it makes the
citizens hostile towards the possibility of true political craft, which pays no attention to
what is gratifying but only what is best (521d8 e1). Continuous exposure to the
speeches, like continuous exposure to the pleasure of the pastry chef, leads to the
enlargement of the appetites of the masses. That is, they demand more gratifying speeches,
greater indulgence of their mistaken views, and see to it that those who please them are put
in positions of power. As Socrates describes in the leaky jar analogies (493a 494a), the
appetites in the corrupt soul become insatiable and require greater difficulty and toil to
procure their satisfiers. And this condition ultimately makes one miserable. The Gorgias
does not provide an extensive psychological profile of the inner experience of the disordered
soul, in particular, what makes his undisciplined and unjust soul so miserable.130 However,
we will see later, Socrates basis the good condition of the human soul on the orderliness of
the universe. And implicit in the suggestion here is that, contra Callicles, injustice is at odds
with nature.
To sum up, we have seen in this section that Socrates criticizes oratory and its way of life
on the basis that it is a knack, which provides and satisfies the apparent good, pleasure. In
Socrates division of the crafts, oratory is presented as a threat to true political rule

an

image of justice. I argued that the basis of this imitation lies in the way in which the orators
undermine the authority of ordinary expertise in the management of the affairs of the city.
Though the orators lack knowledge of the subject matter they are advising, their views
always prevail because they gratify the masses under the pretense that they are benefitting
them. This ultimately brings about and worsens the disorder in the city and its citizens. The
corrosion of genuine expertise for the sake of promoting injustice directly opposes the
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See Moss (2006) on the relationship between pleasure and illusion in Plato.
In contrast, for example, to the kind of detailed description of the inner turmoil of tyrannical
person we get in Republic Book IX.
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function assigned to true political craft, which I will argue below, is one that rules and uses
crafts for the sake of accomplishing justice.

4.3. Politics as Architectonic Knowledge
Towards the end of the dialogue, Socrates gives a memorable speech where he describes
himself as the only person who has ever taken up the true political craft (politikê technê)
and practiced true

(ta politika) (521d5 8). On the occasion that he does give

speeches, Socrates argues, they are always aimed at what is best rather than gratification
(521d8 e1). How should we understand the nature of this true politikê technê according to
the Gorgias?
The answer to this question, I suggest, begins with conceiving of political rule as
architectonic.131 The strongest evidence for this idea comes towards the end of Socrates
refutation of Callicles:
For my part, I believe you ve agreed many times and recognized that after all
this subject of ours has two parts, both in the case of the body and the soul.
The one part of it has the servient one, enabling us to provide our bodies
with food whenever they re hungry or with drink whenever they re thirsty,
and whenever they re cold, with clothes, wraps, shoes and other things our
bodies come to have an appetite for. I m purposely using the same examples
in speaking to you, so that you ll understand more easily. For these, I think
you agree, are the very things a shopkeeper, importer, or producer can
provide, a bread baker or pastry chef, a weaver or cobbler or tanner, so it
isn t at all surprising that such a person should think that such a person
should think himself and be thought by others to be a caretaker of the
body by everyone who doesn t know that over and above all these practices
there s a craft, that of gymnastics and medicine, that really does care for the
body and is entitled to rule all these crafts and use their products because of
its knowledge of what food or drink is good or bad for bodily excellence, a
131

In characterizing the true political craft as architectonic, I do not intend to suggest that the
methodologies and ethical commitments that are typically associated with the character/historical
Socrates are architectonic. Rather, my focus is to articulate the picture of political craft we get in
the Gorgias and what such a craft might look like if it is fully realized. The view of political craft
such a craft on the basis that his speeches aim at what is best rather than what is gratifying.
However, it should be emphasized that the nature of true politikê technê involves more than simply
making speeches that aim at what is best as evidenced by the passage I quote here at 517c7 518a5.
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knowledge which all of the others lack. That s why the other crafts are slavish
and servient and illiberal, and why gymnastics and medicine are by rights
mistresses over them. Now, when I say that these same things hold true of
the soul, too
7 518a5, emphasis mine).
Several things stand out to us in this passage. To begin with, Socrates characterizes the
bodily ruling crafts of gymnastics and medicine with the familiar language of use that we
encountered in the last chapter, especially in the Euthydemus. The basis of this rule is
medicine and gymnastics privileged knowledge of the sort of materials (food and drink)
that bring about bodily excellence. On the basis of their privileged knowledge, the ruling
crafts are the rightful users of the products of the lower crafts. In this iteration of
architectonic thinking, Plato incorporates the division of crafts introduced in the Gorgias,
between crafts that perform a regulatory role and ones that perform a corrective role. So for
instance, we might imagine that gymnastics prescribes the kind of diet that are appropriate
for a healthy body, to maintain its excellent condition. Whereas in the case of medicine,
doctors will prescribe a stricter regimen tailored for the specific purpose of curing the body
of its sickness and bringing it back to health. Similarly, legislation will be concerned with
enacting laws that preserve the excellent condition of the citizens whereas justice involves
giving punishment and speeches that are intended to remove corruption and injustice.
Though both practices are arms of the ruling craft, they work separately with distinct
focuses.
The next important point to note about this hierarchical arrangement of crafts is that
Socrates begins by listing a variety of subordinate crafts ranging from cooking and weaving
to cobblery and even pastry baking. These crafts are grouped together under the description
that they are the things our bodies come to have appetite (epithumia) for (517d4 5).132
Socrates inclusion of pastry baking is interesting here given that it is the bodily counterpart
to oratory and he has previously argued that both are knacks rather than crafts. This
inclusion might be pointing towards the possibility, hinted throughout the dialogue and
later developed in the Phaedrus, of a noble oratory that will suffice as a craft.133
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This claim seems to also confirm the core feature of crafts that I have been advancing: crafts are
services, which minister to our basic needs or help facilitate social and civic life.
133
For the possibility of a noble oratory, see 503a b and 517a.
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Socrates does not specify in the above passage how precisely medicine and gymnastics
might govern the subordinate crafts or what it means to use their products. However, as I
explored this theme in more depth in the last chapter, the user is characteristically
described in Plato as engaging in some kind of norm-issuing behaviour that provides
guidelines and sets limits on how the subordinate crafts are practiced. This typically
involves prescribing the appropriate materials, providing the right timing and right
circumstances for the activity of the lower crafts, and in general setting a target for
flourishing, in this case, the excellent condition of the bodies. Altogether, the task of the
bodily ruling crafts is to devise the material conditions of daily life with a view towards
promoting health. And it accomplishes this through the management of the skills and
knowledge of other craftsmen whose goals are subordinate but auxiliary to health.
At the end of the above passage, Socrates notes that these things hold true of the soul too
(518a5). That is, the two branches of the politikê technê, justice and legislation, are to govern
the relevant subordinate crafts in order to promote the excellent condition of the soul. This
gives us the clearest indication that true political craft is envisioned by Plato to be
architectonic in nature in the Gorgias as well. What might these subordinate crafts be? If
we take seriously the idea that oratory is an intimation of justice, and if I am right that it
does so by subordinating those craftsmen whose expertise make up the kind of
understanding required for the welfare of social and civic life, then we can draw the same
conclusion here about true politics as well. Politikê technê will also govern crafts like
generalship, wall-building, shipbuilding, but in a benevolent rather than competitive
manner.134
Going beyond these examples, we can imagine that, if fully realized, this politikê technê will
encompass a large and diverse collection of crafts that come to fill out a well-run society
designed to promote the flourishing of its citizens. Political rule may involve regulating the
crafts designed for cultivating the temperament of the citizens, like music and poetry as
outlined in the Republic. Or it might preside over a variety of subordinate crafts that are

134

I develop this in more detail in the next section.
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concerned with tool-making, conveyance, and defence according to the taxonomy of the
Politicus (Plt. 287d 288b). With true politikê technê at the helm, such a society may come
to tolerate and even see the need for oratory. In this noble version, oratory will not rival the
task performed by politikê technê, that is, it will not manage the affairs of city according to
what is just, but supports it through its knowledge of persuasion (Plt. 303e 304e). Oratory
will thus be relegated to its own area of expertise, which the Phaedrus suggests involves
something like the study of different types of soul and their receptiveness to different kinds
of speeches (Phdr. 271e 272b).135
The Gorgias however does not stop at this hierarchy. It argues that ultimately, the ruling
crafts of the soul will govern the ruling crafts of the body and everything else subordinate
to them. Socrates had previously expressed this commitment to the sovereignty of the soul
to Polus: if the soul didn t govern the body but the body governed itself, and if pastry baking
and medicine weren t kept under observation and distinguished by the soul then the world
described by Anaxagoras would be true, where all things would be mixed together in the
same

(465d5 7). The soul is not only distinct from the body but the excellence of the

soul is more teleologically superordinate than the excellence of the body, since it is the
former that determines how we will fare in this life and the next.136 We find this idea again
later in an extended discussion on the contrast between a modest craft like helmsmanship
and Callicles oratory (511c7 512d6). Contrary to the grand posturing of orators, the
helmsman understands the limits of his expertise. He has brought about the goal of his
craft preserving lives at sea

but remains agnostic as to whether that goal was ultimately

beneficial to those lives. For he s enough of an expert Socrates states to conclude that it
isn t clear which ones of his fellow voyagers he s benefited by not letting them drown in the
deep, and which ones he has

(511e6 8). To know this, he would need to know the

conditions of their souls (512a5 b1). Thus, the ultimate task of the true politikê technê is to
subordinate all crafts and use their products for the sake of promoting the excellent
condition of the souls of citizens.
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See Yunis (2008) for a useful analysis on the true craft of oratory in the Phaedrus and its
relationship to dialectic, philosophy, and the Gorgias.
136
This is illustrated in the closing myth of the dialogue on the judgements we face in the afterlife
(523a 527e).
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4.4. Order (kosmos) as a Normative Bedrock
If the nature of political rule is architectonic, then how precisely can such a craft deliver on
the promises attributed to justice in the dialogue, namely remove the soul of injustice, act
as a treatment against corruption, make people self-controlled (478e4 c2), and bring order
to their souls (504c1 d3)?137 Moreover, how does the nature of this rule differ from that of
oratory, especially in its relationship to ordinary crafts?
I address these questions in this section by starting with perhaps the most significant thing
we learn about the nature of crafts from the Gorgias, the idea that craftsmanship is the cause
of order (kosmos):
But surely we are good, both we and everything else that s good, when some
excellence (aretê) has come to be present in
the best way in which
the excellence of each thing comes to be present in it, whether it s that of an
artifact or of a body or a soul as well, or of any animal, is not just any old
way, but is due to whatever organization (taxis), correctness, and
craftsmanship is bestowed on each of
it s due to organization that
the excellence of each thing is something which is organized and has
order?...So it s when a certain order (kosmos tis), the proper one for each
thing, comes to be present in it that it makes each of the things there are
good?...So also a soul which has its own order is better than a disordered
one?...But surely one that has order is an orderly one?...And an orderly soul
is a self-controlled one?...So a self-controlled soul is a good one (506d2
507a2).138
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The Gorgias focuses almost exclusively on the corrective part of the political craft justice and
it is mostly silent on the topic of legislation. This focus seems to fit with the general bitter tone of
the dialogue: it depicts an entirely negative view of the Athenians as having been too long
corrupted by the orator-politicians. And hence the emphasis is on the removal of corruption, rather
than the maintenance and regulation of good citizens.
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I have edited out the translation of Socrates own response in place of Callicles for brevity sake.
The Greek here is complete:
,
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The claim that crafts are a means of bringing about order has been only alluded to in the
other dialogues we have looked at thus far, but here Socrates makes this idea explicit.
Moreover, he presents order as the basis for the concept of goodness. Just a few pages earlier,
Socrates attempts to persuade Callicles that order is a good-making feature in both
inanimate objects like boats and houses and in living things like the body and soul (504a
d). Later, Socrates bases the principles that determine the goodness of the soul by appealing
to the cosmic order:
Yes, Callicles, wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness,
self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men,
and that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, and not an
undisciplined world-disorder.139 I believe that you don t pay attention to
these facts, even though you re a wise man in these matters. You ve failed to
notice that proportionate equality has great power among both gods and
men, and you suppose that you ought to practice getting the greater share.
That s because you neglect geometry (507e6 508a8).
In all these passages, Socrates does not attempt to defend order as the basis for goodness
but simply takes it for granted as a founding principle that holds true for the universe and
all things within it. In this respect, we might say that order is presented as a normative
bedrock in the Gorgias. This being the case, we can now ask how does craftsmanship bring
about this order?
Socrates claims that a true craftsman does not proceed at random but always keeps in view
of something (pros ti) (503d7 e1). This something is the product (ergon) of his craft, that
which structures the craftsman s entire process. With a view to his product, the craftsman
can select and work with his materials not at random, but in a way so that he may bring
some shape (eidos) to them (503e1 5). He works by arranging everything he does according
to a certain organization (taxis), and compels one thing to be suited for another and to fit
to it until the entire object is put together in an organized and orderly

(503e5 504a2).

From Socrates remarks, we can interpret the nature of this order, whether it is present in
an artifact or in the universe, as a kind of structural arrangement where the different
139

he whole of this world by
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elements within it are organized in such a way that preserve or bring about its structural
integrity, or in other words, its excellent condition.140 On the other hand, disorder is the
kind of arrangement that is put together haphazardly. An arrangement of this kind or rather
a lack of arrangement disintegrates the entity s structural integrity and actively brings about
its eventual decay.
Socrates lists a few examples (housebuilders, shipwrights, and painters) that help us fill out
this picture. A good house, for instance, is one where we would ascribe certain features that
make it a good house. These might be the ability of the house to withstand environmental
factors, to last for a very long time, or its ability to provide comfortable shelter.141 These
features that are the basis for describing the house as good are the result of its internal
orderly arrangement, the kind that is appropriate for an object of this sort. A craftsman, as
we have seen, is described as someone who has studied the nature of the object he serves
and the means for serving them (465a2 5, 501a3). What these passages bring out in more
detail is that a craftsman is really someone who understands the internal orderly structure
of his product and the sort of materials and manner of composition that can accomplish
such a structure. And so when a housebuilder works, he keeps in view of well-built house,
which is a composite entity made up of various materials fitted in a certain way, and this
product acts as an organizing principle for everything the housebuilder does. From the
selection of wood and tools to the way he chooses to put them together, the housebuilder
acts for the sake of realizing the orderly arrangement of his product.
In the case of political rule, the true craftsman will also keep in view of his product: the
excellent condition of the souls of his citizens. What sets him apart from the orator is that
he knows what constitutes a good soul, namely the kind of orderly structural composition
that is appropriate for preserving and achieving its good condition, as opposed to merely
knowing what most people believe is good for their souls. And according to Socrates, a wellordered soul is the kind of structure that leads people to become law-abiding and orderly
140

For my discussion of order and the concept of goodness, I have drawn from White (2006).
the excellent
condition of something is the one that enables it to perform its characteristic function well. And
thus, what makes the orderly arrangement of a house a good one is that it enables the house to
provide shelter and do so well. However, we do not find an argument of such a sort until Republic I.
141

121
which in turn give rise to the virtues of justice and self-control (sophrosunê) respectively
(504d1 3). Now, we may ask what sort of things are being arranged by the political
craftsman?
Socrates language of one thing being fitted to another and the image of a well-ordered
soul as being constituted by a certain organization of its distinct elements naturally invite
the speculation that Socrates is speaking about the different parts of the soul. Indeed, some
have argued that Plato recognizes in the Gorgias the bipartition of the soul between reason
and desire.142 And thus, the task of the true political ruler would be to bring about the
harmonious state between reason and desire. Others have cautioned us against this reading.
John Cooper, for example, argues that the Gorgias does not advocate for the repression or
diversion of desires in light of what the agent knows to be good, thus supporting the view
of bipartition. Rather the dialogue only suggests that the appetites ought to be eliminated
or restrained so they are not disruptive.143
Putting the controversy of this issue aside, we can say that whichever position we take, the
ordering of the soul minimally requires the political ruler to redirect the appetites of
Athenians in a way that leads them to become better (517b5 c1). As we have seen, excessive
appetites, especially appetites for pleasure under the guise of the good supplied by the
orators, are responsible for the disorderliness of the soul. And thus, the goal of politikê
technê is to manage the appetites in a way that brings about the soul s orderly constitution.
The dialogue suggests a number of things that are needed in order to achieve this goal. First,
it involves administering some form of discipline (kolazein) onto unjust souls, such as
paying one s due and even undergoing physical punishments (476a7 8, 480c8d3). Second,
all forms of flattery must be avoided and we must ensure that oratory and every other
activity is always to be used in support of what s just (527c3 4). Finally, as Socrates makes
clear in his proclamation as the true political craftsman, it involves making speeches that
aim at what is best rather than what is gratifying (521d8 e1).
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It is useful now to return to our account of politikê technê as an architectonic form of
knowledge. I shall demonstrate that such an interpretation can fulfill the things listed
above. Recall that an architectonic conception of political rule is one that subordinates all
crafts and uses their products to promote the excellent condition of the soul. It s corrective
branch

the craft of justice will prescribe the kind of cure that corrects the excessive

appetites for pleasure bred in the Athenians by the orators. The task of appetite correction,
I submit, begins with restoring the place of genuine expertise in society. Rather than
affirming their judgements of value as the orator-politician would do, the architectonic ruler
submits the Athenians under the rule of knowledge. This ensures that the affairs of the city
are governed not according to whatever pleases the soul, but according to what is best. By
preserving the authority of genuine craftsmen, the true ruler ensures that every aspect of
the citizens lives are performed by those with the relevant expertise. It protects the masses
against the harms caused by the deception and malpractice of non-craftsmen.144
This kind of appetite correction constitutes a kind of discipline because it severs one major
source of the masses pleasure, the affirmation of their values based on incorrect beliefs. On
this kind of discipline, Socrates notes:
Now, isn t it also true that doctors generally allow a person to fill up his
appetites, to eat when he s hungry, for example, or drink when he s thirsty
as much as he wants to when he s in good health, but when he s sick they
practically never allow him to fill himself with what he has an appetite
for?...And isn t it just the same way with the soul, my excellent friend? As
long as it s corrupt, in that it s foolish, undisciplined, unjust and impious, it
should be kept away from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything
other than what will make it
isn t keeping it away from what it
has an appetite for, disciplining it? (505a6 b9).
The architectonic ruler thus restrains the masses appetites by preventing them from being
gratified by the orator-politicians speeches, and it does so by orienting their appetites
towards the truth. Following this step of reinstating genuine expertise, the most important

144

This feature is what made knowledge of knowledge initially attractive to Socrates as a
candidate for political rule in the Charmides. Though this condition does not suffice as happiness,
ensuring that those who are in charge of some area of expertise are genuine craftsmen remains an
important preliminary step.
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and distinctive task of the architectonic ruler is to govern the activities of the lower crafts
with an eye towards what is ultimately good for the soul.
As we saw in section 4.3, Socrates envisions the two branches of politics, justice and
legislation, as the rightful ruler of all crafts in light of their privileged knowledge of what is
good and bad for the soul. Like the housebuilder, the political craftsman looks to his final
product, a well-ordered soul, and uses the products of the subordinate crafts like the
housebuilder relies on his materials and tools, in order to devise the life of his citizens in a
way that is conducive to moderating and restraining their appetites. In doing so, he will
provide guidelines on how subordinate crafts are practiced, decide when it is best to act,
and provide the right target for action. In addition, the political craftsman can ban all forms
of flattery or moderate their practice by orienting them towards benefitting the soul. Will
oratory and its bodily counterpart pastry-baking be included in a society whose goal is to
produce flourishing citizens? If so, under what circumstances? What kind of military
personnel and building projects will be ultimately of service to the stability and health of
the city? And how can these matters be decided with the virtues of justice and self-control
of the citizens in view?145 This is what Socrates has in mind, I suggest, when he claims that
one must ensure that oratory and every other activity should always be used in support of
justice (527c3 4).
This manner of rule stands in contrast to the competitive way in which orator-politicians
relate to the subordinate crafts. Rather than attempting to win over the craftsmen as the
orators would do, the true political ruler preserves their expertise and furthers their practice
so that their expertise and products can be used to promote the common good. If fully
realized, an architectonic conception of political rule can remove the soul of injustice by
bringing order to the appetites of the masses. It does so by providing the correct account of
the good towards which all other life-shaping arrangements are made. And this correct
account of the good serves as a target for the ruling craftsman to shape his citizens by
arranging the practical, social, and political aspects of their lives with an eye towards
145

At times Socrates seems extremely critical towards previous politicians for filling the city with
harbours, dockyards, and tribute payments. But at 519a, he seems to suggest that what he takes
and self-
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correcting their disorderly appetites. Eventually, if the citizens are no longer corrupted,
then the Gorgias seems open to the idea that the political ruler can arrange the lives of the
masses by training them to take pleasure in the right things (500a4 6).
The Gorgias remains somewhat ambiguous as to how true politikê technê will implement
this program onto the masses. At 517b, Socrates notes that in redirecting the city s appetites
and getting the citizens to become better, one can use persuasion or constraint (517b6).
This passage leaves open several possibilities. The political craftsman can implement the
genuine craft of oratory (one that has been alluded to throughout the dialogue) to persuade
the masses, especially in political gatherings, to vote in favour of decisions that will
ultimately benefit them. It can also rely on noble oratory to persuade the Athenians towards
adopting the correct conception of the good, thereby submitting them to another type of
persuasion, one that provides conviction with knowledge (454e3 4). Or, if we give priority
to Socrates claim that he is the only one who practices true politics, then perhaps the
dialogue envisions something more personal. The political craftsman can implement its
program by relying on the elenchus, where corrupt souls are submitted to a series of
questions that expose their incorrect beliefs. Lastly, if it is necessary, the Gorgias seems open
to the idea of a kind of autocracy, a constitution that enforces its governance without the
direct input of its citizens.

4.5. Conclusion
I began this chapter with the aim of demonstrating that the Gorgias also presents us with
an architectonic view of political rule. In doing so, I explored the crucial context against
which this view is presented

the value and practice of oratory. I argued that for the orators,

their discipline is seen as a source of power and freedom. For Socrates, oratory is rejected
on the basis that it undermines the place of expertise in society for the sake of committing
injustice. In this way, oratory directly challenges the nature of the true political craft. In this
iteration of architectonic knowledge, the Gorgias incorporates explicitly the distinction
between body and soul and between regulative and corrective crafts. The dialogue also
introduces to us an important connection between craftmanship and order. On the picture,
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the true political craftsman uses and guides the practice of subordinate crafts in order to
provide the orderly constitution of the soul.
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Conclusion

I began this thesis with the goal of investigating the relationship between
of craft (technê) and virtue, as it appears in his early dialogues. The overarching aim of my
not been previously appreciated. In this conclusion, I consider two outstanding issues.
First, I reflect on the question of whether virtue can be called a craft proper for Plato.
Second, I discuss how I see the two parts of the thesis fitting together and how they reflect

To begin with, is virtue a craft for Plato? Over the course of this thesis, I do not directly
answer this question nor do I argue for this claim without qualification. My main
motivation for doing so is that I do not believe that it is particularly useful to think along
these lines. That is, it is not useful to think of virtue and craft as rigid concepts, each with
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that we can rely on for the sake of identifying
one with the other. This thesis has advocated for the importance of the idea of craft to the
way that Plato thinks about, inquires after, and articulates various complex features of
virtue, including political rule. In doing so, I have emphasized the flexibility and the
contextual diversity in which craft sho
conceiving of virtue as a craft is illuminating for Plato, rather than limiting. As I noted in
the introduction of this thesis, technê for the ancient world refers to the systematic
application of human intelligence to some particular field. And to a large extent, Plato
preserves this meaning. Because he considered so many activities and skills as examples of
such an application of human intelligence, he could observe them and see how human
intelligence can be applied to the ultimate question of how to live well, which for him is
concerned with what is good and bad. This being said, I think it is appropriate to call
virtue and the sort of knowledge fit for political rule a craft proper only if we keep in mind
of a rich conception of craft, particularly the one I advocated for in the origins view in
Chapter 2.
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n one single dialogue. This
challenge is most present in the question of how Plato understands the value of ordinary
crafts. Sometimes he seems to speak of their deficiencies while at other times, he is
committed to their good-directness without qualification. Ultimately, my answer to this
question was that ordinary crafts are benefit-

-

-neutral simply understood. Rather, ordinary
crafts have a built-in notion of service, as something discovered for the sake of improving
human life, whether this is to meet our basic needs or to facilitate our social and civic life.
However, in trying to account for this tendency in Plato to present the crafts in conflicting
terms, I found it useful to see that Plato is engaged in two related, but different
philosophical projects. Thus I have organized the thesis to reflect these two projects. The
first half of this thesis focuses on how Plato relies on the idea of craft and various ordinary
examples as a model for virtue, while the second half of this thesis examines
account of political rule relates to ordinary crafts not as a model but as fields of expertise.
When he is thinking about the crafts as a model for virtue, Plato tends to focus on their
positive and even idealized features. He does so because he is trying articulate what all
organized applications of human intelligence have in common and how they can be useful
for developing an organized technê of the human and social kind, as Socrates puts it in the
Apology.
However, in the course of trying to articulate the nature of virtue, Plato has to confront
the issue of how virtue, as a branch of knowledge, relates to other branches of knowledge.
This is not the approach that most ancient philosophers take. Aristotle, for example,
makes it clear that crafts are concerned with production, while virtue is concerned with
action. So while Aristotle is happy to compare virtue with craft, such as in the acquisition
of virtue, he is clear that they operate in two distinct provinces. In contrast to Aristotle,
Plato rejected the separation of the sciences and held a single view of the Good. And thus,
there is a tension between seeing both ordinary crafts and virtue as a kind of expertise. As
I noted in Chapter 3, one main question that drives Plato towards architectonic thinking
(and perhaps even towards a more political conception of virtue) is the question of how
virtue can remain sovereign in guiding our lives in the face of other experts. On this
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question, virtue is ultimately concerned with what is good and bad for a human being and
this is superordinate to all other human pursuits. From this perspective, Plato hones in on
the limitations of ordinary crafts and why in his view, they ought to be subordinated
under the rule of virtue, particularly wisdom and justice. By seeing Plato as serving two
distinct, though overlapping, philosophical goals, we can account for some of the
discrepancies in his view.
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